C.C. v. J.L. o/a [....] Restaurant, 2014 HRTO 1625

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

C.C.

Applicant

-and-

J.L. o/a [….] Restaurant, C.L. and J.L.

Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

J.C.

Applicant

-and-

J.L. o/a [….] Restaurant, C.L. and J.L.

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Alison Renton

Date: November 4, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 1625

Indexed as: C.C. v. J.L. o/a [….] Restaurant

APPEARANCES

C.C., Applicant

Mindy Noble, Counsel

J.C., Applicant

Mindy Noble, Counsel

J.L. o/a [….] Restaurant, C.L. and J.L., Respondents

No one appearing

1These are two separate Applications, both filed on June 7, 2013, under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

background of the respondents not participating

2The respondents have not participated in these proceedings despite the applicants providing the Tribunal initially with one address on the Application forms, and a subsequent one in September 2013 for the respondents. The Tribunal sent communications to both addresses and I am satisfied that the respondents have had notice of these proceedings.

3In Interim Decision, 2013 HRTO 1730, dated October 11, 2013 (“the October 2013 Interim Decision”), the Tribunal set out the history of the respondents not participating in these proceedings. This included the respondents not filing Responses or a joint Response, and not responding to a previous Interim Decision dated August 21, 2013, 2013 HRTO 1428 (“the August 2013 Interim Decision”), in which the Tribunal warned the respondents that if they did not file Responses, the Tribunal may proceed without further notice to them or take steps in accordance with Rule 5.5 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. Ultimately, in the October 2013 Interim Decision, when the respondents failed to participate, the Tribunal ordered that the respondents were deemed to have accepted all the allegations set out in the Applications and waived their rights to notice or participation in these proceedings and that the Applications would proceed without further notice to the respondents.

4Pursuant to the August 2013 Interim Decision, the Tribunal determined that the Applications should be heard together. An in-person hearing for both Applications was held in Sudbury on April 7 and 8, 2014 further to a case management call held on December 2, 2013 for which the respondents also had notice. The respondents did not participate in the case management call or attend the hearing.

5Subsequent to the hearing, the applicants submitted submissions dated April 10, 2014 about the applicability of Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Farris, 2012 ONSC 3876 to their requested remedies, as well as a copy of an un-redacted version of a clinical note that had been entered as an exhibit during the hearing. The applicants also filed submissions dated May 5, 2014, in support of their request for public interest remedies, and advised the Tribunal that the respondent restaurant re-opened between February and April 2014.

the applicants

6The applicants are related. C.C., whose Application is 2013-14655-I, is the mother of J.C. (“J.C.”), whose Application is 2013-14656-I. Both Applications pertain to C.C.’s use of a service animal at the restaurant, J.L. o/a [....] Restaurant, C.L. and J.L. (“the restaurant”), where J.C. worked. C.L. and J.L. are owners of the restaurant.

7C.C.’s Application alleges discrimination pertaining to services on the basis of disability and reprisal. On September 26, 2012, C.C. attended the restaurant for lunch, along with J.C. and another daughter. C.C. also brought her service animal, into the restaurant. She alleges that C.L. denied her service by requiring that C.C. remove her service animal from the restaurant because other people had complained about a service animal being in the restaurant.

8J.C.’s Application alleges discrimination with respect to employment on the basis of family status, association with another person, and reprisal. She alleges that subsequent to the September 26, 2012 encounter, she was threatened by Ms. L., such that she had to quit her employment.

the evidence

9The Tribunal heard evidence from, in this order, R.C., C.C.’s daughter and J.C.’s sister; D.C., C.C.’s husband and J.C.’s father; J.C.; Dr. Barry Shapiro, who is a licenced chiropractor practicing in Toronto for whom C.C. used to work, is her treating chiropractor when she is in Toronto, and a close friend; and C.C., R.C. and Dr. Shapiro testified by telephone. R.C.’s affidavit was introduced as an exhibit, as was Dr. Shapiro’s witness statement, which he also adapted as part of his evidence. D.C., J.C. and C.C. testified in-person. C.C.’s service animal also attended and was very well behaved during the hearing.

10As the respondents did not participate, the witnesses’ evidence was not challenged.

C.C.’s Application

11C.C. has a number of medical issues, including hearing impairment for which she wears a hearing aid, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. To assist her with these disabilities, she has a medically supported service animal, whom she received in April 2012. C.C.’s service animal is identified as a service animal, on several patches, on her vest which she wears at all times in public. The patches say “do not pet” and one says “hearing animal” and “do not distract”. Medical documentation confirming that C.C. requires the use of a service animal for medical reasons was entered as an exhibit, as was a picture of her service animal wearing a service vest. C.C.’s service animal attended the hearing, wearing her service vest.

12C.C. carries the medical documentation with her and testified about ways in which her service animal assists her. Some of those functions pertain to her hearing impairment, including picking up the telephone after a certain number of rings. Other functions address her anxiety and other disabilities, such as standing behind C.C. in a line, nudging her when she is anxious, and tugging on her clothes to get her out of bed.

13C.C., J.C., and D.C. all testified about how the service animal has made a significant positive contribution to C.C.’s life, improving and stabilizing her moods, and allowing her to go out in public, something that she had great difficulty doing before her service animal’s arrival. C.C. is the only one in the area who has a service animal.

14C.C. and her family live in small town in Northern Ontario where there are few options from which to choose to go out to eat. On occasion, C.C. and different members of her family would attend the restaurant. They have attended for lunch and for dinner. Sometimes J.C. would be their server if she was working. After C.C. received her service animal, the service animal would also come into the restaurant and sit tucked under the table and out of the way. Until September 26, 2012, there were no problems with bringing C.C.’s service animal into the restaurant as her service animal is a well behaved service animal. Sometimes, other customers would say that they did not notice that a service animal was in the restaurant until C.C. was leaving the restaurant along with her service animal.

15In early July 2012, C.L. told J.C. that she had observed C.C. attending the municipal buildings, located across the street from the restaurant, with a service animal. Ms. L. questioned why C.C. needed a service animal as she was not blind or deaf. J.C. told Ms. L. that C.C.’s service animal was a service animal and was trained for many tasks. She did not want to provide further details to Ms. L. for fear of that information being circulated to others. J.C. told C.C. about this conversation.

16During the week of September 3, 2012, when J.C. went into work, she saw that a new sign was posted in several locations in the restaurant (“the animal sign”). J.C. took a picture of it and the picture was entered as an exhibit. It read:

ANIMAL RIGHTS

Blind Person’s Rights Act

Section 1. (1) “guide dog”

Means a dog trained as a guide for a blind person.

