Mancebo-Munoz v. NCO Financial Services Inc., 2013 HRTO 974

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Esther del Carmen Mancebo-Munoz

Applicant

-and-

NCO Financial Services Inc.

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel

Date: May 31, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 974

Indexed as: Mancebo-Munoz v. NCO Financial Services Inc.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Esther del Carmen Mancebo-Munoz, Applicant

Self-represented

NCO Financial Services Inc., Respondent

Randy Ai, Counsel

Introduction

1This Interim Decision addresses the applicant’s request that she be provided with anonymity in the Tribunal process.

2By letter dated May 24, 2013, the applicant requested that her name be removed from the Tribunal’s Interim Decisions in this matter which can be found on the website, amongst other legal databases. She gives as a reason the fact that previous decisions have referred to her mental health condition.

3By letter dated May 27, 2013, the respondent objects to the applicant’s request. The respondent submits that the applicant has failed to highlight any exceptional circumstances requiring anonymity.

decision re. anonymization

4It is a well-established principle that there is a public interest in transparent legal processes and that, in accordance with Rule 3.10 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, human rights hearings are intended to be open proceedings. The Tribunal’s jurisprudence has held that anonymity or publication bans should be limited to exceptional circumstances: Marakkaparambil v. Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care), 2007 HRTO 24; Lazarevic v. York University, 2010 HRTO 1601.

5In Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2011 HRTO 1230 (“Visic”), the Tribunal discussed the various principles that require consideration when dealing with requests for anonymity and publication bans of parties’ identities. The Tribunal held at paras. 9 and 10:

Although a publication ban is a discretionary remedy, it is an extraordinary measure that is used to ensure fairness of the hearing process and/or protect significant privacy interests. The importance of an open human rights process is expressed in the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, which state that the Tribunal is committed to “a fair, open and accessible process”. This is also reflected in Rule 3, which provides that the “Tribunal’s hearings are open to the public”, except when appropriate to protect the confidentiality of personal or sensitive information.

Publication bans and anonymization orders have been issued in certain types of human rights cases, such as those involving minors or highly personal or sensitive information, for example in sexual harassment complaints. The party seeking the publication ban bears the onus of proving that there is a real and substantial risk to the hearing’s due process and/or deleterious implications to confidentiality: see for example, Hogan v. Ontario (Health and Long Term Care), 2003 HRTO 6 and C.M. v. York Region District School Board, 2009 HRTO 735. The Tribunal must be satisfied that the personal and public interests collate in favour of safeguarding privacy, thereby outweighing the principle of disclosure and the desirability of a transparent human rights process.

6In my view, the applicant’s request does not highlight any exceptional conditions of sensitivity or privacy necessitating anonymity. Human rights applications often include personal information. The information contained in the Tribunal’s Interim Decisions about the applicant’s disability is not of the nature or degree of private or intimate information present in those cases where bans/anonymity have previously been ordered. As recognized in Visic most disability cases involve some disclosure of personal information surrounding an applicant’s disability, or the basis for the perceived disability, in order to meet the definition in section 10 of the Code and establish that there is a Code-protected ground. See also Han v. Rotman School of Management, 2012 HRTO 2304.

7I find that the applicant has not provided any unique concerns or issues of privacy that justify the extraordinary measure of anonymization. Accordingly, the applicant’s request for anonymity is denied.