HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Martyn Bowman
Applicant
-and-
Toronto Police Services Board and Scott Baptist
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Sherry Liang
Date: May 2, 2013
Citation: 2013 HRTO 737
Indexed as: Bowman v. Toronto Police Services Board
APPEARANCES
Martyn Bowman, Applicant ) Self-represented
Toronto Police Services Board and )
Scott Baptist, Respondents ) Michael Martosh, Counsel
1This is an Application filed on April 16, 2010 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”).
2The applicant, a police officer, alleges discrimination in employment on the ground of disability, by his employer the Toronto Police Services Board (the TPSB) and Inspector Scott Baptist, the applicant’s commanding officer at the relevant time. The Application arises out of the decision made by Inspector Baptist in September 2009 to transfer the applicant from 23 Division to the Central Alternative Response Unit (CARU). The applicant alleges that the transfer was discriminatory because the reason for it was his disability. He also alleges that at the same time, he was required to return his firearm to the police service and he also believes that this is discriminatory.
3The respondents deny that the transfer was discriminatory. In their position, the applicant had no reasonable expectation of a permanent assignment to the Division, and he was transferred to other duties within the service that provided him with suitable accommodation for his permanent medical restrictions.
4At the outset of the hearing, I acknowledged that the applicant was representing himself, as he was entitled to do. I explained my role as a decision-maker and that while I was happy to explain the process to the applicant and answer any questions he might have about it, I could not help him present his case. I also noted that I would be taking notes of the hearing on my laptop computer, which notes are not an official transcript but my own personal notes to help me remember the proceedings, and he would be responsible for taking his own notes for the same purpose. Partway through the hearing I became unable to take notes in the regular way and so decided to make a recording for my own use, which I advised the parties should be treated in the same way as my personal notes of the hearing.
5Also at the outset, I outlined the general process of a hearing before the Tribunal, the procedural history of the case (I had issued several Case Assessment Directions, the result of which was to limit the number of witnesses the parties needed to bring to the hearing), and my general understanding of the nature of the issues before me.
FACTS
6I heard the evidence of seven witnesses, including the applicant and personal respondent. Although there were some differences in their evidence with respect to certain matters, these differences were ultimately not significant to the key determinations I must make.
7At the time of the hearing, the applicant had been a police officer for 23 years. He has always been a Constable and has not sought or received any promotions. For all but about a year of his career in the Toronto Police Service (also referred to here as the “service”), he worked at 23 Division. In January 2006, he was involved in a traffic accident while off duty. This resulted in a medical leave of 5 weeks, and medical restrictions on his return to work. Most notably, the applicant was not able to return to enforcement duties.
8Enforcement duties were also referred to in the evidence as “primary response” duties. These are the duties performed by most police officers in the city, in connection with one of the city’s 17 front-line community Divisions. Police officers performing primary response duties respond to calls for service, patrol the neighbourhood, and generally enforce the law in the community. They are usually in uniform, and carry handcuffs, a baton, pepper spray and a gun. Other police officers in a division may be assigned to “community response” or as a detective. All of these assignments are considered front-line assignments in which officers are expected to be able to respond to law enforcement demands in the community.
9For a brief time after his accident, the applicant worked at the front desk at 23 Division. Then, he was assigned “eCops Quality Control” duties at the Division, which he performed until his transfer in September 2009. His work included training other officers on proper entry of occurrences on the service’s electronic database at the Division, and review of the data entered as needed to ensure accuracy. The applicant proposed and authored a pocket guide distributed throughout the police service, which provided guidance to officers on the proper electronic entry of occurrences. The applicant was also later assigned the duties of a “memobook coordinator”. In this function, he managed the archive of the Division’s memobooks, arranging for their cataloguing, and signing in and out as needed (such as for court). It is not in dispute that the applicant performed these functions well and received favourable performance assessments.
10The evidence was that the nature and demands of these duties changed over time. The creation of the pocket guide was a substantial project which came to a defined end. The cataloguing of memobooks began with the task of entering archived memobooks but once that was done, it evolved into the task of keeping track of membooks on an ongoing basis. As of September 2009, the duties associated with the applicant’s duties as eCops/Quality Control officer were not as time-consuming as they had once been.
