HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Laryn Hussey
Applicant
-and-
Toyota Motor Manufacturing of Canada
Respondent
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Geneviève Debané
Date: October 28, 2014
Citation: 2014 HRTO 1587
Indexed as: Hussey v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing of Canada
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Laryn Hussey, Applicant
Cherolyn Knapp, Counsel
Toyota Motor Manufacturing of Canada, Respondent
Ted Kovacs, Counsel
1The applicant has filed an Application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of family status. In the Application the applicant indicated that the Application should be deferred pending the resolution of another legal proceeding.
2On August 14, 2014, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer and advised the respondent that it did not have to file a Response.
3On September 15, 2014 the respondent filed submissions on the issue of deferral. The respondent also filed a Request to dismiss the Application on the basis of delay. The respondent consents to defer the Application but only after the Tribunal has addressed its Request to dismiss.
Decision
4The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Rule 14.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure). The Tribunal must consider, in light of the particular circumstances of each case, whether deferral is the most fair, just and expeditious way of proceeding with the application. In Baghdasserians v. 674469 Ontario, 2008 HRTO 404, the Tribunal made the following comments about deferral at paras. 18-19:
Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. However, deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings.
Some of the factors that may be relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the type of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer, having regard to the status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them.
5In this case the applicant has filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labour alleging that the respondent breached the leaves of absence provisions of the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (“ESA”). Having reviewed the complaint, I am of the view that the allegations therein are almost identical to the allegations in the Application. The Tribunal has generally deferred applications where there is an ongoing ESA proceeding and if the subject matter is similar to that of the application, see Rogers v. Holcim (Canada), 2011 HRTO 86.
6Applying these principles to this case, I find it is appropriate to defer this Application pending the conclusion of the ESA claim. It would not be constructive to have two proceedings consider concurrently the same facts as this may lead to contrary findings. Therefore, it is most fair, just and expeditious to defer this Application.
7With respect to the respondent’s position that the Application should be dismissed on preliminary issues, the Tribunal does not usually address these requests if it determines that it is appropriate to defer.
8Accordingly, the Application is deferred pending the conclusion of the complaint filed with the Ministry of Labour which includes any appeals. The Tribunal directs the parties’ attention to Rule 14 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure which sets out the procedure if a party wishes to proceed with an application that has been deferred pending the conclusion of another proceeding.
9I am not seized.
Dated at Toronto, this 28th day of October, 2014.
“signed by”
Geneviève Debané
Vice-chair