Michael Jaipaul v. Corporation of the Town of Ajax, Sharon Williamson, Kristina Foreman, Robert Vokey and Geoff Romanowski, 2014 HRTO 1043

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

BETWEEN:

Michael Jaipaul Applicant

-and-

Corporation of the Town of Ajax, Sharon Williamson, Kristina Foreman, Robert Vokey and Geoff Romanowski Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir Date: July 16, 2014 Citation: 2014 HRTO 1043 Indexed As: Jaipaul v. Ajax (Town)

APPEARANCES

Michael Jaipaul, Applicant Self-represented

Corporation of the Town of Ajax, Sharon Williamson, Kristina Foreman, Robert Vokey and Geoff Romanowski, Respondents Andrew Zabrovsky, Counsel

1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to goods and services because of race, colour, ethnic origin, place of origin and reprisal. A hearing in in this case was held on July 7 and 8, 2014. For the reasons that follow I find that there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that a factor in the applicant’s experience in these interactions with the respondents were any of the Code grounds he has cited. In my view the evidence is clear that that the respondents were simply doing their jobs in responding to complaints made by other residents as they were required to do.

BACKGROUND

2The applicant is a resident of the Town of Ajax (“Town”). He is a native of Guyana. He did not otherwise self-describe but is evidently not caucasian. He owns two properties, one in which he lives (the residential property) and the other which he rents to several tenants (the rental property). It appears that the applicant is an active user of his property particularly his residential property. He has several vehicles and a widened driveway. He performs much of the necessary maintenance work on his vehicles himself which is largely out of fashion these days where a generation or two ago it would be quite common for a homeowner to be working on their vehicle(s) in their driveway. He keeps a large recreational house trailer. He has installed an above ground pool and there is a separate below grade entrance to his home. At the times material to this Application the applicant had erected three large sheds on his property. There is nothing inappropriate and much that is admirable about the applicant’s activities, however one upshot appears to have been that there were complaints made about some of this activity by one or more of the applicant’s near neighbours. The applicant baldly asserts that there may have been no complaints and he was simply being targeted by the Town. There is no evidence to support this assertion and no reason at all to not accept the Town’s evidence that there were complaints made about both properties. It is the Town’s investigation and enforcement action in response to the complaints that forms the subject matter of this case.

3I note that the applicant does not dispute that he was in violation of a number of Town by-laws. Nor does he dispute the validity of the various orders that were made by the Town in their investigations. Rather the applicant alleges that the manner in which the various respondents interacted with him was discriminatory.

4In his Application the applicant made a number of allegations some going back many years. At the hearing the applicant clarified that these had been noted to indicate the history between himself and the Town and he was not relying on them. Other allegations were removed on the request of the applicant at the hearing. The remaining allegations of the applicant as set out in the Application can be summarized as follows:

a. The applicant alleges that the personal respondent Robert Vokey referred to him as “you people” in their meeting on April 13, 2012. He also alleges that when he complained about the comments to Mr. Vokey’s supervisor, Ms. Williamson, nothing was done about his concerns.

b. The applicant also alleges that a subsequent “Court Order” provided to him by Ms. Williamson on May 11, 2012 was a reprisal for his early complaint about Mr. Vokey’s comment on April 13, 2012.

c. The applicant also makes a general allegation that he has experienced harassment and discrimination by the By-Law Services Department in relation to issues on his residential property as follows:

i. Many visits about a trailer parked on his property at the residential property.

ii. The Town delivered a letter to him on Sept 29, 2009 falsely suggesting that the applicant was utilizing his garage for auto-mechanical repairs.

iii. A visit about having too many cars park on his driveway in 2011.

iv. One or more visit about the width of his drive-way in 2009- 2011.

v. Several visits about the sheds on his property, including a visit on August 17, 2012, by Kristina Foreman, V. L. and E. T.

vi. On August 17, 2012 Ms. Foreman is alleged to have advised the applicant that a gate on his property required a padlock.

vii. The respondent issued an order with respect to the placement of his sheds even though the applicant was attempting to comply with the by-law by seeking a Minor Variance.

viii. The applicant also alleges that he was treated differently than other residents with respect to the placement of his shed in that he was expected to comply with the by-law when other residents were not.

ix. That the applicant was required to get a permit for a below grade walk out and a deck which has been in place for 20 years.

x. That in January 2013 the applicant was told by a member of staff in the Planning Department that the refusal to recommend a minor variance permit was to avoid the retribution he would be faced with.

