Petru Bujdula v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions (Canada) Ltd., 2013 HRTO 987

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Petru Bujdula

Applicant

-and-

Konica Minolta Business Solutions (Canada) Ltd.

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jennifer Scott

Date: June 4, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 987

Indexed as: Bujdula v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions (Canada) Ltd.

APPEARANCES

Petru Bujdula, Applicant

Self-represented

Konica Minolta Business Solutions (Canada) Ltd., Respondent

Blair McCreadie, Counsel

Introduction

1This Decision relates to an Application filed on October 30, 2012 under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of race, colour, record of offences and reprisal.

2In its Response, the respondent argues the Application should be dismissed on a preliminary basis because the applicant signed a full and final release in favour of the respondent on October 4, 2012, prior to filing the Application. In the alternative, the respondent argues the Application should be dismissed because it does not disclose a Code violation and therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.

3By Case Assessment Direction dated March 1, 2013, the parties were advised the matter would be scheduled for a one-half day teleconference to hear their submissions on the respondent’s request to dismiss the Application.

4By letter dated April 9, 2013, the parties were notified that the teleconference hearing would be held on May 22, 2013. The teleconference hearing proceeded on May 22, 2013 and I heard the submissions of all parties on the respondent’s request to dismiss the Application.

Relevant Facts

5The applicant commenced employment with the respondent on November 7, 2011 as a field service technician.

6In July 2012, the applicant filed an internal complaint against his supervisor. On August 20, 2012, the applicant and his supervisor were issued non-disciplinary letters of concern.

7The applicant’s employment was terminated on October 4, 2012. On that day, the applicant was provided with a written separation offer that included his statutory entitlement, as well as additional compensation if he agreed to the offer and signed a release. The written separation offer advised the applicant that he had seven days to consider the offer.

8The applicant accepted the separation offer on October 4, 2012 and signed the release that day. The release contained the following provisions:

I, Petru (Peter) Bujdula…. do hereby release and forever discharge the Releasee (Konica) of and from all manner of actions, causes of actions, suits, debts, dues, accounts, bonds, covenants, contracts, claims and demands whatsoever which against the said Releasee the Releasor (Bujdula) ever had, now has or can, shall or may hereafter have …. including… any and all claims under the Ontario Human Rights Code, as amended.

IN SIGNING THIS RELEASE, I acknowledge that I have been given sufficient time to consider my actions and to seek such independent legal or other advice, as I deem appropriate. I further acknowledge that no representation of fact or opinion, threat or inducement has been made or given by the Releasee to induce the signing of this Release.

9On October 16, 2012, the applicant filed a further internal complaint with the president of the respondent. On October 23, 2012, the applicant filed a private criminal complaint against his former supervisor. On October 30, 2012, the applicant filed this Application with the Tribunal.

Analysis and Decision

10The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider on a preliminary basis whether or not some or all of an application ought to be dismissed as an abuse of process. Section 23(1) Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, as amended, provides that a tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.

11The Tribunal has held that the doctrine of abuse of process can apply in a variety of circumstances in which the Tribunal determines that it would be unfair to permit an application to continue. The circumstances that can give rise to an abuse of process are not finite and may include, but are not limited to, circumstances such as delay, re-litigation, settlement, as well as certain issues of procedural unfairness. In attempting to preserve and promote judicial economy, consistency and finality, the focus of the doctrine of abuse of process is on the integrity of the administrative justice system. See Johnston v. P & H Foods Division of Parrish & Heimbecker, 2013 HRTO 589 at para. 8.

12The Code does not explicitly bar applications where an applicant has executed a release in favour of a respondent. However, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence establishes that filing a human rights application after signing a full and final release can constitute an abuse of the Tribunal’s process unless there is some compelling basis to set aside the release. See Lauriault v. UTi Canada, 2010 HRTO 1843; Douse v. Hallmark Canada, 2009 HRTO 1254.

13The applicant argues that he should not be bound by the release because the respondent had a legal obligation to explain the terms of the release and it failed to do so. I disagree. The respondent gave the applicant seven days to consider the separation offer, including the release, and to obtain legal advice. When he accepted the separation offer, the applicant acknowledged that he had sufficient time to consider his actions and to seek independent legal advice. The applicant decided to sign the separation offer on the day that it was offered. Because the applicant chose not to exercise his right to obtain independent legal advice does not transfer the obligation to provide legal advice to the respondent. The respondent could not provide such advice because it would have been in a conflict of interest had it done so.

14The applicant argues further that the release was discriminatory because it was used in a protective way by the respondent to wash its hands of the applicant. The applicant is correct that a release is used to protect employers from further liability. That on its own does not make the use of a release discriminatory. The applicant also asserts the release was discriminatory because he did not know where to get legal advice. The respondent argues there are many ways to obtain legal advice or lawyer referrals including from the Law Society of Upper Canada and from the Human Rights Legal Support Centre. There is no evidence that the applicant made any attempt to obtain legal advice. In any event, the fact that the applicant did not know where to get legal advice does not make that term of the release discriminatory.

15There is no issue in this case that the applicant signed the separation offer and the release. The release was signed on the date of termination and by virtue of the date that it was signed, it included all complaints that may have arisen prior to that date. Under the express terms of the release, the applicant released any claims that he may have had under the Code. The release is a binding contract and it prevents the parties from litigating matters that have been settled unless there are compelling reasons to set it aside.

16The applicant has not presented a sufficient basis upon which I can find that he should not be bound by the release. In the circumstances of this case, to proceed with the Application in the face of the release signed by the applicant would be an abuse of the Tribunal’s process. In light of this finding, it is not necessary to address the respondent’s alternative argument that the Application has no reasonable prospect of success.

ORDER

17The Application is dismissed.