Khan v. Heritage Glen Salon and Spa, 2014 HRTO 1556

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Afia Khan

Applicant

-and-

Heritage Glen Salon and Spa, Mary Kearns, Malicky Kearns, Kathleen Kearns and Brigid Kearns

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Paul Aterman

Date: October 20, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 1556

Indexed as: Khan v. Heritage Glen Salon and Spa

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Afia Khan, Applicant

Self-represented

1This Decision explains why the Tribunal has no authority to deal with this Application and must dismiss it. The Application alleges a reprisal with respect to employment contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2The applicant was employed as a stylist by the corporate respondent until her employment was terminated on July 4, 2013. She alleges that during her employment the personal respondent Brigid Kearns would regularly harass her by belittling the quality of her work, yelling at her in front of customers, wrongly accusing her of having taken money and having mislaid keys to the salon. She alleges that, because this was a family business, all of the other personal respondents would condone the behaviour of Brigid Kearns, even while acknowledging that it was wrong and unfounded. The applicant’s employment was terminated by Brigid Kearns.

3The applicant filed a complaint with the Employment Standards Branch of the Ministry of Labour. On April 29, 2014 an Employment Standards Officer determined that the applicant had been slightly overpaid her vacation pay but that the corporate respondent was liable to pay the applicant four weeks’ salary rather than two weeks’ as termination pay.

4The applicant filed this Application on July 3, 2014 alleging a reprisal. The Application does not explain how any of the respondents are alleged to have taken measures against the applicant because she tried to advance her rights under the Code or because she refused to infringe the Code rights of another person. Rather, the Application provides a series of allegations of harassment in the workplace against Brigid Kearns and explains that the other personal respondents turned a blind eye to this allegedly harassing conduct.

5Because the Application does not establish a link to a reprisal contrary to the Code, the Tribunal sent the applicant a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) on August 13, 2014. The NOID explains that the applicant needed to provide information that could establish a connection to reprisal under the Code or her Application would be dismissed. This is because the Tribunal does not have the authority to deal with general complaints of harassment that are not connected to an alleged violation of the rights that are set out in the Code. The NOID referred the applicant to the Tribunal’s decisions in Mirea v. Canadian National Exhibition, 2009 HRTO 32 and Chan v. Tai Pan Vacations, 2009 HRTO 273 so that she might get a better sense of how the Tribunal deals with allegations of reprisal.

6The applicant requested and was granted an extension of time until October 6, 2014 to respond to the NOID because she was trying to obtain legal advice. The applicant has now provided submissions, but they simply repeat what was already set out in the Application. The submissions do not explain how the actions of any of the respondents could be seen as a reprisal for the applicant having asserted or tried to enforce her own Code rights or for having refused to infringe the Code rights of another person.

7The submissions have appended to them a fact sheet produced by the Ministry of Labour which explains why employers cannot take reprisals against employees for having asserted their rights under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c.41. This suggests to me that the applicant may believe that this Tribunal can enforce the provisions of the Employment Standards Act, but this is not the case. The Tribunal only has authority to deal with violations of the Code.

8While the Application and the NOID submissions both set out a number of allegations of harassing conduct in the workplace, none of these is linked to any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Code, including reprisal. As a result I conclude that the Tribunal does not have authority to deal with the issues that are raised by this Application.

order

9The Application is dismissed.