5At the hearing the applicant also appeared to raise a number of other concerns which are not expressly set out in the Application. These included the following:

a. That a work order with respect to rental property was never actually delivered to him and the Town took no steps to ensure that it was;

b. That the respondents did not phone him in advance of their visits to his properties but simply showed up;

c. That on one or more occasions officials of the Town entered his rental property without his knowledge or consent.

6At the outset of the hearing the parties agreed to bifurcate the hearing, to determine first whether or not the respondents had violated the Code and then, if necessary should I find that there has been a violation of the Code, to determine the appropriate remedy.

7The hearing proceeded over two days. I heard the evidence of the applicant and all of the personal respondents as well as V.L. another employee of the Town. Each of the respondents’ witnesses adopted their will-says as their evidence as supplemented by their responses to questions asked of them at the hearing. At the conclusion of evidence the parties made final submissions.

8After the applicant’s evidence the respondents made a motion to dismiss elements of the Application because they had no reasonable prospect of success. I explained to the applicant what the respondents were seeking and heard his submissions (see Pellerin v. Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud, 2011 HRTO 1777). After the parties’ submissions, I directed at that early stage that the allegation with respect to the alleged discriminatory failure to recommend a minor variance be granted to the applicant, must be dismissed. I came to that conclusion because the evidence of the applicant was merely that he believed that the individual involved had acted in self-interest to protect himself from possible unstated consequences in recommending the minor variance. There was no evidence that a factor in this decision were any of the Code prohibited grounds cited by the applicant.

9The applicant has little in the way of direct evidence of discrimination but relies largely on what would otherwise be considered unfairness in the manner in which he was treated as particularized in paragraphs 4(c) and 5 above. However at the heart of this case and the only direct evidence of discrimination is the allegation that the respondent Vokey referred to the applicant as “you people” in a context which suggested to the applicant that Mr. Vokey held discriminatory views of the applicant because of his race colour and ethnic background. The applicant believes that all of the individual respondents shared a similarly discriminatory attitude towards him which affected the manner in which he was treated by them.

10In my view the central issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

a. Did Mr. Vokey refer to the applicant as “you people”;

b. Did the applicant complain to the respondent Williamson about these comments or other discrimination and did she fail to respond to the complaints appropriately;

c. If the answer to (a) above is yes, is there any evidence that the same discriminatory attitude influenced the interactions of the other personal respondents with the applicant in regards to his residential property;

d. If not, can an inference be drawn from all of the circumstances that the interactions with respect to the residential property were influenced in a discriminatory way by the applicant’s personal characteristics.

11Except in a couple of instances the facts are not controversial and I do not intend to recite the evidence in detail. The background circumstances are set out here.

THE RENTAL PROPERTY

12The applicant and three other individuals; his wife and in-laws, owned this property. The applicant’s son was a tenant as were other individuals. One of the tenants made a complaint to the Town about disrepair in the basement. The respondent Vokey attended on January 26, 2011 and was granted entrance by the complaining tenant. Mr. Vokey inspected the premises and found a number of violations of City by-laws. He prepared an Order dated February 6, 2012 addressed to all four owners of the property and caused it to be delivered to the rental property where it was received by the applicant’s son. At this point Mr. Vokey had never met the applicant or any of the other owners of the property.

13The applicant alleges that he did not receive the Order but the un-contradicted evidence of the respondents is that such orders need not be personally served on the owner(s) of a property to be effective. It is also not disputed that the address for delivery of correspondence from the Town was that of the rental and not the residential property. The Order required a number of repairs to the basement unit before March 7, 2012. The time for compliance with the order passed and Mr. Vokey re-inspected the property and noted that although some of the required work had been done the Order had not been fully complied with. He did not attempt to contact any of the owners of the property but caused a summons to be issued by a Justice of the Peace requiring the owners of the property to appear in court on a charge of failure to comply with the Order. The Summons, returnable on May 25, 2012, was issued on April 2 and served on the applicant on April 3, 2012. As of the time the summons were issued by the court, the respondent Vokey had not met the owners of the property.