If the person provides OWNER with a letter from a

physician confirming that the person requires the animal

for reasons relating to the disability.

If letter from physician is not available at the time of

entrance of this food facility the animal will have to

leave the premises.

If any concern contact health unit of Sudbury

705-522-9200

[mistakes in the original]

17In a discussion with J.L., subsequent to the animal sign being posted, he told J.C. that someone had complained to public health about C.C.’s service animal being in the restaurant. Mr. L. told J.C. that public health told the L.’s that they could not have that type of service animal in the restaurant, that subsequent reports would result in the restaurant being fined, and that the $100 food order placed by her family was not worth the fine the restaurant would receive. J.C. testified that she told Mr. L. that C.C.’s service animal was a service animal and that the rules and regulations about service animals were different from regular animals attending a restaurant. Service animals were permitted in the public areas of a restaurant, but not the kitchen. She testified that she told Mr. L. that her mother had a medical letter supporting her need for a service animal. J.C. was not asked to produce this letter by either of the L.’s.

18J.C. told C.C. about the sign and her conversation with Mr. L.. As it turned out, C.C. was on her way with other family members, and her service animal, to the restaurant for dinner. They attended the restaurant, and sat in their usual spot without incident. After C.C. left, other customers told J.C. that C.C.’s service animal was very well behaved and J.C. explained that the service animal is a service animal. Mr. and Ms. L. were also working on this day, but did not say anything.

19Later that night, C.C. was upset about the animal sign because it appeared to be written by public health. She spoke to her nurse practitioner, Erin, about the restaurant’s animal sign because she thought she was being singled out by the restaurant as she is the only person in the area who uses that type of service animal. Erin suggested that C.C. contact public health about the issue to get a friendlier decal about service animals, rather than the animal sign. C.C. contacted public health on September 10, 2012.

20When C.C. emailed the Sudbury & District Health Unit (“the health unit”), she copied various municipal officers from the restaurant’s community, including its mayor. She did this, she testified, to let them know what was happening in their community again because it is a small community, and to educate them. She had had another experience in a small grocery store of which the municipal councillors were aware. The health unit confirmed, by email sent only to C.C., that it had not posted the animal sign at the restaurant. The health unit also provided C.C. with sections from the Food Premises Regulation pertaining to service animals. C.C. responded by email, again copying the restaurant’s municipal officers and the mayor, and requested that such obstacles not be placed before her in her community. The health unit responded to that email, again, only to C.C., confirming that it had not received any complaints about that type of service animal being in the restaurant. The email chain between C.C. and the health unit was entered as an exhibit.

21C.C. testified that after receiving the health unit’s response, she did nothing further because it was a small town, she did not want to cause any problems for the restaurant, and J.C. worked there. She believed that the L.’s had put up the animal sign by themselves, and she felt singled out, but she was not too worried about it because her service animal was a service animal for which she had the supporting documentation and J.C. worked there.

22On September 26, 2012, C.C., J.C. and R.C. had a “girls’ day out” which consisted of going to the restaurant for lunch. Each of them testified about the experience that day. When they entered the restaurant, with C.C.’s service animal, Ms. L. and Mr. L. were both present, as was a customer. The conversation stopped when the C.’s walked in and Mr. L. rolled his eyes as they walked by. The C.’s walked to the table they normally sat at and the service animal was tucked away. They each felt tension.

23Ms. L. followed the C.’s to their table and immediately approached them. J.C. testified that she could tell, having worked with Ms. L. for more than a year and from her body language that day, that Ms. L. was on “a mission”. The C.’s had barely sat down when Ms. L. demanded to see C.C.’s medical documentation as proof that her service animal is a service animal. C.C. gave her the documentation. Ms. L. read it and told C.C. that she was going to photocopy the documentation. C.C. initially gave her approval, but then said that it could not be copied. C.C. testified that “within a split second” she became concerned that Ms. L. would share her personal medical information with others, and that she would be mocked.

24After C.C. told Ms. L. that she could not copy her documentation, Ms. L. replied, “Excuse me?” in a rude tone. She said that she needed proof, and that there had been complaints to public health about C.C.’s service animal entering the restaurant. C.C. said that was not true because she had spoken to public health.

25At this point, R.C. started to video the conversation between C.C. and Ms. L. on her phone. The video was entered as an exhibit and was watched during the hearing. In the video, Ms. L. repeatedly told C.C. that she is obligated to show her the letter once she enters a public place and that if C.C. respected them, she would have brought the letter in earlier. C.C. told Ms. L. that her service animal is clearly marked as a service animal and she is not required to produce documentation. Notwithstanding this, she offered her documentation for Ms. L.’s review.

26The exchange between C.C. and Ms. L. continued and became heated. Ms. L. was agitated, her voice was loud, and she was waving her arms around. C.C.’s voice was initially calm and then it became raised. C.C. referred to the animal sign as being “a stupid sign”. Ms. L. then claimed that C.C. called her stupid; C.C. disputed this, apologized for using this word, and said that she called the animal sign stupid, not Ms. L. C.C. also read out the restaurant owner’s obligations for service animals from the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005. She also stated, repeatedly, that she does not need to provide documentation because her service animal is clearly marked as a service animal.

27In C.C.’s opinion, and based upon the previous exchange that Ms. L. had with J.C. about C.C. using a service animal, Ms. L. was trying to see the documentation because she wanted to know C.C.’s disabilities which required the use of a service animal.

28J.C. testified that she felt that Ms. L. was targeting her mother and finding a reason to remove her from the restaurant. There were other ways Ms. L. could have handled the situation, including asking J.C. to produce the documentation at an earlier point in time.

29Ms. L. refused to serve the C.’s. She told them, “I’m not waiting on you and you called me stupid”. C.C. told her that she had no right to refuse them service and if she wanted them to leave she would have to call the police. Ms. L. said in response, “You are going to wait a long fucking time because I ain’t no fucking waiting on you”. She said that C.C. would not humiliate her in front of the mayor or in front of city council and she would do what she wanted in her restaurant. Mr. L. was at the bar observing the incident.

30During this encounter, C.C.’s service animal was calm and in a sit down position to manage C.C.’s stress. After Ms. L. walked away, R.C. stopped taping on her telephone. At this point, the customer approached them and told C.C. that her “therapy animal” was not working for her. C.C. told this customer that her service animal was a service animal not a therapy animal, but the customer disagreed. The customer’s comments suggested to J.C. that the service animal and her role for C.C. had been previously discussed between the L.’s and the customer.

