Crystal Park v. Discount Car and Truck Rentals and Jerico Joshua Rosete, 2014 HRTO 429

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Crystal Park

Applicant

-and-

Discount Car and Truck Rentals and Jerico Joshua Rosete

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: March 26, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 429

Indexed as: Park v. Discount Car and Truck Rentals

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to the provision of goods and services because of sex, sexual solicitation and reprisal.

2On February 13, 2014 the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer (“NOID”) this Application pending the conclusion of a criminal proceeding dealing with the subject matter of the Application. The applicant did not respond to the NOID although the time for doing so has passed. The respondent opposed deferral.

3The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, and on its own initiative (Rule 14.1). The Tribunal has stated that deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings. It is a discretionary measure that the Tribunal exercises on the basis of the circumstances in each case.

4However the Tribunal has generally deferred applications where there is an ongoing proceeding based on overlapping facts and issues. The deferral of an Application in these circumstances addresses the questions of judicial economy, efficiency and the avoidance of inconsistent results of concern where there appears to be ongoing concurrent litigation with respect to the same issues.

5In my view it would be appropriate to defer this Application pending the conclusion of the criminal proceeding. In her Application the applicant alleges that the personal respondent made sexual advances towards her, kidnapped her, harassed her by text messages and overcharged her for a rental vehicle. The criminal proceedings concern charges of sexual assault and criminal harassment brought against the personal respondent related to the allegations of the applicant.

6The organizational respondent argues that because the remedies available in the two proceedings are different it would not be appropriate to defer the Application. I do not agree. The respondent referred to a number of cases where the Tribunal declined to defer a case where it appeared that the issues raised in the concurrent proceedings were different. While it is clear that the remedies available to the applicant in a criminal proceeding are entirely different than those she seeks in this proceeding that is not at all determinative of the issue. The fact is that the subject matter of the allegations in the criminal proceeding largely overlaps with that of the Application such that the risk of inconsistent conclusions on facts critical to the resolution of the dispute is present. For this reason it is in my view appropriate to defer the Application.

7The Tribunal directs the parties’ attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the procedure by which the Application may be brought back on after the conclusion of the criminal proceeding.

8I am not seized.