HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Hardeep Sidhu
Applicant
-and-
Peel Regional Police
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Maureen Doyle
Indexed as: Sidhu v. Peel Regional Police
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Hardeep Sidhu, Applicant
Self-represented
Introduction
1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to provision of services because of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin and creed, contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2The Application was filed on February 6, 2014 and indicates that the date of the last incident was November 4, 2008.
3On February 25, 2014, the Tribunal sent a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) to the applicant, indicating that it appears the Application is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because it was filed more than a year after the last incident of alleged discrimination, that the applicant did not appear to have cited facts that constitute “good faith”, and because the Application failed to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondent.
4The NOID provided the applicant with the opportunity to make written submissions responding to the above-noted jurisdictional issues.
5The applicant has now responded with his written submissions.
BACKGROUND
6The applicant states that he was arrested and charged with domestic violence and was taken to a police division station on November 3, 2008. He alleges that he was kept in a holding cell there overnight and that a police officer there assaulted and threatened him. He alleges that the police officer grabbed him by the shirt, swore at him and said “If you ever touch that woman again I will not leave you” and pushed him “to the ground violently”.
7In his Application, he states that he did not “apply earlier as I was very much mentally affected by that event and related subsequent events and I did not know about my rights until very recently”.
8In the written submissions he provided in response to the NOID, the applicant restates the above-noted explanation from his Application. He also states that he was “stressed and depressed” and that he was “dealing with a criminal case until July 2013”, was “serving a sentence until July 2013”, had brought his allegations to his lawyer’s attention several days after the events, and submits that he was not aware of a deadline for filing his Application.
ANALYSIS
9An Application will only be dismissed at a preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the Application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
10Section 34 of the Code provides:
(1)If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part 1 have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) Within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) If there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2)A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
11The applicant does not dispute that his Application fails to meet the one year requirement set out in section 34(1), but he relies on section 34(2) in submitting an explanation for the delay in filing his Application. Though the applicant does not state it explicitly, he appears to argue that it was filed in good faith.
12His explanations are essentially that he was incarcerated for a period of time, he was unaware of his rights under the Code and he was “depressed”.
13The Tribunal has found that ignorance of one’s rights under the Code does not constitute good faith within the meaning of s. 34(2) of the Code. See for example Lutz v. Toronto (City), 2009 HRTO 1137 and Winston v. University Health Network, 2011 HRTO 1648. These cases indicate that it is not enough for applicants to show that they were ignorant of their rights under the Code, but that they must also show that they had no reason to make enquiries about those rights. The applicant has not made submissions which would indicate he had no reason to make enquiries about his rights under the Code.
14The applicant’s submissions regarding his incarceration are not fulsome and it is not at all clear for what period of time the applicant says he was incarcerated, indicating only that he was “serving a sentence until July 2013”. Further, it is not clear why during any period when he was incarcerated, he was prevented from filing an Application. Nor is it clear why he waited until February 6, 2014 to file his Application and why he did not file his Application sooner following his release from prison in July 2013.
15The applicant submits that he was “depressed”. In some cases, an applicant has been able to establish that a personal characteristic included as a ground of discrimination under the Code is closely connected to his failure to file his Application on time (see for example Kelly v. CultureLink Settlement Services, 2010 HRTO 977). It is not necessary for me to consider whether this assertion, without more, is sufficient indication that the applicant would be able to establish a good faith reason for the delay in filing his Application, as I find that that this Application should be dismissed on a preliminary basis for the reasons set out below.
16Upon review of the Application and the applicant’s submissions, in my view it is plain and obvious that the Application fails to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondent.
17As the allegations have no connection to the grounds of discrimination the applicant has claimed, I am satisfied that it is plain and obvious that this Application raises no potential Code claim and therefore is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and must be dismissed for that reason.
Dated at Toronto, this 2nd day of June, 2014.
“Signed by”
Maureen Doyle
Vice-chair

