HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Wendy Benson
Applicant
-and-
Chrysler Canada Inc., and Canadian Auto Workers, Local 444
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Geneviève Debané
Indexed as: Benson v. Chrysler Canada Inc.
APPEARANCES
Wendy Benson, Applicant
David Deluzio, Counsel
Chrysler Canada Inc., Respondent
Clifford J. Hart, Counsel
Canadian Auto Workers, Local 444, Respondent
Piper Henderson, Counsel
Introduction
1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment and membership because of sex and reprisal.
2This Interim Decision deals with the request of the respondents to remove the named personal respondents.
Personal respondents employed by the respondent employer
3In her Reply the applicant has agreed to the removal of the personal respondents employed by the respondent employer.
Personal respondents of the union representatives
4In her Reply the applicant has opposed the removal of the individual respondents who are representatives of the respondent union. The applicant did not provide any written submissions with respect to the respondent union’s Request to remove the union representatives as personal respondents.
5In Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31 at para. 5:
Applying these principles to the Tribunal’s power to remove a personal respondent from a proceeding, the following non-exhaustive list of factors may be helpful in assessing whether a personal respondent should be removed:
Is there is a corporate respondent in the proceeding that also is alleged to be liable for the same conduct?
Is there any issue raised as to the corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the conduct of the personal respondent who sought to be removed?
Is there any issue as to the ability of the corporate respondent to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringement?
Does any compelling reason exist to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found?
Would any prejudice be caused to any party as a result of removing the personal respondent?
In considering whether any compelling reason exists to continue the proceeding against a personal respondent, one way of approaching this question is to ask whether it is necessary to involve this person as a party in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the complaint.
6The Union submits that all of the principles in Persaud have been satisfied and that the union representatives should be removed as parties.
7I have reviewed the applicant’s pleadings, and in essence, the Application against the Union representatives is with respect to their alleged failure to properly address the applicant’s workplace issues, including a failure to bring forward a complaint on her behalf in a manner that was satisfactory to the applicant. In the absence of any submissions from the applicant as to why these individuals should remain respondents and that the aforementioned conduct infringed the applicant’s Code rights, I find that there is no compelling reason that they remain respondents to the Application.
ORDER
8The Tribunal Orders as follows:
a. All of the named personal respondents are removed as personal respondents and the style of cause shall be immediately amended to remove their names.
Dated at Toronto, this 17th day of January, 2013.
“Signed by”
Geneviève Debané
Vice-chair

