Umanski v. Cree, 2014 HRTO 1263

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Rita Umanski

Applicant

-and-

David Cree, John Heintzman, Cathleen McDonald

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Alison Renton

Date: August 27, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 1263

Indexed as: Umanski v. Cree

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Rita Umanski, Applicant

Self-represented

1This Application was filed June 27, 2014, under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). It identifies August 5, 2010 as being the last date of the incidents upon which the Application is based.

2In responding to a question on the Application about why she was filing more than a year from the last event, the applicant stated that she was not able to find information about the Tribunal and that she experienced “traumatic suppression as a result of severe repeated abuse”. She also identified several unrelated adverse events, including a car accident in early 2009, head trauma due to a fall in February 2010, surgery in May 2011, and illness in her extended family which caused significant suffering for prolonged periods of time and interfered with her ability to efficiently and appropriately deal with her allegations.

3The Application has not been sent to the respondents for Response.

4The Tribunal sent a Notice of Intent to Dismiss letter dated July 9, 2014 to the applicant indicating that the Application may be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because it was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination and because it did not appear to have cited facts that constitute “good faith” within the meaning of the Tribunal’s case law. The Tribunal requested that the applicant file submissions addressing the apparent delay issue.

5The applicant filed submissions dated July 30, 2014. In those submissions, she claims that she deeply suffered from the alleged abuse and its consequences, and did not know her options to assert her right not to be harassed and solicited. She stated that this was all the more challenging for “people like I who did not happen to grow up in Canada”. She did not know she could file an application with the Tribunal.

6Furthermore, the applicant submitted that her ignorance of human rights law was due to “massive psychological trauma and suppression” that she experienced as a result of repeated instances of abuse. She was overwhelmed with painful feelings, which she identified, which prevented her from complaining of being harassed, making persistent inquiries, and finding necessary information until the spring of 2013. The applicant attached to her Application a copy of a June 21, 2013 complaint letter she filed with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (“CPSO”) about the respondents, an August 9, 2013 letter to the investigator responding the respondents’ responses, a November 11, 2013 decision (“the November 2013 decision”) of the CPSO’s Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (“the Committee”) dismissing the applicant’s complaint, and her February 10, 2014 letter to the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board requesting a review of the Committee’s November 2013 decision (“the February 2014 review”).

law and analysis

7Sections 34(1) and (2) of the Code provide:

34(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under subsection 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

8Section 34(1) is a mandatory limitation period established under the Code. The Tribunal has held in numerous decisions that if an applicant seeks to rely upon an untimely allegation, he or she must satisfy the Tribunal that the delay in raising the allegation was incurred in good faith pursuant to section 34(2) of the Code. The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, while recognizing that there will be legitimate circumstances that justify exercising the discretion under section 34(2). See Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241.

9While the Tribunal accepts that a delay may be in good faith because of an applicant’s medical condition, it has consistently ruled that it requires medical evidence that the disability was so debilitating as to prevent an applicant from pursuing his or her legal rights under the Code: see, for example, Forde v. Avon Maitland District School Board, 2011 HRTO 1664, and the cases cited therein at para. 39. The applicant, whose background is in medicine and psychology, and who hopes from this proceeding to be appointed for a training position in psychiatry or Ph.D. program leading to a career in neuropsychology, provided very little to the Tribunal beyond mere assertions about the psychological trauma and suppression from which she suffered. She provided no medical documentation in support of these claims. It appears that some of her education continued during the time period relevant to her allegations, specifically the passing of some examinations in the summer of 2010.

10With respect to the applicant’s assertion that she was ignorant of human rights laws and its requirement that an application be filed within the mandatory one-year limitation period, the Tribunal has said in many cases that ignorance of the law is no excuse in matters relating to delay in asserting one’s rights. See, Imrie-Howlett v. Peel District School Board, 2009 HRTO 1339 at para. 10, and Lutz v. Toronto (City), 2009 HRTO 1137 at para. 8.

11Furthermore, the applicant failed to provide any explanation about how she could pursue rights before the CPSO, commencing in June 2013, yet not file an Application prior to June 27, 2014, a year later. Efforts to pursue one’s rights in other areas or forums without filing an Application have not, without more, been held by this Tribunal to justify a waiver of the one-year limitation period under section 34(2). See Gagne v. Maximum Mining, 2010 HRTO 689 at para. 12. She has provided no explanation about why it took her seven months from receiving the Committee’s November 2013 decision to file her Application, or four months from her request of the February 2014 review.

12For these reasons, I find that the Application was filed outside the mandatory one-year limitation period required by section 34(1) of the Code and that the applicant has not provided a good faith explanation for her delay in filing her Application as required by section 34(2).

13Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.