Haig v. Mount Dennis Medical Group, 2014 HRTO 258

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Bruna Haig

Applicant

-and-

Mount Dennis Medical Group and Marianne Hatherley

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel

Date: February 25, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 258

Indexed as: Haig v. Mount Dennis Medical Group

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Mount Dennis Medical Group and Marianne Hatherley, Respondents

Ben Millard, Counsel

Introduction

1In her Application, the applicant alleged that the respondents discriminated against her on the basis of sex and reprised against her contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990 c. H. 19, as amended (the “Code”). The applicant’s primary allegation is that the respondents refused to allow her to work in the same position to which she was assigned before taking pregnancy leave. In addition to filing her Application, the applicant also filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labour alleging that this same conduct by the respondents violated the Employment Standards Act (“ESA”).

2On January 15, 2014, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer (“NOID”) the Application on the basis that there is another legal proceeding dealing with the subject matter of the Application. The Tribunal invited the parties to file submissions as to whether or not the Application should be deferred.

3The applicant did not respond to the NOID.

4The respondents submitted that the Application should be deferred as the applicant’s Application and ESA complaint raise the same facts and issues.

Decision

5Under Rule 14.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party. Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same or similar issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law.

6The Tribunal will generally defer an application where the parties are involved in another proceeding based on the facts or issues raised in the application. Some factors that have been identified as relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are: the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the types of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer, having regard to the status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them. See Baghdasserians v. 674469 Ontario, 2008 HRTO 404.

7The Tribunal has deferred applications where there are on-going ESA claims with facts and issues that overlap with the subject matter of the Tribunal application. See, for example, Mounfield v. Cambridge Memorial Hospital, 2012 HRTO 1400 and Matechuk v. OLG at Thousand Islands, 2009 HRTO 324.

8I find that deferral is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. The applicant commenced her ESA claim before her Application and this claim remains outstanding. The factual circumstances in the Application overlap almost completely with those in the applicant’s ESA claim. Both claims include the same narrative with respect to the respondents’ refusal to permit the applicant to return to the position she occupied before her pregnancy leave. In these circumstances there is a significant risk of inconsistent factual findings if the two matters were to proceed concurrently.

9For these reasons, the Tribunal orders the deferral of the Application pending the conclusion of the applicant’s ESA claim. Where a party wishes to proceed with an application which has been deferred, the party must make a Request for an Order During Proceedings in accordance with Rule 19 within 60 days after the conclusion of the other proceeding (Rules 14.3 and 14.4).

10I am not seized of this matter.