14At some point after service of the summons, the applicant contacted Mr. Vokey to arrange a meeting to discuss the Order. That meeting occurred on April 13, 2012. Mr. Vokey noted that some work had been done to remediate many of the issues identified in the Order but there was still a problem with the ceiling tiles in the basement. A dispute ensued between the applicant and Mr. Vokey about what was to be done to bring the ceiling tiles into compliance.

15In the Application the applicant alleged that he proposed repairing the damaged tiles and repainting them to which the respondent responded “That would not be satisfactory and will not meet to (sic) the by-law standards because I know how you people work. You will just do a temporary patch repair.”

16In the Application the applicant alleged that he then said: “How can you make such a judgement without not (sic) seeing the final repairs” to which the respondent replied “I have seen it all before.” The applicant then alleged that he made it clear that “this was not fair.” He also alleged that he was very concerned about the comments and asked Mr. Vokey to have his supervisor contact him. The applicant further alleged that Mr. Vokey’s supervisor, Sharon Williamson, did not call him until after he called her. He alleged that he told her about the comments and “about the repairs to the ceiling” but nothing was done.

17At the hearing the applicant gave two slightly different versions of this interaction. Although he did not change the words that he alleges were used he re-ordered the conversation somewhat. In his iteration in chief it was largely as set out in the Application and was largely devoid of surrounding detail. He testified that there was a dispute about the ceiling and that Mr. Vokey was not interested in his proposal to first repair and then paint the tiles. He then testified that Mr. Vokey then made the alleged comments as set out in the Application.

18When questioned on cross examination he initially changed the order of the conversation and adopted Mr. Vokey’s order in that the applicant asked for Ms. Williamson’s contact information before the alleged discriminatory comments were made but then quickly changed his evidence and testified that he asked for her telephone number after the discriminatory comments were allegedly made. In any case he was sure that he asked for Ms. Williamson contact information and testified that he called her immediately after Mr. Vokey left. This is somewhat inconsistent with the Application in which he alleged that he asked Mr. Vokey to have his supervisor call him and when she did not that he had to call her.

19Mr. Vokey testified that there was a dispute about the ceiling tiles. He understood the applicant to propose that he merely paint the tiles. Mr. Vokey testified that he advised the applicant that this would not be satisfactory and would not meet the requirements of the by-law to which the applicant responded that he wanted his supervisor’s name and telephone number. He testified that the applicant then complained that he had not been properly informed about the order and that this was unfair. The conversation continued according to Mr. Vokey’s testimony but concluded when the applicant said that he (Vokey) was prejudiced and that “if he (the applicant) were a white man standing here, you (Vokey) would not be saying this.” Mr. Vokey testified that he ended the conversation at this point and left the property. As he approached his vehicle he heard the applicant say that the conversation had been recorded. Mr. Vokey’s contemporaneous notes to which he referred in his evidence mirror the testimony he gave at the hearing.

20In his Reply the applicant stated and confirmed in his evidence at the hearing that he did not say that he had recorded the entire conversation but said he wished he had.

21Mr. Vokey testified that he reported this interaction to Ms. Williamson later that day. Ms. Williamson confirmed that Mr. Vokey advised her of what he understood had occurred including that the applicant had accused him of discrimination. Ms. Williamson testified that Mr. Vokey did not tell her that he had referred to the applicant as ‘you people”. He did tell her that the applicant had claimed to have recorded the interaction. Ms. Williamson confirmed that she received a voice mail message from the applicant that afternoon.

22The applicant and Ms. Williamson testified that they spoke to each other on Monday April 16, 2012. The applicant testified that he related his version of the incident to Ms. Williamson including the “you people” comment. Ms. Williamson denied that this was the case and testified that while the applicant thought it was unfair and discrimination he did not specifically identify any particular thing that made it so and did not claim to have been referred to as “you people”. A subsequent email exchange tends to confirm Ms. Williamson’s version of the conversation in that the substance of Ms. Williamson’s email of April 18, 2012 confirms her evidence that she understood that the disagreement was about whether or not painting alone would suffice to bring the ceiling tiles into compliance. There is no reference in this exchange to the “you people” comment. The applicant did not challenge Ms. Williamson’s characterization of the issues in play in this correspondence.

23In her email of April 18 Ms. Williamson offered to re-attend at the rental property with Mr. Vokey to re-inspect the tiles and discuss the options open to the applicant. The dispute was ultimately resolved by the applicant taking Ms. Williamson’s suggestion to repair and replace tiles followed by repainting.