31This was a devastating event for C.C. and J.C.. J.C. testified that she wanted to crawl into a hole and C.C. was humiliated, upset, and could hardly breathe. They decided to leave, but they had to walk by the L.’s as they left the restaurant. C.C. and R.C. walked to the municipal building across the street, J.C. moved their vehicle out of the restaurant’s parking lot, and then met them at the municipal building. They met with the clerk who gave them a private room, and showed her the video. C.C. was crying and could barely speak. The clerk shook her head, apologized, and offered to go to council for support and to educate the businesses. Initially C.C. agreed, but then she changed her mind after J.C. was threatened by Ms. L. (which is set out below). They then went home.

32At home, they told D.C. what happened. He encouraged them to go to another establishment as they had not eaten lunch. They did and had no difficulties at the other establishment. C.C. testified that she could not remember where they went as she was so upset from the treatment by the L.’s. When they arrived back home again, C.C. became so upset that D.C. took her to the Crisis Intervention Unit at the hospital that evening, from where she was given some pills and later released. C.C. was told to see her nurse practitioner the next day, and she booked an appointment the next morning. However, she cancelled it later that day because her anxiety level was high and because her nurse practitioner’s office is located across from the restaurant and she did not want to see the L.’s, who often stand outside smoking. She spoke with a nurse practitioner that day on the phone when the hospital called to check up on her.

J.C.’s Application

33J.C. started working at the restaurant around July 27, 2011 as a part-time waitress. She worked approximately 15 to 20 hours per week. In addition to working as a waitress, during the winter months J.C. ran a dog sled business which she operated for over 5 years. She lived with her parents in the small, rural community until some point in 2013.

34She had a good relationship with the L.’s, who owned the restaurant, until the interactions she had with them about her mother using a service animal.

35J.C. testified that after the September 26, 2012 incident, she was terrified of going back to work. She wished she was in a hole, her anxiety was peaking and she felt physically sick. She thought about not going into her next shift, but she went because she is not the type of person not to go into work. That next shift was September 28.

36When she arrived at work, Mr. L. was busy with a customer who was picking up a take-out order. J.C. went to fill up the ketchup bottles. Ms. L. approached J.C. and told her that she had submitted the restaurant’s security tape to their lawyer and was having her lawyer prepare paperwork so that C.C. would not be able to enter the restaurant again. She told J.C. that if her mother tried to come into the restaurant with her service animal, that J.C. should refuse to serve her and should ask her to leave. If her mother refused to leave, then Ms. L. instructed J.C. to call the police and C.C. would be charged with trespassing. Ms. L. told J.C. that it was her restaurant, she could do what she wanted in it, and she was not scared with C.C. going to the municipality. She told J.C. that her mother would be sorry if she took it any further.

37Ms. L. told J.C. that if her mother took it further, Ms. L. would make sure that J.C.’s business would not open this winter or any other winter. Ms. L. had reviewed J.C.’s website and noticed a number of violations on it, which she identified. She said, “This isn’t a threat, but a fucking promise” and “do you understand?”.

38J.C. worked the rest of her shift on auto pilot. When the L.’s were not in the room, J.C. testified that other customer, whom she identified, told her to be careful and that Ms. L. had planned to threaten J.C.. J.C. was scared as this was no longer a private situation as people in town knew what had happened. She believed Ms. L.’s threats to be real and sincere.

39She was upset when she arrived home at the end of her shift. She was crying and told her parents and R.C. what had happened. D.C. tried to assure her that Ms. L. could not affect J.C.’s dog sledding business.

40The next day, September 29, 2012, J.C. contacted the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) and wanted to make a formal complaint about Ms. L. and the threats that she made. The OPP told J.C. that there was nothing that they could do and told her to follow up with the Tribunal. She asked that an informal complaint be on the record which they did. A copy of J.C.’s interactions with the OPP was entered as an exhibit.

41At this point, J.C. decided that she could no longer continue to work for the respondents given that her other business had been threatened, and she had been instructed not to serve her mother and call the police if her mother came into the restaurant. The working environment was hostile and J.C. felt uncomfortable being around the L.’s. She wrote out a resignation letter, dated September 30, 2012, and D.C. hand delivered it to the restaurant because J.C. could not face Ms. L. again. The resignation letter was marked as an exhibit.

42In mid-October 2012, J.C. saw one of the restaurant’s customers in the grocery store. The customer told her that he knew that she no longer worked at the restaurant because Ms. L. did not want C.C.’s service animal in the restaurant. J.C. understood that he learned this information from Ms. L. J.C. learned from a friend that the animal sign was removed from the restaurant on December 2, 2012. In September 2013, J.C. was in a small restaurant in a community 30 kilometers away when the waitress told her that she had heard about the incident. J.C. could not believe that a year later it was still being discussed.

43On December 12, 2012, a public health inspector came to the C’s house about J.C.’s business. J.C. was not home, but D.C. and C.C. were. C.C. spoke with the inspector who told her that a complaint had been made about J.C.’s business, but he did not identify the complainant. The complaints were the same as those which Ms. L. had identified to J.C.. A copy of public health’s investigation records was entered as an exhibit. Public health had removed the identity of the complainant. J.C. testified that she never previously had a complaint about her business and that it had a 99% satisfaction rate with a wait list. J.C. testified that she believed that Ms. L. followed through with her threats about reporting J.C.’s business, particularly since it was before the start of her business’ season. As a result of the complaint, J.C. was furious and could not breathe. She could not pull herself together to speak with the inspector, so C.C. had to, despite her own fragile state. Ultimately, public health concluded that it had no concerns with her business.

44Before her resignation, J.C. had been looking for other employment to supplement her salary from the restaurant. She was successful in obtaining employment with Pioneer Construction on road repair, commencing October 1, 2012. It was supposed to be 40 hours a week. She planned to work at both places of employment. After her resignation, she worked approximately 55 hours per week at Pioneer Construction, but she was laid off from it in December 2012 at which time she started up her dog sledding business. She operated her dog sledding business from January to March 2013. She collected EI benefits following her lay off from Pioneer Construction, although she did not receive those until June. In mid-June 2013, she commenced employment with another company. She is seeking loss of wages from September 30, 2012 until July 8, 2013 when she commenced employment with a new company.

The Effect upon C.C.

