Goetz v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2014 HRTO 1176

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Ernst Goetz

Applicant

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as Represented by the Minister of Community and Social Services (Family Responsibility Office)

Respondent

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: Jennifer Scott

Date: August 8, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 1176

Indexed as: Goetz v. Ontario (Community and Social Services)

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Ernst Goetz, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1This Application, filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleges discrimination with respect to services because of sex. The applicant alleges that the respondent enforced child support orders against him in a discriminatory manner because of his gender.

2By decision 2014 HRT0 836 (the “Decision”), the Tribunal dismissed the Application because it was out of time and was therefore, outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

3On June 12, 2014, the applicant filed a Request for Reconsideration on the basis that there were new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier and other factors exist that outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions. With the Request for Reconsideration, the applicant filed a letter to the respondent dated July 17, 2013 wherein the applicant complained about the respondent’s failure to remit the issue of child support arrears back to court when it became aware of the applicant’s change in circumstances and the undue hardship that he experienced from 2011 to 2013.

test for reconsideration

4Under section 45.7 of the Code, the Tribunal may, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, reconsider its decisions in accordance with Tribunal’s Rules.

45.7(1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.

(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.

5The Tribunal has issued Rules governing such requests as well as a Practice Direction to provide guidance to the community on the Tribunal’s exercise of its reconsideration powers. Rule 26 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure states:

26.1 Any party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal within 30 days from the date of the decision.

26.5 A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that

(a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or

(b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or

(c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or

(d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

6The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration begins with the following statements:

Decisions of the HRTO are final and are not subject to appeal. However, parties may request that the HRTO reconsider a final decision it has made. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the HRTO. Generally, the HRTO will only reconsider a decision where it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary circumstances for doing so and where these circumstances outweigh the public interest in finality of orders and decisions.

decision

7In the Request for Reconsideration, the applicant states the discriminatory practice and policy of the respondent is ongoing and as such, the Application is not out of time. The fact that the applicant continues to experience the continuing effects from the enforcement decisions made by the respondent in 2009 and 2010, namely the current child support arrears, does not make the Application timely. The Tribunal’s jurisprudence is clear that the one-year limitation period commences from the date of an alleged discriminatory act and not from the consequences of the act. See Garrie v. Janus Joan Inc., 2012 HRTO 1955. In this case, the events being complained about occurred in 2009 and 2010. The applicant did not file the Application until 2013. It is out of time for this reason.

8The applicant states further that the Tribunal erred in when it held he should have sought “relief” under the Code much sooner. The applicant is correct in so far as the Tribunal held he should have pursued his rights under the Code within the one-year limitation period as required under the Code.

9The applicant also submits he would have brought his Application to the Tribunal sooner had the respondent informed him of its practice and policy to discriminate on the basis of sex. It is the applicant’s obligation to file his Application in a timely manner. As stated in the Decision, the applicant failed to do so and failed to provide a good faith explanation for his delay.

10The applicant complains further that the Tribunal did not address the question of whether the respondent was prejudiced by the applicant’s late filing of the Application. As stated in the Decision, the Tribunal did not address the question of prejudice because it was unnecessary to do so in light of the fact that the applicant had not established a good faith explanation for his delay.

11The applicant relies on his letter July 17, 2013 to extend the limitation period. This letter is not an incident of discrimination. It is simply a complaint to the respondent regarding its alleged failure to remit the question of child support arrears back to the court when it became aware of the applicant’s change in circumstances and the undue hardship that he was experiencing. There are no allegations of discrimination relating to this letter.

12Finally, the applicant relies on a Request for Order During Proceeding dated June 2, 2014, filed after the summary hearing on April 24, 2014. In the Request for Order, the applicant sought to amend the Application relating to the monetary and non-monetary losses claimed and the compensation sought. The Tribunal did not deal with the Request for Order because the Application was dismissed for delay and was outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear. As such, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s request to amend the Application.

13The Request for Reconsideration is essentially an attempt by the applicant to re-argue matters that were already presented or argued at the hearing or to appeal the Decision. In my view, the applicant has provided no reason to conclude that compelling and extraordinary circumstances exist that outweigh the public interest in finality of decisions. The Request for Reconsideration is denied on that basis.

ORDER

14The Request for Reconsideration is dismissed.