Felix v. Everlink Payment Services, 2014 HRTO 1034

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Hans Felix

Applicant

-and-

Everlink Payment Services, Greg Blanchard, Peter Leeuwen, Raymond Gingras and Credit Union Central of Manitoba

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw

Date: July 15, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 1034

Indexed as: Felix v. Everlink Payment Services

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Hans Felix, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1This Application alleges reprisal and discrimination with respect to employment because of race, colour, ancestry, citizenship, ethnic origin, gender identity, creed and record of offences contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2On February 19, 2014 the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application (“NOID”) and directed the applicant to respond to the issues identified by no later than March 21, 2014.

3The NOID states that the Application appeared to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because:

the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in your Application and you do not appear to have cited facts that constitute “good faith” within the meaning of the HRTO’s case law [s.34(1)]. See for example Thomas v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2009 HRTO 1582 and see for example Diler v. Cambridge Memorial Hospital, 2010 HRTO 1224 for a discussion of “good faith”.

4In the Application, the allegations relate to events that occurred in 2009 and 2010. In the Application and the subsequent submissions filed on March 14, 2014, the applicant detailed the progress and results of various court proceedings commenced apparently between 2009 and 2011 with respect to the same issues and respondents.

5In addition, the applicant refers to his prior Application, HRTO file 2010-04680-I, relating to the same respondents and same issues. That file was administratively closed because it was incomplete.

analysis and decision

6Section 34 of the Code provides that a person may file an application alleging that his or her rights under the Code have been infringed within one year of the incident (or last incident) of alleged discrimination. It also provides that persons may apply to the Tribunal more than one year after the incident(s) in certain circumstances. Section 34 states:

34(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

7In this case, I find that any act of discrimination took place more than one year prior to the Application being filed, and therefore the Application does not meet the requirements of section 34(1).

8I must therefore consider whether the applicant’s delay in filing the Application meets the requirements of section 34(2), namely that the delay was incurred in good faith and would cause no substantial prejudice. The Tribunal has held that if it has not been shown that the delay was incurred in good faith it is not necessary for the Tribunal to make the further determination as to whether anyone has been substantially prejudiced by the delay: see Esanu v. Georgetown Men’s Non-Contact Hockey League, 2009 HRTO 579.

9This Tribunal has repeatedly rejected the submission that waiting for another legal proceeding to conclude before pursuing one’s rights under the Code constitutes a good faith reason for delay in filing an application. See Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 1670, Mu v. Cargill Foods, 2011 HRTO 846, at paragraph 42 and others.

10Having considered the applicant’s Application and his subsequent filing, I find that the applicant has not met the onus on him to demonstrate that the delay in filing this Application was “incurred in good faith” as required under s. 34(2) of the Code, and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with this Application

order

11This Application is dismissed.