45C.C., D.C., J.C., R.C. and Dr. Shapiro testified about the impact of the respondents’ actions upon C.C.. Each testified that C.C. suffered significant mental health setbacks after this incident with the respondents and after the health inspector visited the C’s residence. J.C. and C.C. were visibly upset when D.C. was testifying about this. R.C. and Dr. Shapiro were emotional over the telephone.

46J.C. testified that after C.C. communicated with public health and found out that it had not posted the animal sign in the restaurant, she was upset and felt singled out by the respondents as she was the only service animal user in the area. C.C. also told J.C. that the animal notice was not required as the respondents had many opportunities to talk with J.C. about C.C.’s service animal or her mother without having to post a public notice.

47C.C. testified that following the incident with the respondents, she was depressed and experienced suicide ideation. She had not thought about suicide for 20 years and her mental health had been improving, particularly since she got her service animal. However, people from the community knew what had happened with the restaurant and it was also affecting J.C.. She spoke to a nurse practitioner, not Erin who was on pregnancy leave, about her thoughts and she signed a suicide contract. However, she started to plan her suicide and researched it so that it would be done correctly. On November 28, 2012 she emailed the Right To Die Society of Canada asking where she could purchase an exit bag and she received a responding email from them on December 2. Copies of these emails were entered as an exhibit.

48On December 12, 2012, after she spoke with the health inspector and after he left, C.C. went into her bedroom and texted Dr. Shapiro that she was going to commit suicide the next day. Her text to Dr. Shapiro was introduced as an exhibit. Dr. Shapiro told C.C. that she had go to the hospital or he was going to tell D.C.. She said she would go to the hospital, and got in her car. She took her service animal with her.

49She told D.C. that she was going to the hospital because she knew that he would accept her leaving without him to this location, but she had no intentions of going to the hospital. She thought that she would kill herself that day instead of the next day like she had planned, but her plan was falling apart quickly because she still needed to buy the items she required for her suicide. She also could not turn off her phone because D.C. would then know that something was up. She ended up driving to the hospital and sitting in the parking lot for a while. As her service animal was getting cold, she walked into the hospital and spoke with a crisis worker and then saw a doctor. The doctor involuntarily admitted her into the hospital where she stayed until she was released to D.C. the next day.

50D.C. testified that C.C. is depressed, in constant pain, and has panic attacks which prevent her from leaving the house without him. She is terrified when a car comes into the driveway or when she hears a car drive by as she is worried that it is a health inspector or the SPCA. D.C. knows that they are not doing anything wrong, but C.C. becomes extremely agitated and upset. C.C. persistently checks on him when he is out of sight, even when he is clearing the snow on their large property. She either pokes her head out the door, or texts or calls him on his cell phone. She gets into a state of panic when she cannot communicate with D.C. or see him after 10 minutes. She is terrified of Ms. L., what she has done, and is in constant pain. She cannot be left alone and he cannot work because he cannot leave her alone in the house. They are living off of C.C.’s ODSP benefits and are trying to sell their house to leave the area.

51R.C. testified that her mother is so scared that she does not know what to do.

52J.C. testified that because she lives in a different community, C.C. is constantly texting her and if she does not respond within minutes, C.C. will call her. C.C. is much more anxious than she was prior to the restaurant incident, and cannot hold herself together if she is separated from others.

53Dr. Shapiro’s evidence was that C.C. told him about the incident at the restaurant on September 26, 2012, and how distressed she was about the situation not only because of her own embarrassment but also because of the threats that had been made against J.C.’s business. She communicated with him that she had a lot of fear about the situation and how large an impact it had on her because she lived in a small community. After the incident, C.C. slipped into an abyss and was extremely upset, depressed and emotionally unable.

54Dr. Shapiro testified that the text message C.C. sent on December 12, 2012, was unusually calm with very specific information in it that she had had enough although she did not detail the specific plans she had to kill herself. She asked Dr. Shapiro to take care of her service animal and would email detailed instructions about how to care for her. She asked Dr. Shapiro not to tell D.C. about this text, as she wanted to spend her last day with them in harmony. Dr. Shapiro testified that he felt helpless as he was 5.5 hours away from C.C.. He asked her to go to the hospital and told her that he would tell D.C. if she did not go to the hospital. Eventually she went to the hospital. In his opinion, the incident at the restaurant and the subsequent threats to J.C. contributed to her decision that there was nothing else she could do but commit suicide.

55Dr. Shapiro also wrote a letter, dated January 7, 2013, about C.C.. This letter was introduced as an exhibit. Dr. Shapiro testified that he wrote this letter for C.C. if she needed to validate the presence of her service animal somewhere including at a restaurant.

56C.C. and D.C. testified that they may have to move away from this community as they continue to hear about people talking about C.C.’s experience with the restaurant. They had an experience shortly before the hearing where some people got up and changed seats in a restaurant when they sat down. C.C. is still worried that Ms. L. will come after her.

The Effect Upon J.C.

57After the animal notice was posted, J.C. testified that it was awkward and tense at work and hard to be there. She started to get comments from regular customers that Ms. L. had been spreading rumours about her when she was not at work, although she could not remember what the rumours were.

58On her last shift at the restaurant, after Ms. L. threatened her, J.C. worked on auto pilot and could not speak with Ms. L. for the rest of the shift. She barely held herself together. She believed Ms. L.’s threats to be real and sincere. When she left the restaurant that night, she cried and told her parents and R.C. about what happened. She believes that the health inspector’s visit in December 2012 was as a result of Ms. L. complaining to public health as the issues in the complaint were the same ones that Ms. L. told her about on September 28, 2012.

59J.C. has a number of medical conditions, some of which had been dormant. Following her interactions with the respondents and the inspector’s visit, the symptoms for J.C.’s medical conditions increased. This included fibromyalgia, stress, joint pain and swelling, sensitivity to light, body aches and depression and decreased interest in her usual activities. Medical documentation in support of these conditions was introduced as an exhibit. She was terrified about the SPCA being called in and terrified that they would put down her dogs. Because of her increased medical conditions, J.C. could not continue with her dog sledding business, although it operated in the winter of 2012/2013, but not at full capacity. J.C. found homes for her sledding dogs. She was extremely upset to give up a business that she spent 10 years building and where there was a wait list and she considered her dogs to be her kids. She, and her parents, were very emotional during this part of her testimony. J.C. cannot see her dogs because it is too upsetting for her to see them. She also decided to move away to another location, where she is now working.