THE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY

24In response to a complaint about a third accessory building (“shed”) which the applicant apparently erected in his yard, the respondent Ms. Foreman attended at the applicant’s residential property on October 5, 2011. She inspected the sheds with the applicant in attendance and determined that there may have been a number of issues with one or more of them. In particular she noted that it appeared that all three sheds were not properly set back from the property line and that their size may require building permits although already erected. She also noted that a vehicle was parked on what she described as a walkway beside the driveway.

25Ms. Foreman issued a letter to the owners of the property (the applicant and his spouse) on October 17, 2011 describing the issues with the sheds and requesting that the owners remove or move the sheds to bring them into compliance with the set back requirements. The letter also indicated that it appeared the driveway was wider than allowed and must be restored to the maximum width allowed of 6.1 meters. The letter advised that the applicant could apply for a minor variance and provided contact information it that option was of interest to the owners. The letter invited the owners to contact Ms. Foreman if there were any questions or concerns.

26In apparent response to this letter the applicant contacted Ms. Foreman. An argument apparently ensued. Ms. Foreman testified that the applicant threatened to sue her and the City.

27It is agreed that the applicant told Ms. Foreman that he had identified a significant number of properties (50 or 72) throughout the Town which had, in his view, similar set back issues. Ms. Foreman advised the applicant that Town policy was that in the circumstances it would only investigate complaints on properties that could be seen from his property. This policy or practice became a source of dispute between the applicant and the respondents but was confirmed on several occasions by the respondents. The only evidence before me is that it is the Town’s policy that where a property is under investigation complaints made by that property owner will only be investigated on properties that can be seen from the complainant’s property.

28Ms. Foreman testified that she investigated three of the applicant’s complaints. One she determined was not valid, the other two were and voluntary compliance was secured.

29Following the conversation with the applicant, Ms. Foreman investigated his concerns further. It was determined that while she had understood the lot to be a corner lot with specific set back requirements, it did not meet the legal definition in the by-law because it was not located at a street intersection and accordingly the set back requirements were not as great as she had initially concluded. It was also determined after further research and consultation with Ms. Williamson that because it could not be determined when the driveway had been widened beyond the maximum width it would be considered as legal non-conforming and this issue was dropped from a revised letter which set out the revised requirements for the shed.

30Ms. Foreman re-attended the property on February 9, 2012. The applicant told her that he was busy and advised her to do what she needed to do. Ms. Foreman re-inspected and found that nothing had been done with respect to the sheds. Ms. Foreman checked with the planning department to determine if the applicant had made an application for a minor variance but he had not at that point - it is agreed that he made the application in July 2012. Consequently Ms. Foreman took steps to have charges laid and a summons was issued on April 11, 2012 returnable May 11, 2012. A summons was served on the applicant by Ms. Williamson during her meeting with the applicant and Mr. Vokey at the rental property on April 26, 2012 and his spouse a few days later at the residential property.

31Ms. Foreman re-attended this property on July 24, 2012 in respect of the charges which she had laid – she noted that no changes had been made. It is not clear whether or not the applicant was aware of this visit. Ms. Foreman attended again on August 17, 2012. She testified that she attended in connection with the minor variance application the applicant had recently filed and was accompanying two officials of the Town from another department. According to Ms. Foreman she was asked to attend with them because the applicant had been “disagreeable” with Town staff in the past but he was familiar with her.

32During the course of this visit Ms. Foreman noted that a gate to the backyard of the property did not have a lock which was required because of the pool in the back yard. She mentioned this to the applicant as being important for safety and insurance reasons. Ms. Foreman also mentioned to the applicant that he might want to move what Ms. Foreman described as debris in his backyard because it might give rise to a neighbour’s complaint. Ms. Foreman testified that she was trying to be helpful and made no order with respect to the issues. The applicant describes the material as firewood and believes that Ms. Foreman’s mentioning of it and the lack of a lock was harassment.

33A discussion ensued between the applicant and a member of the planning department V.L. who noted some concern with the placement of the shed as it might effect water drainage on the applicant’s and an adjoining property. The applicant became argumentative although he also claims that V.L. was argumentative and discourteous.

