Sandra Defillat v. D’Arcy Lane Incorporated and Vivian Cywink (Peters), 2014 HRTO 40

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Sandra Defillat

Applicant

-and-

D’Arcy Lane Incorporated and Vivian Cywink (Peters)

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw
Date: January 10, 2014
Citation: 2014 HRTO 40
Indexed as: Defillat v. D’Arcy Lane Incorporated

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Sandra Defillat, Applicant Self-represented

D’Arcy Lane Incorporated John Peters, Counsel

Introduction

1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of race.

2This Interim Order is made with respect to the applicant’s Request for an Order During Proceedings, dated October 25, 2013, requesting that the corporate respondent disclose the personal respondent’s last known address to facilitate service of the Application on her.

3The Tribunal had e-mailed the applicant on October 7, 2013 asking for an alternate address for the personal respondent. The applicant responded that she did not have one.

4By Interim Decision dated October 17, 2013, I advised that if the applicant was unable to find the personal respondent’s address she could make a Request for an Order During Proceedings (“RFOP”), which she did on October 25, 2013.

5The corporate respondent opposed the request, citing the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”), and stating that it cannot use personal information for purposes other than for which it was collected and cannot disclose such information to a third party without the consent of the affected individual.

6By Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated December 12, 2013, I advised the applicant that within 7 days of the CAD, she was to provide information with respect to the efforts she had made to locate an address for the personal respondent because she had provided no details in her RFOP.

7I also directed the corporate respondent to provide any further information with respect to the application of PIPEDA given it is federal legislation as well as with respect to the fact that even if it did apply, it appeared to allow an organization to provide information ordered by a body with authority to compel production. I also directed the corporate respondent to provide any further submissions it wished to make with respect to its disclosure obligations in light of the Tribunal’s authority pursuant to s. 5.4(1)(e) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, s. 43(3)(f) of the Code and Rule 1.7(p) of the HRTO’s Rules of Procedure to compel production of information.

8The applicant advised that she has attempted to locate current address information for the personal respondent, Vivian Cywink-Peters, by performing searches on Google and related internet sites, at 411 Directory information and on social media such as Facebook, by using the names Vivian Cywink, Vivian Peters and Vivian Cywink-Peters, all of which have provided no additional address information.

9The corporate respondent provided no additional submissions in response to the CAD.

analysis and decision

10The corporate respondent confirmed that the personal respondent was no longer an employee at the time the Notice of Application was delivered and, therefore, it appears she did not receive a copy of the Application.

11The Tribunal has in previous decisions required corporate respondents to provide last known addresses for personal respondents who no longer are in the company’s employ. See: Berahmand v. B2B Trust, 2012 HRTO 788; Grant v. Dura Automotive Systems of Canada, 2009 HRTO 10; Letourneau v. Jenny Craig Canada, 2011 HRTO 342 and Khudabaksh v. Optima Communications International Inc., 2012 HRTO 35.

12Rule 1.7(p) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure states that the Tribunal may:

Require a party or other person to produce any document, information or thing and to provide such assistance as is reasonably necessary, including using any date storage, processing or retrieval device of system, to produce the information in any form. (See also: 5.4(1)(e) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 and s. 43(3)(f) of the Code).

13In the circumstances of this case, I find it is appropriate to require the corporate respondent to provide the last known address of the personal respondent, Vivian Cywink-Peters, in order to facilitate delivery of the Application.