HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Fair Parenting Inc.
Applicant
-and-
Durham Student Transportation Services, Durham District School Board and Durham Catholic District School Board
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Geneviève Debané
Indexed as: Fair Parenting Inc. v. Durham Student Transportation Services
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Fair Parenting Inc., Applicant
Eric Letts, Counsel
1This Application filed on October 24, 2014, alleges discrimination with respect to contract because of family status contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The Application has not yet been delivered to the respondents.
2On November 19, 2014, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application on the basis the Application appeared to be outside of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because the applicant is not a person, and the Application does not allege that any of the applicant’s rights under the Code have been infringed.
3On November 20, 2014, the applicant filed submissions in support of its position that the Application falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Decision
4The applicant asserts that its primary activity is managing a platform of standardized parenting plans that facilitate the integration of children with two homes to maximize efficiency and participation while reducing friction and conflict for all parties. The applicant alleges that the respondents’ current policies with respect to school bus service discriminate against parents, separated parents and children with two homes. The applicant asserts that the respondents are directly discriminating against it and that the applicant is unable to contract equally with these parents. The applicant also takes the position that it is being forced to discriminate against these parents in contract because of the respondents’ policies.
5I wish to address the applicant’s argument that the Tribunal must accept the Application because all that the Code requires is that the applicant believes that its rights under the Code have been infringed. The Tribunal has the power to review an Application to determine whether or not the issues identified therein fall within its statutory mandate and jurisdiction. The process that the Tribunal has adopted is to provide the applicant with Notice that the Application may not be within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction so that the applicant has an opportunity to explain why the Tribunal should continue to process and deliver the Application to the respondent. However, if the Tribunal is satisfied, after reviewing the applicant’s submissions, that it is plain and obvious that the Application does not fall within its jurisdiction, then the Application is dismissed.
6The Code does not prohibit discrimination in all facets of life, but only with respect to specific social areas as identified in the Code. See: Hutchinson v. York University, 2014 HRTO 653 at paragraph 36.
7Having considered the matter, I find that it is plain and obvious that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the Application. In this case, the applicant has indicated in the Application and its submissions that the applicable social area is contracts. However, it is clear that there is no contractual relationship between the applicant and the respondents. The contractual relationship referred to in the Application is between the applicant and parents whose children may be receiving educational and/or transportation services from the respondents. This however does not create any contractual relationship between the applicant and the respondents. The principles of tort law relied upon by the applicant simply have no application in this case, including the cases with respect to tortious interference with contractual relations, nor do these create any contractual obligations between the respondents and the applicant.
8Further, the ground relied on by the applicant is that of “family status”. It is clear, since the applicant is not an individual, that it is not capable of being in a parent-child relationship as contemplated by the Code and that therefore this ground cannot be relied on by the applicant.
9In light of my findings above, it is unnecessary for me to determine whether a legal person that is not an individual has standing to bring an application under the Code.
10The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 3rd day of December, 2014.
“Signed by”
Geneviève Debané
Vice-chair