11From January 2006 to the date of his transfer out of 23 Division, the applicant did not perform any primary response duties, because of his restrictions. His restrictions were treated as temporary initially, but in August 2008, after consultation and review, the Toronto Police Medical Advisory Service (MAS) declared the restrictions to be permanent. The form used to indicate the applicant’s restrictions has a number of items checked off, the most notable being “non enforcement duties only”, “inside duties” and “exempt from use of force”. The result of having these restrictions declared permanent was that unless the applicant advised the MAS of any change in his medical status, no follow up was required. The service would treat the applicant as requiring indefinite accommodation in his work, in accordance with his documented restrictions, without any further review.
12The transfer of a police officer from one unit1 to another can be initiated by the officer through submission of a transfer request, subject to the approval of management. It can also be initiated by management at the service. At 23 Division, in 2009, Inspector Baptist was the officer responsible for the day to day administration of the Division, reporting to the Division Superintendent. His duties included work assignment, human resources, performance management and budgeting. It is not in contention that he could, in connection with his duties, make decisions approving or initiating the transfer of police officers.
13Inspector Baptist was assigned to 23 Division in March 2009. On his arrival, he acquainted himself with the organization of the work at the Division, including the personnel there. He made inquiries with the MAS about the nature of the applicant’s medical restrictions and learned that they had been deemed permanent. After reviewing the circumstances and making his inquiries, Inspector Baptist decided to initiate a transfer of the applicant to the CARU.
14The CARU is a centralized call centre for the entire service, staffed by police officers. It receives calls that have been determined by the service’s telephone operators to be non-emergency in nature. Calls from the public that require immediate police presence in the field are sent to the divisions. Calls that do not require immediate police assistance in person are sent to the CARU staff. Although these calls are about law enforcement matters and require police assistance, they can be dealt with over the phone by the CARU staff, and in order of priority. Because of the nature of the work, the CARU is a workplace where officers with medical or other restrictions that render them unable to perform law enforcement duties can still perform productive policing work. There are a few other areas in the service where police officers who cannot perform front-line policing duties can also be accommodated, but the CARU is the largest workplace of such kind.
15Superintendent Mark Fenton gave evidence about the establishment of the CARU, the rationale for creating the unit, and the current work there. His evidence, which was supported by other witnesses, was that the unit has been very successful in diverting calls that would otherwise occupy the resources of community-based divisions. This has allowed the divisions to devote more of their officers and time to front-line policing. The CARU handles in the vicinity of 55,000 calls per year.
16In his evidence, Inspector Baptist explained the decision to initiate the transfer of the applicant to the CARU. He testified that the main function of a division is to be available to respond to community needs for law enforcement assistance. In meeting those needs, it is important that as many officers working at a division as possible be able to perform primary response duties.
17At any one time at a police division, there are some police officers who for various reasons are unable to perform primary response duties or require another kind of accommodation in their work. Where these restrictions are seen as temporary, the division can usually accommodate them, through duties such as staffing the front desk or, as in the case of the applicant, quality control. In the Inspector’s evidence, accommodation of a police officer’s medical restrictions can usually be accomplished in the first instance at the division level. However, when an officer develops permanent restrictions, the search for accommodation extends beyond the division. Because the primary role of a division is to provide law enforcement services in the community, although officer who is unable to perform primary response duties can usually be accommodated temporarily at the division level, it is more difficult to provide that accommodation on a long-term basis.
18There are some situations where officers who require disability-related accommodation are assigned on a long-term basis to the Division but these are unusual. The Inspector discussed two particular officers requiring permanent accommodation who remained at the Division. In one case, there was a particular history of litigation resulting in a unique work arrangement that was treated as an addition to the Division’s normal complement of officers. In the other case, the officer had particular expertise and long experience in a particular area which resulted in a long-term accommodation which subsequently came to an end.
19The distinction between the treatment of temporary and permanent restrictions is consistent with the service’s policy on Workplace Accommodation. Under that policy, Division management is responsible for the accommodation of temporary restrictions within the Division, unless no position is available. However, once restrictions are deemed permanent, the decision about where to place the officer can include a service-wide search for a position.
20In the Inspector’s evidence, in the ideal circumstance, every position at a Division would be filled by an officer who is fully trained and qualified to perform primary response duties. Realistically, at any given time, there may be any number of officers who require accommodation in their duties, for Code-related reasons. The Division adjusts the way work is performed and the different duties and assignments to find meaningful work while meeting the needs of those officers. But these are not treated as long-term solutions and no officer filling in such a position has any expectation that such assignments are permanent.
