Hahnfeld v. Nacora Insurance Brokers, 2014 HRTO 1161

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Allison Hahnfeld

Applicant

-and-

Nacora Insurance Brokers, Kuehne & Nagel Ltd., Darryl Wolfe, David Schleifer, Natasha Shields, Andrea Joseph, Vini DiCarlo, Dana Pickles and Mirko Rodic

Respondents

INTERIM decision

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel

Date: August 1, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 1161

Indexed as: Hahnfeld v. Nacora Insurance Brokers

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Allison Hahnfeld, Applicant

Self-represented

Nacora Insurance Brokers, Kuehne & Nagel Ltd., Darryl Wolfe, David Schleifer, Natasha Shields, Andrea Joseph, Vini DiCarlo, Dana Pickles and Mirko Rodic, Respondents

Andrew Bratt, Counsel

1By Application filed on May 23, 2014, the applicant alleged that the respondents discriminated against her because of sex and family status and that they reprised against her contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code").

2The applicant raised the following allegations in her Application: that her work duties were taken from her and assigned to a new contract employee while she was on maternity leave; that the respondents did not provide reasonable accommodations in order for her to pump breast milk upon her return to work; that the respondents did not provide her with updated computer equipment upon her return from maternity leave whereas her co-workers received such equipment; that the respondents did not provide reasonable accommodations for her to care for her sick child; that she was denied a cost of living increase that her co-workers had received; and that she was terminated after raising human rights concerns with the respondents.

3In her Application, the applicant noted that she had filed a claim with the Ministry of Labour pursuant to the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41 ("ESA") regarding the subject matter of her Application. The applicant provided a copy of the ESA claim, dated May 12, 2014. The applicant raised all the same issues set out above in her ESA claim.

4On June 25, 2014, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer to the parties indicating that the Tribunal was considering deferring the Application pending conclusion of the Ministry of Labour ESA claim. The Tribunal invited the parties to file submissions as to why the Tribunal's consideration of the Application should or should not be deferred.

5The respondents filed submissions on July 23, 2014, supporting deferral. The respondents submit that both legal proceedings involve significantly similar allegations of discrimination and reprisal. It submitted that concurrent proceedings should be avoided to ensure the orderly administration of justice and to prevent the possibility of inconsistent findings of facts or law.

6The applicant filed submissions on July 24, 2014, opposing deferral. She submitted that the Ministry of Labour advised her that a portion of her complaint fell outside the Ministry's jurisdiction under the ESA – that is, her claim regarding the provision of inadequate accommodations for pumping breast milk. She also submitted that her Application should not be deferred because it raises serious human rights issues and she would continue to suffer personal financial hardship during a deferral.

DECISION

7Under Rule 14.1 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party. Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same or similar issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law.

8The Tribunal will generally defer an application where the parties are involved in another proceeding based on the facts or issues raised in the application. Some factors that have been identified as relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are: the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the types of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer, having regard to the status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them. See Baghdasserians v. 674469 Ontario, 2008 HRTO 404.

9The Tribunal has deferred applications where there are on-going ESA claims with facts and issues that overlap with the subject matter of the Tribunal application. See, for example, Irwin v. HMV Canada, 2013 HRTO 151, Mounfield v. Cambridge Memorial Hospital, 2012 HRTO 1400, and Matechuk v. OLG at Thousand Islands, 2009 HRTO 324.

10While deferral is not automatic simply because the parties are engaged in another proceeding, deferral does not require that the other proceeding deal with precisely the same legal issues as raised in the human rights application. See for example, Christianson v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, 2009 HRTO 438.

11I find that deferral is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. The applicant commenced her ESA claim before she filed her Application and this claim remains outstanding. I understand that she originally sought to file her Application on the same date as her ESA claim but ended up filing it later because she made amendments in light of legal advice she had received. This does not change the fact that the Application was filed after the applicant's ESA claim. A review of the applicant's ESA forms reveals that there is significant overlap between the Application narrative and the ESA claim. In fact all of the same issues are raised in both claims. In these circumstances there is a significant risk of inconsistent factual findings if the two matters were to proceed concurrently.

12There is little doubt that the ESA claim will be addressing the same facts and allegations as raised in this Application, particularly in relation to the circumstances surrounding the termination of the applicant's employment. In these circumstances, I find it appropriate to defer this Application.

13I understand that the applicant is experiencing difficult financial circumstances and that these will continue during the deferral. However, in my view, these concerns cannot override the significant administration of justice considerations that need to be balanced when a claimant has begun concurrent proceedings.

ORDER

14For the reason set out above, the Tribunal defers consideration of the Application pending the conclusion of the ESA process. Where a party wishes to proceed with an application that has been deferred, the party must make a Request for an Order During Proceedings in accordance with Rule 19 within 60 days after the conclusion of the other proceeding (Rules 14.3 and 14.4).

15I am not seized.