34Ms. Foreman agreed that the applicant complained to her that all of these visits were harassment and making the applicant ill. In response it is agreed that she told the applicant that she had been there pursuant to a valid complaint and that the other two Town employees were there because of an application he had made. At the hearing the applicant argued that Ms. Foreman contradicted herself when Ms. Foreman testified that on this occasions she was not investigating the prior complaint but then stated that she had been there pursuant to a valid complaint. Whether or not the applicant might have been confused about what Ms. Foreman said, this contradiction if that is what it is, does not affect the facts as they were at the time. Ms. Foreman was there accompanying members of another department dealing with an application the applicant had made for a minor variance.

35As part of the planning process leading to the consideration of the minor variance other issues identified by officials of the planning department required that the applicant obtain permits for a deck and a below grade entrance to his home. He was later advised that until the permits were taken out the minor variance application could not be processed further. The applicant objected to these requirements and testified that he believed their being imposed on him were harassment and/or reprisal. There is no evidence which would support the applicant’s belief and the evidence is that the Town required that applicants for a minor variance otherwise bring themselves into compliance before an application will be processed. Ms. Foreman re-attended the property on September 7, 2012 with members of the planning department in respect of the minor variance application. The applicant appears to have been aware of this visit and there appear to have been no issues.

36Ms. Foreman returned to the residential property on October 10, 2012 to re-inspect the property for the ongoing court proceeding. A building permit had been taken out for one of the sheds and the applicant had laid a new foundation for it. Ms. Foreman noted that it appeared to be compliant with the by-law in terms of the set-back required. Ms. Foreman advised the applicant to be careful when measuring for the set back and be mindful that once he added walls and a roof to the shed it might encroach. The applicant testified that he perceived this as harassment as he had taken out a building permit which required drawings approved by other officials of the City. Ms. Foremen testified that she did not have access to any plans or drawings that the applicant might have submitted and so did not know what he was intending to construct on the foundation. She testified that she was simply trying to be helpful.

37The applicant subsequently plead guilty to the charges laid in respect of both properties.

ANALYSIS

38The credibility of the various witnesses is not a significant issue except with respect to the “you people” allegation because there is not much in dispute with respects to the preponderance of the other facts. However in respect of the allegations related to the inappropriate comments and their immediate aftermath the participants take significantly opposed views of what was said. Accordingly I must determine which version of these interactions ought to be preferred.

39In submissions the respondent cited what has become the standard statement of the law on the assessment of credibility in cases like these, Faryna v. Chorny 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), [1952] 2 DLR 354 (BCCA) at p. 356-57:

…the validity of evidence does not depend in the final analysis on the circumstance that it remains uncontradicted or the circumstance that the Judge may have remarked favourably or unfavourably on the evidence or the demeanour of a witness; these things are elements in testing the evidence but they are subject to whether the evidence is consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole and shown to be in existence at the time…

If a trial judge’s finding of credibility is to depend solely on which person he thinks made the better appearance of sincerity in the witness box, we are left with a purely arbitrary finding and justice would then depend upon the best actors in the witness box. On reflection it becomes almost axiomatic that the appearance of telling the truth is but one of the elements that enter into the credibility of the evidence of a witness. Opportunities for knowledge, powers of observation, judgment and memory, ability to describe clearly what he has seen and heard, as well as other factors, combine to produce what is called credibility…A witness by his manner may create a very unfavourable impression of his truthfulness upon the trial judge, and yet the surrounding circumstances in the case may point decisively to the conclusion that he is actually telling the truth. I am not referring to the comparatively infrequent cases in which a witness is caught in a clumsy lie.

The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. Only thus can a Court satisfactorily appraise the testimony of quick-minded, experienced and confident witnesses, and of those shrewd persons adept in the half-lie and of long and successful experience in combining skilful exaggeration with partial suppression of truth. Again a witness may testify what he sincerely believes to be true, but he may be quite honestly mistaken. For a trial judge to say “I believe him because I judge him to be telling the truth”, is to come to a conclusion on consideration of only half the problem. In truth it may be easily self-direction of a dangerous kind.

40The respondent argued that that it did not appear that the applicant was lying about the interactions between himself, Mr. Vokey and Ms. Williamson on April 13 and 16, 2012, that is, he sincerely believed that he heard the respondent refer to him as “you people”. I agree with this submission. However that apparently sincere belief does not mean that these interactions unfolded exactly as the applicant remembers and recounts them.