60D.C. testified that he tried to assure J.C. that Ms. L. would not follow through with her threat and even if she did, it would not be a problem as J.C. was not doing anything wrong in her business. However, when the health inspector showed up, J.C. was even more terrified that the SPCA would show up, seize her dogs and put down her dogs without her knowledge. J.C.’s fibromyalgia, that she has had since 2006, flared up which affected her and her ability to run her dog sledding business.

61J.C. attempted to find other employment from December 2012, when she was laid off by Pioneer Construction. She received EI and eventually found employment in July 2013.

law and analysis

C.C.’s Application

62The relevant Code sections for C.C.’s Application are 1, 8, 10(1) “disability”, and 13(1). They state:

1. Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability.

2. Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Act, to institute and participate in proceedings under this Act and to refuse to infringe a right of another person under this Act, without reprisal or threat of reprisal for so doing.

3. “disability” means,

(a) any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, a brain injury, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical co-ordination, blindness or visual impairment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment, or physical reliance on a guide dog or other animal or on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device,

(d) a mental disorder.

13(1) A right under Part I is infringed by a person who publishes or displays before the public or causes the publication or display before the public of any notice, sign, symbol, emblem, or other similar representation that indicates the intention of the person to infringe a right under Part I or that is intended by the person to incite the infringement of a right under Part I.

63While the respondents did not participate in the Tribunal’s process, C.C., as an applicant, still has the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that a violation of the Code has occurred. A balance of probabilities means that it is more likely than not that a violation has occurred. Clear, convincing and cogent evidence is required in order to satisfy the balance of probabilities test. See F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 at para. 46.

64In order to establish a case of discrimination, an applicant must prove that (1) she had, or was perceived to have, a disability; (2) she received adverse treatment, and (3) her disability was a factor in the adverse treatment. See Shaw v. Phipps, 2010 ONSC 3884 at para. 47, upheld 2012 ONCA 155, and Peel Law Association v. Pieters, 2013 ONCA 396 at para. 56.

65I find that C.C. has a “disability” within the meaning of the Code. In addition to the oral evidence, the medical documentation submitted indicates that she has bipolar disorder, which the Tribunal has found is within the definition of “disability”. See Lane v. ADGA Group Consultants Inc., 2007 HRTO 34, upheld 2008 CanLII 39606 (ON SCDC). Hearing impairment, for which C.C. wears a hearing aid, is specifically included in the Code definition of disability. She has, for medical reasons, a service animal, her service animal, who is clearly marked as a service animal, and whose badge says “do not pet”, and for whom she has medical documentation confirming that her service animal is a service animal. The evidence is that C.C. is the only one in the community who uses a service animal.

66Notwithstanding section 13, the announced intention to discriminate section, intention to discriminate is not a governing factor in construing human rights legislation. See Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (“Simpsons-Sears”) at para. 18. Instead, it is the result or effect of the alleged discriminatory action that is significant. However, it is difficult to see how the respondents’ actions pertaining to C.C. were anything but intentional.

67It may be that the L.’s, who own and operate a small restaurant in a small community, are unknowledgeable about their legal obligations under the Code, but this does not shelter them from their Code obligations pertaining to either services or employment.

68First of all, the personal respondents were specifically told by J.C. that C.C.’s service animal was a service animal. J.C. testified that in July 2012 she told Ms. L. that C.C.’s service animal was a service animal after Ms. L. questioned why C.C. entered the municipal building with an animal when she was not blind or deaf. J.C. did not disclose the nature of C.C.’s disabilities, but she was not required to do so when stating that the animal was a service animal. J.C. also testified that in September 2012, after the animal sign was posted, that she told Mr. L. that C.C.’s service animal was a service animal who, by law, was permitted to enter the public area of restaurants, but not kitchens. C.C.’s service animal clearly wears a service vest which indicates that she is a service animal and not a pet.

69Despite receiving information in July 2012 that C.C.’s service animal was a service animal, knowing that C.C. is not blind, and knowing that she is the mother of one of their employees, the restaurant posted two animal signs in early September 2012 restricting the entry of service animal to those trained as a guide for blind persons only. In the video, Ms. L. confirms that she wrote the animal sign. Based upon just this restriction alone, C.C. would have been denied entry into the restaurant if she attended with her service animal.

70Furthermore, Mr. L.’s statement to J.C. in early September that someone had complained to public health about an animal being in the restaurant was not true. The public health manager confirmed in emails to C.C. that it did not produce the animal sign and that it had not received any complaints about an animal being in the restaurant.

71At no time did Mr. or Ms. L. ask J.C. to provide a copy of documentation, medical or otherwise, confirming that C.C. was required to use a service animal. At no time did Mr. or Ms. L ask J.C. to have C.C. contact them to produce documentation, medical or otherwise, in support of her use of a service animal. In hindsight, this may have been a better approach for the respondents to take as it would have addressed their alleged customer complaint particularly as C.C. attended the restaurant on several occasions with her service animal and other members of her family without any questions or trouble.

72On September 26, 2012, Ms. L.’s conduct with the C.’s suggests that she was looking for a way to deny service to C.C.. She virtually pounced on C.C. with her demand to produce medical documentation when she closely followed the C.’s to their table and requested this documentation before the C.’s had even sat down. I accept the evidence that C.C.’s hearing aid was visible to Ms. L. and that her service animal was clearly identified as a service animal this day. I accept the evidence that C.C. agreed to produce her medical documentation, and then produced it. I also accept the evidence that Ms. L. wanted to photocopy the medical documentation, to which C.C. initially agreed, and then changed her mind and refused to let it be photocopied. I do not see why Ms. L. was required to photocopy the documentation upon it being presented to her and there was no evidence to support why this request was made.

73After this, the video captures C.C. attempting to explain, initially in a calm manner and then with a raised voice, that she does not have to produce documentation because her service animal is clearly marked as a service animal and is permitted in the restaurant. She also reads excerpts from the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005. Ms. L., by contrast, is upset with her voice raised and her arms moving around as she makes gestures. She makes no attempt to listen to or understand the requirements under the legislation from which C.C. is reading.

74C.C. specifically refers to the animal sign as “stupid”, which, upon hindsight was a poor choice of word to use. Ms. L. mishears or misinterprets C.C.’s comment to mean that she is stupid and she refuses to accept C.C.’s explanation that the comment was attributed to the sign, not her. However, by this stage, Ms. L. is incensed and unreasonable in her interactions with C.C., and she refuses any other explanation saying that she wrote the animal sign and that C.C., by calling the sign stupid is calling her stupid.

