HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Her Majesty the Queen
Applicant
-and-
Pro Bono Law Ontario
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir Date: July 25, 2014 Citation: 2014 HRTO 1092 Indexed as: the Queen v. Pro Bono Law Ontario
APPEARANCES
Her Majesty The Queen, Applicant
Self-represented
Pro Bono Law Ontario, Respondent
Peter Fenrick, Counsel and Fareed Muttalib, Student-at-Law
1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code").
2In a Case Assessment Direction issued on April 11, 2014 the respondent's Request for a Summary Hearing was granted and a telephone hearing was held on July 18, 2014. Both parties participated.
3In his Application the applicant alleges that he was denied services by the respondent because he is a person with a disability. The applicant alleges that he is a person with schizophrenia and sought legal assistance from the respondent, a charitable institution which provides legal services to persons in financial need.
4The applicant sought the services of the respondent to launch a civil suit for wages allegedly owed to him for his reign as Her Majesty the Queen. The applicant has apparently changed his legal name to Her Majesty (first name) the Queen (last name). Although he identified himself to the Tribunal by his previous legal name, he has submitted documentation to the Tribunal that appears to confirm his change of legal name, including a document of name change issued under the Vital Statistics Act, dated March 20, 2014. In the circumstances of this case, where the applicant has self-identified as an individual with a psychiatric disability, I see no need to identify the applicant by his previous legal name. The proposed defendant was Stephen Harper.
5The applicant made an application for legal assistance from the respondent. He submitted an application in which he provided information necessary for the respondent to assess his application. Amongst other criteria an applicant's financial means are assessed. The respondent also makes an assessment of the likelihood of success of the proposed legal proceeding. In his application the applicant articulated his civil claim as set out above.
6It is agreed that the applicant was advised by the Executive Director of the respondent that they could not assist him because his claim had no reasonable prospect of success and being a charitable institution with limited resources it could not assist every applicant for its services.
7Rules 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure read as follows:
19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.
19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.
8Details about the nature of a summary hearing were set out as follows in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994 at paras. 8 and 9:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
9There is no dispute about the essential facts and they are as set out above. The applicant can point to no evidence which would tend to support his claim of discrimination on the basis of disability or association with a member of a protected group. At the hearing I asked the applicant to elaborate on the reasons why he believes that the respondent would not assist him because he is a person with a mental health disability. The applicant argued that he has been a consumer of psychiatric treatment and on various medications for many years. He argued as well that the fact that he is a person with a disability would be obvious to anyone who interacted with him. He agrees that the respondent advised him that it would not take his case because it appeared to have no reasonable prospect of success. He argued at the hearing that a person who interacted with him at the "wicket" is not a judge and cannot decide whether a claim has a reasonable prospect of success. The applicant also relied on the fact that the RCMP, the City of Toronto and the Registrar have accepted that his name is Her Majesty the Queen. At the hearing he argued that his claim for wages as the Monarch would succeed because he is Queen Elizabeth II and that it is a difficult job.
10Having reviewed the materials and the submissions of the parties I find that the Application must be dismissed because the Application has no reasonable prospect of success. As indicated the applicant has no direct evidence of discrimination. The applicant asks that an inference be drawn from the fact that he is a person with a disability and that the respondent would not provide him with assistance. In the circumstances of this case no inference can be drawn from these facts.
11In the context of a summary hearing the factual allegations are generally accepted if capable of proof and little regard is given to the position of the respondent. However in this case even if the facts relied on by the applicant were capable of supporting an inference of discrimination, which in my view they are not, the position of the respondent that the applicant's claim had no reasonable prospect of success appears entirely reasonable and does not support the inference the applicant wants to draw. In my view it is clear that this Application has no reasonable prospect of success and must be dismissed.
12The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 25th day of July, 2014.
"Signed by"
David Muir
Vice-chair

