de Koning v. St. Louis Bar and Grill Cityplace, 2014 HRTO 561

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Stephanie de Koning

Applicant

-and-

St. Louis Bar and Grill Cityplace, James (Jim) Soutar, and Julia Anderson

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Ken Bhattacharjee

Date: April 22, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 561

Indexed as: de Koning v. St. Louis Bar and Grill Cityplace

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Stephanie de Koning, Applicant

Self-represented

1The purpose of this Interim Decision is to deal with the applicant’s request for production of information from a non-party.

2The organization respondent, which is a bar and restaurant, employed the applicant and the two individual respondents.

3On October 9, 2013, the applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), against the respondents. Among other things, she alleged that the individual respondent, James (Jim) Soutar, was criminally convicted of assaulting her.

4In support of her Application, the applicant attached a Probation Order, which indicated that Mr. Soutar has been convicted of assault, and an Undertaking Given to a Peace Officer or an Officer in Charge, which indicated that Mr. Soutar had undertook, among other things, to notify Detective D.B. of the Toronto Police Service (“TPS”) of any change in his address.

5In her Application, the applicant provided the address of the organization respondent as the address for all the respondents.

6On January 14, 2014, the Tribunal sent the Application to each of the respondents at the address of the organization respondent.

7On January 30, 2014, the Tribunal received a letter from the organization respondent, which stated that it was returning the Application sent to Mr. Soutar at its address because Mr. Soutar was no longer employed by it and was not being represented by it in this proceeding.

8On February 3, 2014, the Tribunal sent the applicant a letter requiring her to confirm the address for delivery for Mr. Soutar.

9On February 14, 2014, the applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings (“RFOP”), which requested that the Tribunal order the TPS to produce the current address of Mr. Soutar. The applicant stated that she had contacted Detective D.B. of the TPS about this matter, and he had informed her that the TPS would need an order from the Tribunal to produce Mr. Soutar’s current address. Neither the respondents nor the TPS filed a Response to the RFOP.

10Pursuant to the Code and the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal has the authority and power to order the production of documents, information or things from both parties and non-parties in a proceeding before it.

11Sections 40 and 41 of the Code provide that the Tribunal shall dispose of applications by adopting procedures and practices, including alternatives to traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures, which offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications before it.

12Section 43(1) of the Code further provides that the Tribunal may make rules governing the practice and procedure before it, and s. 43(3)(f)(i) of the Code specifically provides that the Tribunal’s rules may authorize the Tribunal to require a party to a proceeding or another person to produce any document, information or thing and provide such assistance as is reasonably necessary, including using any data storage, processing or retrieval device or system, to produce the information in any form.

13The Tribunal has made Rules in accordance with the above provisions of the Code. Specifically, Rule 1.7(p) provides that in order to provide for the fair, just and expeditious resolution of any matter before it the Tribunal may require a party or other person to produce any document, information or thing and to provide such assistance as is reasonably necessary, including using any data storage, processing or retrieval device or system, to produce the information in any form.

14In my view, the applicant’s request should be granted because her Application against Mr. Soutar will not be able to proceed unless the Tribunal can send the Application to Mr. Soutar at his current address, and the TPS is the organization that is most likely to have his current address. Furthermore, neither the respondents nor the TPS has opposed the applicant’s request.

15The Tribunal therefore makes the following order and direction:

1. Within seven days of the date of this Interim Decision, the TPS shall produce Mr. Soutar’s current address to the applicant.

2. Within 14 days of the date of this Interim Decision, the applicant shall provide Mr. Soutar’s current address to the Tribunal and request that the Tribunal send the Application to him.

16I am not seized of this matter.