75Ms. L. walks through the restaurant yelling. In response to C.C. requesting that the C.’s be served and that they will sit until the police are called, Ms. L. says, in the presence of another customer, “You are going to wait a long fucking time because I ain’t no fucking waiting on you”. She said that C.C. would not humiliate her in front of the mayor or in front of city council and she would do what she wanted in her restaurant.

76In the meantime, Mr. L., who was present in the restaurant, did not intervene, try to de-escalate Ms. L.’s reaction, or serve the C.s.

77Based upon the above, I find that C.C. was intentionally discriminated against by the respondents contrary to sections 1, 8 and 13 of the Code on the basis of her disability when she was denied service in the restaurant on September 26, 2012 because she was with her service animal.

J.C.’s Application

78The relevant Code sections for J.C.’s Application are sections 5(1), (2), 8 (which is set out above), and 10 “family status” and “harassment”. They state:

5(1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability.

(2) Every person who is an employee has a right to freedom from harassment in the workplace by the employer or agent of the employer or by another employee because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability.

10 “family status” means the status of being in a parent and child relationship

“harassment” means engaging in a course of vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.

79Based upon the evidence before me, I find that the respondents discriminated against J.C. contrary to sections 5 of the Code based upon being a daughter of C.C. and/or because of her association with C.C. and reprised against J.C..

80Essentially, J.C.’s Application picks up where C.C.’s leaves off – late September 2012. While J.C. experienced some discomfort in July and September 2012 because of her conversations with Mr. and Ms. L. about C.C. using a service animal, it was not directed specifically to her until after September 26, 2012.

81On September 28, 2012, Ms. L. discriminated against J.C. when she intentionally instructed J.C. not to allow her mother entry into the restaurant, when she was legally entitled to be in the restaurant, not to serve her mother, and to call the police if her mother refused to leave. Her further threats to go after J.C.’s dog sledding business if C.C. pursued her legal rights and her comments “this is not a threat but a promise” could likely be construed as constructive dismissal. These comments arose solely because of J.C.’s relationship with C.C. and placed J.C. in an extremely difficult situation, continuing to work at the restaurant or refusing service to her mother and/or calling the police to remove her mother when her mother was legally entitled to be at the restaurant. Ms. L.’s comments made it untenable for J.C. to continue to work at the restaurant, and it is understandable why she would want to resign rather than to continue to work for the respondents. She tendered her resignation.

82In the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) decision, B. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2002 SCC 66, the employee was related, through marriage, to the two men who owned the business. The employee was the husband to the owners’ sister and father to a daughter to whom the owners were uncles. The employee was terminated after one of the owners was accused by the employee’s daughter and wife of sexually assaulting the employee’s daughter when she was a young child. The employee claimed that his termination was discriminatory on the basis of marital and family status. The SCC asked whether the employee was arbitrarily disadvantaged on the basis of his marital or family status, and concluded, on page 429, that he was.

83In Giguere v. Popeye Restaurant, 2008 HRTO 2, the Tribunal considered a situation where the complainant was a waitress at a small town restaurant. The complainant’s partner was HIV-positive and the restaurant received complaints from customers about the complainant working there as there was fear that she would contract and spread her partner’s disability. The restaurant terminated the waitress. The Tribunal concluded that the complainant was terminated because of her association with a person, her partner, who had a disability.

84Similarly, I find that Ms. L.’s comments to J.C., on September 29, 2012 were discriminatory based upon J.C.’s status as C.C.’s daughter and/or her association with someone who has a disability. Ms. L.’s comments were directly about J.C.’s mother and stated to prevent J.C. to admit her mother into the restaurant, where she was legally entitled to go.

85Furthermore, Ms. L.’s comments constituted harassment and were such that she ought to have known where unwelcome. The Tribunal has recognized that in appropriate circumstances a single incident, if serious, will meet the definition of harassment. See Romano v. 1577118 Ontario Inc., 2008 HRTO 9 at para. 65; Ibrahim v. Hilton Toronto, 2013 HRTO 673 at para. 163.

86In Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878, the Tribunal’s then Chair, now Executive Chair, held at para. 33 that the following elements must be established in an application alleging reprisal: an action taken against, or threat made to, the applicant; the alleged action or threat is related to the applicant having claimed, or attempted to enforce a right under the Code; and an intention on the part of the respondent to retaliate for the claim or attempt to enforce the right. The Tribunal also held, at para. 34, that there was no strict requirement that the applicant had filed an application under the Code or that the Tribunal find the respondent did violate the applicant’s substantive rights to be free from discrimination.

87Ms. L.’s comments and instructions to J.C. constitute reprisal within the meaning of the Code. Neither J.C. nor C.C. had filed an application under the Code, but Ms. L.’s comments were certainly a threat to J.C. in relation to her mother asserting her Code rights at the restaurant during the confrontation. Furthermore, it is clear that the comments were intentionally made to scare J.C., and C.C., from attempting to enforce their rights. The threat to J.C.’s dog sledding business is a clear form of retribution.

88Based upon this, I find that J.C. was discriminated against by the respondents contrary to sections 5(1), (2), and 8 of the Code.

Remedies

89The Tribunal's remedial jurisdiction is set out in sections 45.2(1) and (2) of the Code, which provides that the Tribunal has the power to order monetary compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect; to order restitution; and to direct any party to do anything that promotes compliance with the Code.

90It is well-established that the purpose of the Code is remedial, not punitive. The purpose of ordering that monetary compensation be paid to an applicant is an attempt to restore the applicant to the position he or she would have been in had the discrimination not occurred. An award of monetary compensation seeks to compensate the victim of discrimination and not punish the perpetrator. See Simpson-Sears, above, at para. 18.

91While the respondent may be a small business, in assessing quantum, the Tribunal is mindful of not setting the amount too low so as to avoid trivializing the social importance of the Code by effectively creating a “licence fee” to discriminate. See Sanford v. Koop, 2005 HRTO 53 at para. 34, and Ferreira v. KMS Van Lines Inc., 2013 HRTO 182 at para. 102. The Tribunal has held that the loss arising out of the injury to an applicant’s dignity, feelings and self-respect is no less compensable because of the limited financial situation of a respondent. See Longboard v. 708179 Ontario Inc., at para. 50.

