HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Ronald Marsh
Applicant
-and-
ADGA Group Inc.
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Douglas Sanderson
Indexed as: Marsh v. ADGA Group Inc.
APPEARANCES
Ronald Marsh, Applicant
Self-represented
1This is an Application filed on December 17, 2013 under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of disability.
2The Application indicates that the applicant worked for the respondent between August 2006 and October 2009. The materials filed with the Application indicate that the applicant worked as a Certified Electronic Engineering Technician at a federal corrections facility until he experienced sudden deafness with tinnitus and dizziness resulting from trauma he experienced as a member of the Canadian Armed Forces. The applicant could no longer work in the corrections facility as a result of his condition and he declined an offer of part time work with the respondent. The applicant states that the termination of his employment was also related to attending a hearing with Veteran Affairs Canada, which required him to take time off of work.
3On March 7, 2014, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (the “Notice”). The Notice indicates it appears the Application is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because:
While your response to question #7 of the Application alleges that the discrimination you experienced is ongoing, a review of your Application indicates that it is either not clear what incident of discrimination is alleged to have occurred is ongoing or how the incident described as ongoing constitutes an incident of discrimination within the meaning of the Code. See for example Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241; Mafinezam v. University of Toronto, 2010 HRTO 1495; and Garrie v. Janus Joan Inc., 2012 HRTO 1955.
The HRTO does not have the power to consider claims filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination or the last in a series of incidents of discrimination unless the delay in filing was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay [s.34(1)]. You do not appear to have cited facts that constitute “good faith” within the meaning of the HRTO’s case law. See for example Thomas v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2009 HRTO 1582 and see for example Diler v. Cambridge Memorial Hospital, 2010 HRTO 1224 for a discussion of “good faith”.
4The Notice directed the applicant to file written submissions addressing these issues on or before April 6, 2014.
5The applicant filed submissions on April 1, 2014, but these submissions do not address the issues identified in the Notice. Rather, the applicant attached a news release and several other documents related to a class action lawsuit brought by veterans against the federal government, in which it appears the applicant may be a participant. The applicant submitted that he had been keeping the respondent informed since he ceased working for it in 2009, but it is unclear what the applicant communicated to the respondent or the significance of this information. The applicant went on to indicate that “it is hoped” that the federal government’s “economic action plan 2014” will provide earnings loss benefits, which would make pursuit of the respondent for such benefits unnecessary. The applicant requested that the Tribunal and the Canadian Human Rights Commission inform the respondent and Veterans Affairs Canada of his circumstances and that the new veteran’s charter will provide earning loss benefits to veterans, subject to parliamentary approval.
Analysis and Decision
6An application will only be dismissed at a preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381.
Section 34 of the Code provides:
(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
7While it appears that the applicant’s allegations raise potential issues regarding discrimination because of disability, the applicant made no submissions providing a good faith explanation for the delay in filing the Application, within the meaning of the Tribunal’s case law. The applicant indicated in the Application that discrimination that he allegedly experienced continued beyond the termination of his employ up to September 2013, but he did not identify any incident attributed to the respondent after October, 2009. The applicant also stated that he had to exhaust the Veterans Affairs Canada process, but the Tribunal’s case law is clear that waiting for the completion of another legal process does not amount to a good faith explanation.
8In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is plain and obvious that this Application is out of time and should be dismissed for that reason.
Dated at Toronto, this 9th day of April, 2014.
“Signed by”
Douglas Sanderson
Vice-chair