Dubé v. Campeau, 2014 HRTO 377

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Troy Dubé

Applicant

-and-

Ian Campeau, Jenna Young, Don Kelly, Alain Garon, Shawn Atleo, Assembly of First Nations, A Tribe Called Red, Barbara McIsaac and Qajaq Robinson

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jennifer Scott

Date: March 17, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 377

Indexed as: Dubé v. Campeau

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Troy Dubé, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"), alleging discrimination because of race and colour. The issue before the Tribunal is whether the Application is outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction because it does not raise a social area covered by the Code.

2The Application involves the respondent Ian Campeau ("Campeau"), his band, "A Tribe Called Red", and Campeau's legal counsel. It also involved the Assembly of First Nations (the "AFN"), the First Nations Chief, Shawn Atleo, and the staff of AFN.

3The thrust of the Application concerns a human rights complaint filed by Campeau with the Tribunal regarding the logo used by the Nepean Redskins football team. The Tribunal did not address Campeau's complaint because it was resolved early on in the process.

4In this Application, the applicant asserts that it is a double standard for Campeau to complain about the Nepean Redskins' logo when: (a) Campeau is in a band called "A Tribe Called Red"; (b) the band has a song "Red Skin Girl"; (c) one of the band members wears a hockey jersey for the Chicago Blackhawks; and (d) Campeau wears attire with alternate slang terms such as "Whiteskins" and "Caucasians".

5The applicant complains further about the support given to Campeau's complaint by the AFN and its refusal to meet with the applicant about his concerns regarding the alleged double standard being employed by Campeau. The Applicant believes that the double standard is a form of discrimination. Finally, the applicant complains about the failure of Campeau's legal counsel to respond to his concerns.

6By letter dated December 9, 2013, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application as being outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction because it appeared the Application did not raise a social area covered by the Code.

7The applicant provided submissions in response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application on January 28, 2014.

Analysis

8Section 1 of the Code states:

Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status or disability.

Does the Application relate to a service within the meaning of section 1 of the Code?

9As the Tribunal explained in Dopelhamer v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2010 HRTO 765 at para. 21, the Tribunal must determine whether the allegations in an Application implicates a right to equal treatment on the grounds listed in the Code and in relation to the social areas of employment, accommodation, or goods, services, and facilities. If an Application does not involve one of these social areas, the Code does not apply to the situation and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine the allegations.

10The Tribunal has stated that section 1 of the Code must be interpreted broadly and purposively, including the definition of "services". That said, the definition of "service" is not limitless. For example, the Tribunal has held that there must be some sort of service relationship between an applicant and a respondent in order to constitute a "service" and that mere interaction between them is not enough. See Padayachee v. Peel Children's Aid Society, 2010 HRTO 709 at para. 12.

11The Tribunal has also held that the expression of an opinion or belief is not a "service" under the Code. In Dallaire v. Les Chevaliers de Colomb, 2011 HRTO 639, the Tribunal held an inscription on a monument is not a "service" under the Code because the content and expression of a religious belief is not a "service". In a similar vein, the Tribunal held the content of a newspaper editorial is not a "service" within the meaning of section 1 of the Code in Whiteley v. Osprey Media Publishing, 2010 HRTO 2152.

12In this case, there is no service relationship between the applicant and Campeau, including Campeau's band and his legal counsel. Any contact that exists between them is more akin to that of mere interaction as opposed to a relationship. In the absence of a service relationship, there is no "service" for the purposes of the Code.

13Further, what the applicant complains about is, in some ways, similar to a complaint about an expression of a belief or opinion. The complaint is really about Campeau's complaint against the Nepean Redskins football team and his belief that the logo is discriminatory. The applicant is not complaining about the title of Campeau's band, the title of a song, and what Campeau and other band members wear as clothing per se, he is complaining that Campeau is applying a double standard to the Nepean Redskins football team and spreading this double standard to a social audience. The applicant asserts that the message being sent by Campeau is that it is okay for indigenous people to use the term "red skin", but it is not acceptable for anyone who is not indigenous to use that term. In my view, the applicant's complaint is similar to a complaint about an expression of a belief, that is, whether Campeau is promulgating a double standard when he complains about logo of the Nepean Redskins football team. This is not a complaint in respect of a "service" under the Code.

14The applicant complains further about the support given by the AFN to Campeau's complaint. Again, the applicant is not complaining about a service that he received from the AFN. He is complaining about an expression of support given by the AFN to Campeau's complaint and the refusal of the AFN and its staff to meet with the applicant about his concerns. Because the applicant is not in a service relationship with the AFN regarding Campeau's complaint, there is no "service" under the Code. Similarly, the applicant is not in a service relationship with Campeau's legal counsel.

15In the absence of a service relationship between the applicant and any of the named respondents, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear this Application. Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.