Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Daniel Millar
Applicant
-and-
The Community Network Canada
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw
Indexed as: Millar v. Community Network Canada
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Daniel Millar, Applicant
Self-represented
Introduction
1This Application alleges reprisal and discrimination with respect to contract because of disability contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2On June 4, 2014 the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application (“NOID”) and directed the applicant to respond to the issues identified by no later than July 4, 2014.
3The NOID states that the Application appeared to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because:
- a review of the Application and the narrative setting out the incidents of alleged discrimination fails to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondent.
- the Application does not allege that any of the rights of the applicant have been infringed and the Application is not made on behalf of another person or persons pursuant to s. 34(5) of the Code: see Oliphant v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2009 HRTO 1902 and Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Municipality), 2010 HRTO 1704.
4The NOID further stated:
Your completed Application does not appear to raise an issue the HRTO has the jurisdiction (power) to resolve as follows:
you allege discrimination based on “reprisal or threat of reprisal” but have failed to explain how the respondent’s behaviour was related to any of the following: claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code [s. 8]. See for example Mirea v. Canadian National Exhibition, 2009 HRTO 32; Chan v. Tai Pan Vacations, 2009 HRTO 273.
5In the Application, the applicant set out the circumstances surrounding a contract entered into between him, his wife and the respondent for the respondent to provide advertising for the applicant and his wife’s business. He alleges that the contract they signed was different than the verbal contract they had with the respondent. He further stated that in 1993 he was in a plane crash and received brain stem and vocal cord damage. He has trouble communicating on the telephone because his voice sounds harsh and has little intonation. His allegation that the pink contract he signed was different from the verbal contract distresses him because his plane crash had “affected” his sight as well.
6The applicant wrote to the Tribunal after the NOID was delivered to him and provided some further information including an assertion that the respondent took advantage of the applicant due to his disability but provided no details in support of that allegation. He also asserted that the respondent took advantage of him and his wife because his wife is a woman.
7The applicant provided no details with respect to reprisal.
Analysis and Decision
8An application will only be dismissed at a preliminary stage, before it is delivered to the respondent, if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381.
9Having considered the applicant’s Application and her subsequent filing, I find that the applicant has failed to make any allegations of Code-related discrimination.
10Section 8 of the Code states:
Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Act, to institute and participate in proceedings under this Act and to refuse to infringe a right of another person under this Act, without reprisal or threat of reprisal.
11To successfully make out a claim of reprisal, the applicant must demonstrate that he experienced reprisal for:
- claiming or enforcing a right under the Code;
- instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or
- refusing to infringe the right of another person.
The applicant has not asserted any facts to support a claim of reprisal.
12First of all, the applicant refers to the contract as being one signed to advertise his wife’s business. It is not clear that the applicant was a party to the contract and he has not brought this claim on his wife’s behalf.
13Second, even if the applicant is a party to the contract, he has not alleged any facts that make any link between his claims and a Code ground. The applicant has not asserted that the respondent’s alleged conduct was because of the applicant’s disability, and he alleged only that his eyesight was affected by his accident. He did not make a link between his eyesight and the contract he signed. In fact, the applicant admits in the additional information provided that he and his wife now know that the fact that the contract was a two year contract and not a one year contract was in the fine print.
14The applicant asserts that the respondent’s behaviour was because the applicant’s wife is a woman but this Application is not brought on behalf of the applicant’s wife, nor is there anything provided other than the applicant’s bald assertion that this was the reason for the respondent’s alleged behaviour.
11Based on the information before me I find it plain and obvious that the allegations of discrimination, which are not linked to a Code ground, and of reprisal do not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
12This Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 10th day of July, 2014.
“Signed By”
Dawn J. Kershaw
Vice-chair