21In the applicant’s evidence, he did not disagree that his assignment to eCops/Quality control duties was not permanent, or that the service could make decisions about transfer and assignments of police officers for operational reasons.
22As indicated above, the Inspector determined that the applicant’s medical restrictions had been deemed permanent. The applicant was also well away from retirement age, which meant that he would potentially require workplace accommodation for many years to come.
23The Inspector stated that on his review of the organization of the work in the Division, he came to the conclusion that if the applicant were transferred to another unit which could continue to provide him with appropriate workplace accommodation, the Division would benefit from having a position available for an officer who could perform primary response duties. Although the Inspector did not have a specific replacement or re-organization in mind, he saw the possibility that the applicant’s duties could be performed in the future by an officer who was also trained and qualified to performed front-line policing duties as needed. For the near term, although the tasks were important, he also saw the possibility that the quality-control tasks could be divided between several other officers until a longer-term arrangement was arrived at.
24Therefore, after determining that there was a position available at the CARU, Inspector Baptist decided to initiate the applicant’s transfer. In addition to consulting with the applicant’s direct supervisor and the supervisory officer at the CARU, the Inspector also told the Toronto Police Association steward about the intended transfer.
25I heard evidence from Constable Bowman, Inspector Baptist and Detective Sergeant Les Stasiuk about the meeting on September 9, 2009 in which the applicant was told of decision to transfer him to the CARU. The meeting was relatively brief. The announcement came as a shock to the applicant. The applicant felt that a unilateral decision was being made that he did not agree with and which he felt took no account of his interests.
26The evidence was that the Inspector explained to the applicant that he had taken steps to inquire about the applicant’s restrictions, and had been advised that they were permanent. Although the applicant stated that he did not recall the word “permanent” being used, he testified that he understood this to be the focus of the discussion. In the Inspector’s evidence, he explained to the applicant that 23 Division was a front line station and had a limited capacity to accommodate officers with permanent law enforcement restrictions. He explained that the service could provide such permanent accommodation, but not necessarily at the unit level. The Inspector stated he had spoken to the commander at the CARU and had determined there was a position available there to which the applicant would be transferred. He stated that this was not a reflection on the applicant’s work performance. The Inspector also stated that he expected the eCops role to be changing in the future and a new person assigned to it.
27Although the applicant did not remember the conversation exactly as the Inspector recounted it, he stated that he agreed with the gist of the above. To him, the predominant message was that he was being transferred because of his disability.
28During this meeting, the Inspector told the applicant that the transfer would likely occur on September 21 but this would be confirmed after the meeting. The applicant received a confirming email following the meeting to this effect. The Inspector explained the choice of September 21 as the effective date, as it was linked to the Division’s five-week cycle.
29Following this meeting, the applicant had a brief conversation with Detective Sergeant Stasiuk in which the Detective Sergeant also reiterated that the transfer was related to the permanency of the applicant’s restrictions, and his inability to perform enforcement duties.
30Also following the meeting, the Inspector asked Detective Sergeant Stasiuk to retrieve the applicant’s gun from him. As indicated, the applicant was exempt from “use of force” training, which is the mandatory yearly training for officers who carry firearms. As of September 2009, he had not taken this training for more than a year. He was, at this time, therefore not qualified to use a firearm and, given his restrictions, he did not need to have those qualifications or the gun for his work.
31In the Inspector’s evidence, when he made the decision to transfer the applicant, he did not have a specific plan for assigning another officer to the quality control/eCops duties. In his view, while he planned to find a way to have these duties performed, whether by one officer or a division of the tasks amongst several, it was not critical that decisions be made immediately. However, coincident with the applicant’s transfer, he learned about a police officer in the Division, Constable M, who had made a request to work a day shift, in order to accommodate child care needs. This officer was qualified to perform primary response duties but sought a schedule that did not involve working the type of shifts that other primary response officers worked. At this time, she was about to return to regular duties after working a temporary assignment in a position that accommodated these needs but it was unclear what further opportunities there may be at the Division to enable her arrangement to continue.