41I have considered the evidence of the two participants carefully and have concluded that it more likely than not that the Mr. Vokey did not use the words “you people” although it is entirely possible that the applicant believes the words were said or might have felt like this was why Mr. Vokey would not accept his proposal about remediating the tiles. I have come to this conclusion for a number of reasons.

42First as I noted above the applicant’s evidence about the discussion was cursory and provided little in the way of context and colour. It had a rehearsed feel to it and appeared to be more a reflection of his sincere belief that he had experienced discrimination than of an actual event. I also observed that he gave two slightly different versions of the order in which things were said which casts some doubt on the reliability of his recollection. Similarly as noted above in his Application the applicant claims that he asked Mr. Vokey to have Ms. Williamson call him and complains that when she did not he had to call her. His evidence at the hearing was, and this is agreed, that he asked for her contact information and called her almost immediately after Mr. Vokey left the property.

43I also find that the applicant’s recollection of the nature of the dispute on April 13, 2014 is incorrect casting further doubt on the reliability of his evidence. The applicant testified that he proposed repairing the tiles first before repainting them and Mr. Vokey would not listen. Mr. Vokey testified that he understood that the applicant was proposing to simply paint the tiles which in his view would not be sufficient. The applicant’s version of the dispute is not supported by Mr. Vokey’s contemporaneous notes. I also note that Mr. Vokey believed that the conversation had been recorded. Believing that, I find that it is unlikely that he would not attempt to accurately record in his notes what he believed had occurred that day. More importantly the applicant’s version of the dispute is contradicted by the available record flowing from the applicant’s conversation with Ms. Williamson about the dispute, in particular the email exchange between the applicant and Ms. Williamson which appears to confirm unambiguously that the dispute between Mr. Vokey and the applicant at the time was whether or not painting alone would suffice.

44Finally I have considered the fact that the applicant did not raise the issue again in any of his interactions with Mr. Vokey or more significantly in his interactions with Ms. Williamson, nor did he raise it with her superiors or when he met with Ms. Williamson and a City Councillor months later. I appreciate that the applicant alleges that on April 16, 2012 he told Ms. Williamson about the “you people” comments, but again there is no reference to it in the email exchange on April 18, 2011. Even if I were to accept this evidence, which I do not, it seems to me unlikely that had the applicant heard the words he claims to have been said (which he asserts affected him deeply) he would not continue to raise them again in any of his interactions with Mr. Vokey, Ms. Williamson or his councillor. In fact he did not raise them with anyone at the Town until the Application was filed 9 months later.

45Accordingly I find that it is more likely than not that Mr. Vokey did not refer to the applicant as “you people” on April 13, 2012. I also find that there was nothing discriminatory in any other aspect of the interactions. Although the applicant lead no evidence which would tend to establish that any aspect of this investigation was discriminatory and accordingly has failed to establish a prima facie case, I have considered the respondents’ evidence with respect to its investigation of the complaint about this property and find that there was nothing inappropriate about the respondents’ actions.

46I have also considered whether or not the respondents failed to properly investigate the applicant’s complaint of discrimination. Having found the allegedly discriminatory comments were not made there is no need to consider that issue, however it is agreed that the applicant did allege harassment and discrimination on a number of occasions in particular on April 13 and April 16, 2012. I find that to the extent that there was an obligation to investigate such a general claim the respondents, in particular, Ms. Williamson met their obligation. See Scaduto v. Insurance Research Bureau, 2014 HRTO 250. It is clear that Mr. Vokey reported the applicant’s general complaint of discrimination to Ms. Williamson. I accept Ms. Williamson’s evidence that they often get such complaints when property owners are unhappy with what they are being told by by-law enforcement and given what the applicant told her she inferred, reasonably, that the substantive concern about how to remediate the ceiling tiles was the source of the complaint and that a mutually acceptable resolution of that issue would deal with a vague and general allegation of discrimination or harassment. In my view the “investigation” conducted by Ms. Williamson was appropriate in all of the circumstances including my conclusion that there was nothing discriminatory in Mr. Vokey’s approach and interactions with the applicant. If the applicant was unhappy with the result of his complaint to Mr. Vokey and Ms. Williamson he took no steps to raise the issue with Ms. Williamson’s superiors.

47The applicant also claims reprisal. He alleges, and it is not disputed, that when Ms. Williamson attended the rental property on April 26, 2012, she served a summons on him in respect of the charges related to the residential property and in doing so said “I have more bad news for you” or words to that effect.

