HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Lydia Sabourin
Applicant
-and-
Francis Canada Truck Centre, Phillip Francis, Peter Conlin, and Paul Armstrong
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Geneviève Debané
Indexed as: Sabourin v. Francis Canada Truck Centre
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Lydia Sabourin, Applicant
Self-represented
Francis Canada Truck Centre, Phillip Francis, Peter Conlin, and Paul Armstrong, Respondents
Kecia Podetz, Counsel
1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to employment because of sex and sexual orientation contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2This Interim Decision addresses the respondents’ Request to remove Phillip Francis, Peter Conlin, Paul Armstrong and Sandra Armstrong as personal respondents. The applicant opposes this Request.
Decision
3Rule 1.7(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure provides that the Tribunal may add or remove a party. The respondents take the position that all of the factors in the seminal case of Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31 (“Persaud”), have been met in this case. The Tribunal states at paragraph 5, of Persaud:
Applying these principles to the Tribunal’s power to remove a personal respondent from a proceeding, the following non-exhaustive list of factors may be helpful in assessing whether a personal respondent should be removed:
Is there is a corporate respondent in the proceeding that also is alleged to be liable for the same conduct?
Is there any issue raised as to the corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the conduct of the personal respondent who sought to be removed?
Is there is any issue as to the ability of the corporate respondent to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringement?
Does any compelling reason exist to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found?
Would any prejudice be caused to any party as a result of removing the personal respondent?
In considering whether any compelling reason exists to continue the proceeding against a personal respondent, one way of approaching this question is to ask whether it is necessary to involve this person as a party in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the complaint.
4Having reviewed the allegations made by the applicant in the Application I find that it is appropriate only to remove Sandra Armstrong as a personal respondent. The Application contains insufficient allegations against Ms. Armstrong, for her to remain a respondent in this matter.
5However, I am satisfied that there are sufficient allegations against the remaining individual respondents, Mr. Francis, Mr. Conlin and Mr. Armstrong, which could constitute to be considered harassment under the Code, and to which personal liability may attach. Therefore, even though the other factors in Persaud appear to have been met, this may be a case in which, if the applicant is able to prove her allegations, that the Tribunal may impose a remedy specifically against these respondents.
Order
6The Tribunal orders:
a. That Sandra Armstrong is removed as a personal respondent and the style of cause shall be immediately amended to reflect this change; and
b. The respondents’ Request to remove the remaining individual respondents as parties to the Application is denied.
7I am not seized.
Dated at Toronto, this 24^th^ day of November, 2014.
“signed by”
Geneviève Debané
Vice-chair