32Inspector Baptist decided to assign Constable M to the applicant’s previous duties, as it seemed to meet both the officer’s needs for child care accommodation, and the Division’s needs to have as many officers as possible who could perform primary response duties.
33The Application made a number of assertions about the circumstances of Constable M’s assignment to the Quality Control duties. It is unnecessary to review them in detail. This officer gave evidence which was consistent with that of the Inspector about how she came to be assigned these duties, and which did not support those allegations.
34Part of the applicant’s evidence was about what he described as a stigma within the service, associated with the CARU. The applicant called witnesses whose evidence was intended to demonstrate a negative attitude by officers around the police service towards the CARU and by extension, the officers who work at the CARU. As indicated, many of the police officers who work at the CARU require disability-related accommodation. At the CARU, they can continue to perform productive work for the service, even while unable to perform primary response duties, and thus retain their positions with the service. The service also assigns to the CARU officers who are unable to perform front-line policing for reasons other than disability. Thus, there are officers at the CARU who are under professional investigation, or who face criminal charges that may or may not be related to their policing work.
35Although the work of the CARU is, by all accounts, necessary and valuable to the service, it was also the evidence that the presence of officers in the unit who face disciplinary and other charges has led to it being referred to as the “penalty box”. One of the applicant’s witnesses, Constable J, referred to other epithets being applied to the CARU, such as the place for “deadwood” or “the land of the misfits”. He finds it personally embarrassing to admit to others that he works there.
36Constable J testified however that, in his view, the CARU is the “ideal spot” for disability-related accommodation. Officers who are there perform valuable work for the police service. Morale is very high and officers who have a disability are very well accommodated in that workplace. On the other hand, he feels that it is not appropriate to assign officers who are unable to perform front-line duties for disciplinary reasons to the CARU. Some of these officers are disgruntled (in his word,”nasty”) and that has some effect on morale.
37What emerges from Constable J’s evidence is that to the extent there exists some unfortunate and unfair perceptions among members of the police force about the officers at the CARU, it arises out of some association of the CARU with officers facing disciplinary and other charges. His evidence does not suggest that officers with the police service denigrate the CARU and the officers there because it is a workplace where officers’ disability-related needs are being accommodated. As indicated, Constable J believes that the work at the CARU provides officers with disabilities with excellent accommodation of their disability-related needs.
38Constable M was asked whether she has heard officers in the service use demeaning comments about the officers at the CARU and she stated she has not. She testified that she had heard a reference to the CARU as a place where the “walking wounded” go, when they cannot be medically accommodated at a division. She was unable to recollect any derogatory comments being made about the CARU based on its association with officers with disciplinary issues.
39Another one of the applicant’s witnesses, CB, was asked whether she has heard derogatory comments about the officers at the CARU and she stated she has not. This officer currently has responsibilities in staff planning with the police service, and was asked questions by the applicant about the promotions process. She stated that she is not aware of many applicants from the CARU being promoted, because officers in that unit generally do not apply for promotions.
Submissions
40What is unusual about this case is that the applicant does not allege that his assignment to CARU does not accommodate his disability to the point of undue hardship. It is acknowledged that the assignment provides appropriate workplace accommodations for his continuing disabilities, to enable him to continue working as a police officer and retain his position as a constable. Unlike many other cases alleging disability-related accommodation, the allegation of discrimination arises in a context where this employer transferred an employee from one position in which his disability was appropriately accommodated to another position in which he was appropriately accommodated.
41The case therefore is not about disability-related discrimination in the sense described in Simpson v. Commissionaires (Great Lakes), 2009 HRTO 1362, as a failure to accommodate, but rather a more straightforward assertion of discrimination under section 5(1) of the Code, which provides:
Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability.
42Here, the applicant contends that his current position is less favourable than his previous position for various reasons, and he would not have suffered this disadvantage but for his disability. He therefore believes that he was treated unequally, because of his disability. The applicant alleges that out of more than 240 officers based at the Division, he was singled out for a transfer to the CARU, because of his disability. He was not spoken to about the transfer, and given a chance to provide input. Further, he was sent into a workplace with a poisoned environment. Because of the derogatory attitude of other officers at the force towards the CARU, he feels humiliation about telling others that he works there.
43The applicant alleges that there were two other officers with permanent disabilities who continued to be accommodated at the Division, and neither was forced to transfer. He stated that there is one officer who has been performing front desk duties, and there is no reason this officer could not have been transferred to the CARU, instead of him.