48The reprisal section of the Code only applies to actions that are intended as a reprisal for asserting one’s human rights. See Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878 at para. 31. The applicant lead no evidence which could establish that Ms. Williamson’s serving the summons at this time was intended as a reprisal for his having earlier alleged discrimination. He also pointed to no adverse consequence of her doing so. The summons was valid and would have to be served on him. It is not at all clear how serving it on this occasion as opposed to some other time could be understood to be a reprisal. Although not necessary to dispose of this issue, I accept Ms. Williamson’s evidence that she did it out of convenience both for the Town as well as the applicant.

49As indicated the applicant claims that the failure of the Town to investigate his complaints that many other properties throughout the Town had set back issues was discriminatory based on his personal characteristics. There is no evidence that this is the case. One can understand the applicant’s frustration in being required to do something that others in the Town were, in his view, not being required to do but there is no evidence that in this respect the applicant was treated in any way differently than any other property owner who was the subject of a complaint investigation.

50The only other allegations that the applicant has made is the general one that the totality of the visits by Town by-law officials constitute harassment - a course of vexatious conduct that ought reasonably have been understood to be unwelcome. There is no evidence to support this claim. While the applicant asserts that maybe there were no complaints about his properties he has no evidence to support this assertion and on its face the claim is untenable. I also accept the evidence of the respondents that there were complaints which they received and which they were required to investigate. I also accept their evidence that the applicant’s experience is not unusual. I also note and accept the evidence of Mr. Williamson that in response to the applicant’s concerns she read all of his files to determine if he was being targeted by a neighbour and she determined that he was not. I observe, although this is not determinative, that the applicant takes no issue with the various Orders made and acknowledges that in several respects he was not in compliance with certain Town by-laws. Finally I have considered whether the totality of the visits in the context of two complaints about two different properties, subsequent charges for failure to comply with valid Orders, as well as the application for a minor variance filed by the applicant might reasonably lead to an inference of discrimination and have concluded that it can not. The number of visits by Town officials in these circumstances does not appear to be at all disproportionate in these circumstances such that a reasonable question about why they were occurring might arise. To the extent that such a question might have arisen on these facts, the respondents have as indicated, provided a reasonable non-discriminatory answer.

51I have also considered the argument of the applicant that what we referred to as add-on issues to the visits necessitated by other matters, such as the reference to the lack of a lock on a gate; the removal of debris; and being careful to ensure that the finally constructed shed did not encroach on the property line were evidence of harassment. I do not agree. I accept that the applicant may have found them irritating but there is no basis to conclude that they could be reasonably perceived as unwanted. I have no reason to doubt that Ms. Foreman thought she was being helpful and in some objective respects she probably was. I also note that there were no consequences for the applicant in this advice being given, no orders were ever made. The matters were mentioned and dropped.

52Much of what the applicant complains about flows in equal parts from his misunderstanding of the by-law enforcement process as well as his view that as a “loyal” taxpayer he was entitled to better service from the Town. So for example he made much of the fact that the Order with respect to the residential property was delivered to the residential property, not his residence, and that he did not receive it until he asked Ms. Williamson to provide him a copy long after the time for compliance had expired. Similarly he assumed that the Town would make efforts to follow up with him when it appeared to the Town that he was not complying with its Orders. He was also unhappy with the fact that Town officials were entering the rental property without his knowledge or consent, not understanding that his consent was not required.

53The applicant also complained that he would have expected the Town to have done its research before arriving at his property pursuant to complaints that were said to have been made. Included in this concern would be the driveway issue raised in Ms. Foreman’s October 17 2011 letter as well as an earlier letter advising him that the Town had received a complaint that he was operating a commercial auto repair business on his property. In both instances the issues were resolved in the applicant’s favour and again, there is no evidence that the applicant was treated in any way differently than any other property owner would have been in the circumstances.

54I have no doubt that the convergence of these disputes with respect to both his residential and rental property coming at roughly the same time would have been a source of stress and anxiety. Nor do I doubt that the applicant might have felt somewhat persecuted given his incomplete understanding of the processes in which he had become enmeshed, however for the reasons set out above I find that there is no factual basis to his claims of harassment, discrimination and reprisal and accordingly the Application is dismissed.