Daniel Weaver v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2014 HRTO 82

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Daniel Weaver

Applicant

-and-

Criminal Injuries Compensation Board

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel

Date: January 20, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 82

Indexed as: Weaver v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Daniel Weaver, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1The applicant filed an Application alleging that the respondent discriminated against him contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). Specifically, the applicant claimed that the respondent, Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (“Board”), discriminated against him when it denied his claim to compensation. The applicant filed a claim with the Board claiming compensation for alleged abuse when his mother used drugs during her pregnancy. The Board found that it did not have jurisdiction over the applicant’s claim because he was an unborn child at the time of his alleged injury.

2On January 6, 2014, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application (“NOID”) on the basis that the Application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination. The Notice also advised that the Application appeared to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction due to the application of the doctrine of judicial immunity. The NOID directed that the applicant provide submissions in response to these two issues.

3The applicant provided submissions in response to the NOID. Among other things, the applicant provided links to various human rights and other websites. He also provided a copy of a Statement of Claim issued in a proceeding he commenced against the Children’s Aid Society. Finally, he also provided a copy of an excerpt from the Bible.

Analysis

4The Tribunal will only dismiss an Application at a preliminary stage where it is plain and obvious that the Application is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

5I find that it is plain and obvious that the Application is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction due to the application of the doctrine of judicial immunity.

6The doctrine of judicial immunity prohibits legal proceedings against judicial and quasi-judicial actors that are based on their actions as adjudicators or decision-makers. The doctrine is rooted in the principle of judicial independence, the purpose of which is to ensure that judicial and quasi-judicial actors are free to execute their decision-making duties with independence and without fear of consequences. See Taucar v. University of Western Ontario, 2013 HRTO 597, Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered, 2009 HRTO 2180, and Cartier v. Nairn, 2009 HRTO 2208.

7This Tribunal has held that the Board is a quasi-judicial decision maker to which the doctrine of judicial immunity applies. See McWilliams v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2010 HRTO 937, and Zubiak v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2010 HRTO 2236.

8The applicant is seeking to challenge a decision made by the Board with respect to his claim to benefits. This decision is a quasi-judicial decision to which the doctrine of adjudicative immunity applies. Therefore, it is plain and obvious that the Application is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and must be dismissed.

Order

9For the reasons set out above, this Application is dismissed.