44In answer to some questions from me, the applicant stated that he does not take the position that the transfer of any officer to the CARU is discriminatory. He stated that there should have been an assessment of whether he, or the officer at the front desk, would have been better suited to be assigned to the CARU. He stated that many officers are content with a transfer there. The work at the CARU meets disability-related needs, but it is not necessarily reasonable for all officers.
45In the respondents’ submission, there is no doubt that the applicant is being treated differently from a non-disabled officer, whether before or after his transfer. As a result of his disability, the applicant is unable to perform the essential duties of a front-line police officer, as described in the Police Services Act, and the policies of the service. The fact is that his duties take into account his medical restrictions - he is being given accommodation in the workplace.
46Discrimination is more than just a difference in treatment, however. Referring to cases such as McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l'Hôpital général de Montréal, 2007 SCC 4, [2007] 1 SCR 161, counsel submits that there is a difference between discrimination, and a distinction which is not discriminatory. There is no discrimination here, whether direct or indirect.
47Counsel submits that the work the applicant is performing may not be as exciting and fulfilling as that of a regular constable, but that is because of the applicant’s permanent restrictions. The fact that the applicant cannot perform front-line policing duties is a significant restriction. Before his transfer, he was performing duties in which his disability-related needs were being accommodated. That is the same after his transfer. His assignment to eCops/Quality Control duties was an accommodation. In counsel’s submission, it does not become the paradagmitic position against which a suitable accommodation must then be assessed. Rather, the question is whether applicant can remain in the position of a constable, performing useful work, with accommodation. Here, that is precisely what the service has done.
Decision
48The following explanation of the Code protection against discrimination on the basis of disability is found in Krieger v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2010 HRTO 1361 at paras 116-118, provided in the applicant’s book of authorities:
Section 5(1) of the Code prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, a ground which is defined in s. 10(1) of the Code to include mental as well as physical disorders. The onus lies with the applicant to prove on the balance of probabilities that not only did he have a disability, but that he experienced differential treatment linked to that disability.
In response to such an allegation of discrimination, the respondents can argue that they based their decisions on considerations unrelated to the applicant’s disability. Alternatively, they can argue that the applicant was incapable of fulfilling the essential duties of the position of a police officer. Section 17(1) of the Code specifies that if the individual with the disability is “incapable of performing or fulfilling the essential duties or requirements attending the exercise of the right because of a disability,” then differential treatment is not an infringement of that person’s rights.
Section 17(2) incorporates the duty to accommodate into the analysis by specifying that a person with a disability shall not be found incapable of performing the essential duties if the needs of that person can be accommodated “without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodating those needs.” In determining the question of undue hardship, the Code specifically identifies two considerations: cost (including outside sources of funding) and health and safety requirements.
49In this case, there is no dispute that the applicant has disabilities. Further, there is no dispute that as a result of those disabilities, he is unable to perform the essential duties of a front-line police officer. The duties of police officers are described generally in the Police Services Act, and include “preserving the peace”, “preventing crimes and other offences”, and “apprehending criminals”: see section 42(1). The duties of officers assigned to a division are described in the policies of the service, specifically Procedure 04-18, Appendix D (Divisional Deployment). That document states that divisional police officers may be assigned to the primary response function, the community response function, or the detective operations function. All of these functions involve front-line duties.
50Under the Code, and as a result of the applicant’s disabilities, the Toronto Police Service has an obligation to accommodate the applicant’s needs in the workplace, to the point of undue hardship. In this case, there is no dispute that it did this, both before and after the applicant’s transfer to the CARU. The issue of undue hardship does not arise in this case as the service was able to accommodate the applicant’s needs throughout. The assignment to eCops/Quality Control was an accommodation; the assignment to the CARU was also an accommodation.
51It is useful to emphasize at this point what has been stated many times before, that the duty to accommodate does not require an employer to provide a disabled employee with a perfect accommodation solution: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970. That is, the service was not obliged to provide the applicant with the perfect or his preferred workplace assignment.
52In this case, as stated above, it is not alleged that the discrimination consists of a failure in the duty to accommodate. Rather, the case is about an allegation of direct discrimination, an allegation that the applicant was “singled out” because of his disability. The applicant believes that he would not have been transferred but for the fact that he had disability-related needs and that this, in itself, amounts to discrimination. The applicant believes that there was no valid reason for transferring him to the CARU and that this means he was “targeted” because of his disability.