92In the oft-cited Arunachalam v. Best Buy Canada, 2010 HRTO 1880 the Tribunal explained that there are several key factors that it considers in ordering remedies, specifically the objective seriousness of the conduct and the effect on the particular applicant who experienced discrimination. At paras. 52 to 54 it stated:

The Tribunal’s jurisprudence over the two years since the new damages provision took effect has primarily applied two criteria in making the global evaluation of the appropriate damages for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect: the objective seriousness of the conduct and the effect on the particular applicant who experienced discrimination: see, in particular, Seguin v. Great Blue Heron Charity Casino, 2009 HRTO 940 at para. 16.

The first criterion recognizes that injury to dignity, feelings, and self respect is generally more serious depending, objectively, upon what occurred. For example, dismissal from employment for discriminatory reasons usually affects dignity more than a comment made on one occasion. Losing long-term employment because of discrimination is typically more harmful than losing a new job. The more prolonged, hurtful, and serious harassing comments are, the greater the injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

The second criterion recognizes the applicant’s particular experience in response to the discrimination. Damages will be generally at the high end of the relevant range when the applicant has experienced particular emotional difficulties as a result of the event, and when his or her particular circumstances make the effects particularly serious. Some of the relevant considerations in relation to this factor are discussed in Sanford v. Koop, 2005 HRTO 53 at paras. 34-38.

Remedies in C.C.’s Application

93I decline to award the $40,000 that C.C. seeks as monetary compensation that she requested, and instead have determined that $10,000 is a more appropriate amount.

94Objectively, the respondents’ conduct, particularly that of Ms. L., is egregious. They operate a restaurant in a small community where there are limited possibilities to dine out. The respondents did not want C.C. to attend their restaurant, with her service animal, given the animal sign they posted, the untrue assertion of a complaint made to public health, their refusal to listen to the legal obligations about which J.C. and C.C. informed them prior to and on September 26, 2012, and the rude and aggressive behaviour Ms. L. demonstrated towards C.C. on September 26, 2012. The respondents employ her daughter J.C., and C.C. is the only person in the community to use a service animal.

95Subjectively, C.C. was significantly affected by the respondents’ actions. She felt that the respondents targeted her personally, were rude to her, in the presence of another customer, and limited her already limited dining options. On September 26, 2012, right after the incident, she could not breathe well, was crying and was upset. Later that night, she continued to be distraught such that she attended the crisis intervention unit at the hospital where she received medical treatment and medication.

96Later, after J.C.’s employment was affected, C.C. experienced an increase in her medical symptoms such that by the end of November 2012 she was contemplating suicide and was researching into different methods of committing it. In December 2012, after the health inspector attended her residence, C.C. stated her intention to commit suicide in a text to Dr. Shapiro, and then was involuntarily admitted to the hospital for suicide ideation.

97While I recognize that C.C.’s medical condition deteriorated after the September 26, 2012 incident, and I have considered the oral testimony given during the hearing about it, I cannot find that it was solely attributable, after October 2, 2012, to the conduct of the respondents given the medical conditions that existed before and after September 26, 2012, the absence of medical evidence linking it to the respondents’ conduct, and the lack of direct evidence establishing that one of the respondents called the health inspector about J.C.’s business. Had there been more medical information connecting C.C.’s medical condition to the respondents’ conduct and direct evidence that established one of the respondents complaining about J.C.’s business to the health department, the amount awarded to C.C. would have been higher.

98I note that no medical practitioner who was treating C.C. for her mental health conditions was called to testify. While Dr. Shapiro testified about C.C.’s mental health condition during the fall of 2012, in my opinion, he did so because of the personal friendship that he had with C.C., rather than as a treating medical professional. In any event, Dr. Shapiro is a licensed chiropractor who was not treating her for her mental health conditions.

99The only reference to the restaurant incident is in a clinical note dated October 2, 2012 from a nurse practitioner. That note also indicates that C.C. was seeing a psychiatrist, yet no medical documentation from the psychiatrist was entered as an exhibit.

100The subsequent medical notes from the nurse practitioner address the side effects C.C. was having with medications and/or not taking medications. The stated reason for the suicide ideation in November, according to the November 26, 2012 clinical note that was entered as an exhibit, is because of a lack of treatment for her bipolar disorder and her desire not to feel this way for the rest of her life. The medical documentation pertaining to her involuntary admission to the hospital in December 2012 for suicide ideation identifies her “history of bipolar disorder with rapid cycling”, does not state or identify the restaurant or provide any reasons about why she had active suicide ideation

101I can place little weight on Dr. Shapiro’s letter dated January 7, 2013 and particularly the line, “I have seen improvement in her overall health since she has been in partnership with her service [animal], [name of animal]”. This line is inconsistent with the evidence, documentary and oral, including Dr. Shapiro’s own, that C.C.’s medical condition deteriorated to the point that she was contemplating suicide in November 2012 and was involuntarily admitted to the hospital in December 2012 for active suicide ideation. I also place little weight upon his evidence as, in my opinion, he was testifying as a close friend rather than as a neutral medical practitioner.

102There is no direct evidence that one of the respondents actually made a complaint about J.C.’s business to the health department. The documentation from public health about the complaint does not identify the complainant. In correspondence from the health unit to C.C. enclosing its records, the health unit reported that the third party personal information was removed pursuant to section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act and it outlined an appeal process if C.C. did not agree with its decision. I did not hear any evidence from either C.C. or J.C. about appealing that decision, and no one from the health unit or the respondents was subpoenaed to testify, regardless of whether or not they were compellable to testify.

103Clearly C.C. and J.C. have concluded that Ms. L. followed through with her threat to complain about J.C.’s dog sledding business to the health department. They may be right in coming to that conclusion, but I am not prepared to infer that one of the respondents contacted the health unit and attribute that inference to C.C.’s deteriorated mental health following the inspector’s visit in light of the concerns I have expressed, above, about the medical documentation.

104I have considered the line of service animal cases that have been decided by the Tribunal in services cases and the monetary compensation that has been awarded. This includes: Hill v. Bani-Ahmad, 2014 HRTO 937 ($5,000); Schussler v. 1709043 Ontario, 2009 HRTO 2194 ($500); Bourdeau v. Kingston Bazar, 2012 HRTO 393 ($15,000). In the circumstances of this case, I find that $10,000 is an appropriate amount to award in C.C.’s Application, which shall be paid jointly and severally by the respondents. Pre-judgment interest, in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act (“CJA”) shall run from September 26, 2012. Post-judgment interest, in accordance with the CJA, shall run on any unpaid amount that is unpaid after 30 days of the date of this Decision.