53The idea of being “targeted” suggests that another person in the same position, but who was not disabled, would not have been transferred, or that the Inspector sought his transfer because he (and this is indeed the allegation) saw an opportunity to rid himself of a disabled officer.
54As I have described above, the reality is that the applicant would not have been doing eCops/Quality Control duties at 23 Division at all had he not been disabled. As stated in the respondents’ submissions, he was already being treated differently from other officers, because of his disability. That was not discriminatory – it was in fact the realization of the TPSB’s human rights obligations towards a disabled officer.
55It is true that the position was subsequently filled by a non-disabled officer, Constable M. The evidence was that this officer requested an assignment that would accommodate child care responsibilities and the Quality Control job was suitable for that purpose. The assignment of this officer to these duties does not support a finding that the applicant’s transfer was discriminatory. There is nothing discriminatory about a decision that the Division would be better served by having these functions performed by an officer who was also qualified for primary response duties, if necessary. In this context, it was not discriminatory for Inspector Baptist to decide to change the way in which the work was being performed, and there is no basis in the evidence for the suggestion that he was motivated by any “anti-disability” views. The service did not have an obligation to continue to have the work performed in the way to which the applicant had become accustomed, and in the way he preferred.
56The applicant himself does not believe that every transfer to the CARU would be discriminatory. Essentially, he believes that another officer should have been transferred instead of him. In choosing to transfer him instead of another disabled officer at the Division, in his view, the service treated him unequally because of a disability. Even if it could be established that the transfer of another officer would have been a better operational decision (and the evidence does not support that proposition), the decision to transfer the applicant instead of another disabled officer would not amount to discrimination on the ground of disability.
57The applicant also believes that his career path was detrimentally affected by the transfer into CARU. The evidence does not support his belief. There is nothing before me to establish any concrete advantage or disadvantage to the applicant’s future career prospects based on differences between his position at 23 Division and his position at CARU. The applicant has never sought a promotion, so the theory that any future promotional opportunities have been curtailed is speculative at best. There is nothing establishing that, given his permanent restrictions, his career prospects are worse because he has been assigned to the CARU instead of to a Division.
58There does appear to be some unfortunate attitudes amongst some members of the force towards the CARU. Derogatory adjectives have been used by some officers to describe the CARU. The applicant believes therefore that there is a stigma about working at the CARU and that diminishes his future prospects. The evidence does not establish that these attitudes improperly influence those responsible for making decisions such as promotion or transfer.
59Further, the evidence about these comments does not establish that there is a “poisoned work environment” that amounts to discrimination under the Code. The evidence is that the work environment at the CARU is very supportive of the disability-related needs of its officers, that morale is high and that there is a sense that valuable work is being done. Against this, the unfortunate attitudes of some officers outside the CARU (which appear to be more related to the disciplinary history of some officers and not disability) do not amount to discrimination by the respondents against the officers in the CARU, on the basis of disability.
60I acknowledge that the applicant believes his work to be less fulfilling than previously. He finds the type of policing work in which he is engaged to be undemanding. I can also appreciate that after spending almost his entire career in one Division, he found the transfer away from the Division unwelcome. But the disadvantages he describes do not amount to Code-related discrimination.
61There is no question that the work at CARU fully accommodates the applicant’s disabilities, allowing him to maintain his position as a constable even while he is unable to perform front-line policing duties. Having met its obligations to accommodate the applicant’s disabilities in the workplace, before and after the transfer, I cannot find the decision to transfer him to amount to discrimination on the basis of disability.
62Finally, I also find nothing discriminatory in the decision to ask the applicant to return his firearm. This was a piece of service equipment that he did not need in the CARU, which he indeed had not needed or been qualified to use for some time, and which he would not need for the foreseeable future.
63For the above reasons, I find that the applicant has not established that the respondents discriminated against him under the Code and this Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto this 2nd day of May, 2013.
“signed by”
Sherry Liang
Vice-chair
1 although not specifically addressed in the oral evidence, it appears that the 17 Divisions are each referred to as a “unit” although there are also specialized units such as the Marine Unit, the Mounted and Police Dog Unit, as well as various detective units.