Remedies to J.C.

105J.C. had requested $35,000 as monetary compensation for the respondents’ actions towards her, $58,378 for losses incurred pertaining to her dog sledding business, $5,002.95 as loss of wages, and pre- and post-judgment interest. I find it appropriate to award $15,000 as compensation for loss of dignity, feelings and self-respect, plus pre- and post-judgment interest, and I decline to award any losses pertaining to either her business or her wages.

Monetary Compensation for Injury to Dignity, Feelings and Self-Respect

106The Tribunal has recognized that loss of employment usually affects dignity more than a comment on one occasion. See Aranachalum, at para. 53. It has also accepted that an applicant who is forced to quit because of a respondent’s discriminatory actions can receive monetary compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. See Byers v. Fiddicks Nursing Home, 2012 HRTO 952. It has also considered the length of employment in assessing compensation, with higher amounts awarded to long term employees or shorter service employees when disability is involved. See O’Brien v. Organic Works Inc. 2012 HRTO 457, Defina v. Lithocolour Services Ltd., 2012 HRTO 1768 and Moore v. Curraghmore Farm Inc., 2013 HRTO 1586.

107Objectively, J.C.’s situation was a very difficult one. One of the owners of her employer, in a small town, instructed her not to allow her mother, who was legally entitled to be there, into the restaurant and directed her to call the police if her mother refused to leave. Furthermore, that same owner directly threatened not only to report J.C.’s dog sledding business if her mother pursued her legal rights about being denied service in the restaurant, but threatened to make sure that the business would not open that winter or any other winter. However, she had been an employee for approximately 14 months and the issues with her employer arose because of her association with her mother rather than against her personally.

108Subjectively, J.C. was affected by her employers’ actions, such that she immediately tendered her resignation because of the hostile working environment. She was also so concerned that she approached the OPP to report the threat that Ms. L. made towards her, but the OPP told her it was a civil matter, not a criminal one. She lived in fear that Ms. L. would act upon her threats, and, in her opinion, this materialized when the public health inspector arrived at her home on December 12, 2012.

109However, it was not until the inspector visited on December 12, 2012 that J.C.’s otherwise dormant medical conditions flared, which affected her ability to operate her dog sledding business to the same level she had in previous years and impacted her ability to find other employment. The medical documentation that was entered as an exhibit is from May 2013 and provides no information from September to December 2012. As with C.C.’s situation, in the absence of information confirming that the complaint to public health was one of the respondents, I am not prepared to accept that the effects on J.C. from December 12, 2012 onwards, were because of or related to the respondents.

110I have determined that $15,000 is appropriate for monetary compensation for loss of injury, dignity and self-respect which shall be paid jointly and severally by the respondents. Pre-judgment interest, in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act (“CJA”) shall run from September 28, 2012, the date Ms. L. communicated her threats to J.C.. Post-judgment interest, in accordance with the CJA, shall run on any unpaid amount that is unpaid after 30 days of the date of this Decision.

Losses Pertaining to her Dog Sledding Business and Loss of Income

111I am not prepared to award any loss of business or income for J.C.. I accept her evidence that she intended to continue working at the restaurant once she started working with Pioneer Construction on October 1, 2012, which was the day after she resigned. She testified that initially she was going to work 40 hours with Pioneer Construction and that they would let her leave work early on Friday afternoons to go and work at the restaurant for Friday, Saturday and Sunday shifts. However, after she quit her employment at the restaurant, Pioneer Construction allowed her to work 55 hours per week, which she did until she was laid off on December 13, 2012, the day after the health inspector attended her home. While working with Pioneer Construction, she had a higher hourly wage than she did at working at the restaurant, so her wages during this time were $170.60 per month higher than if she had worked at both places, based upon 15 hours a week at the restaurant as she claimed.

112With respect to her tips, I cannot find that J.C. has established what her losses in tips would have been during this period. She testified that she made about $100, in cash, as tips on a monthly basis, which she deposited into her bank account. Her statements from May 1 to October 31, 2012 show differing monthly cash deposits, with each month less than $100. Further, since she made more than $100 per month in wages while working exclusively with Pioneer Construction, it would appear that there was no loss of tips during this period.

113Given my finding that the effect on J.C. after December 12, 2012, the date the health inspector attends her premises, was not because or related to the respondents, any losses she suffered for her dog sledding business and any loss of income subsequent to that date are not awarded.

Future Compliance Remedies

114The applicants advised the Tribunal that the restaurant closed at some point subsequent to their interactions with it, but re-opened sometime between February to April 2014 with the same owners, but at the second address it had provided the Tribunal in September 2013. Subsequent to the hearing, the applicants provided various documentation in support of this position.

115The applicants request that the Tribunal award future compliance remedies against the respondents. Those remedies include: posting a letter in the restaurant stating that service animals are welcome in their establishment; consulting with an external consultant who is an expert in human rights matters and drafting an anti-harassment policy pertaining to individual’s Code rights in services and employment; providing a copy of the harassment policy to all employees; and providing training to all staff within 6 months. The applicants made submissions that future compliance remedies could be awarded even if the restaurant was not operational citing Garrie v. Janus Joan Inc. 2014 HRTO 272, and Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Farris, 2012 ONSC 3876 (Div. Ct.).

116In the circumstances of these Applications, I see no reason why not to order the future compliance remedies that have been requested.

order

117Accordingly, the Tribunal orders the following:

1. Within 30 days of the date of this Decision, the respondents shall, jointly and severally, pay to C.C. the amount of $10,000 as monetary compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, along with pre-judgment interest from September 26, 2012, in accordance with section 128 of the CJA;

2. Within 30 days of the date of this Decision, the respondents shall, jointly and severally, pay to J.C., the amount of $15,000 as monetary compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, along with pre-judgment interest from September 28, 2012, in accordance with section 128 of the CJA;

3. The respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay C.C. and J.C. post-judgment interest in accordance with section 129 of the CJA on any amounts in paras. 1 and 2 that are not paid within 30 days from the date of this Decision;

4. Within 6 months from the date of this Decision, the respondents shall, jointly and severally:

a. post a letter in the restaurant stating that service animals are welcome in this establishment;

b. consult with an external consultant who is an expert in human rights matters and draft an anti-harassment policy pertaining to individual’s Code rights in services and employment;

c. provide a copy of the harassment policy to all employees;

d. provide human rights training to all staff; and

e. provide written confirmation to the applicants’ counsel that they have complied with this Order.