HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Elizabeth Woodwork
Applicant
-and-
Halton Regional Police Services and David Cziraki
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Naomi Overend
Indexed as: Woodwork v. Halton Regional Police Services
Introduction
1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to services because of age, sex, disability and reprisal, contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2Pursuant to a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated December 2, 2011, the Tribunal directed, on its own initiative, that a summary hearing be convened pursuant to Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure to determine whether the Application should be dismissed, in whole or in part, on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect that the Application will succeed.
3In its CAD, the Tribunal directed that the summary hearing would proceed in writing, in accordance with an earlier request of the applicant, unless the applicant asked to make oral submissions by December 1, 2011. Instead, the applicant made brief written submissions by that date, which she served on the respondents.
4The CAD advised the respondents that they would not be required to file response submissions unless so directed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal is able to make a determination of this matter without these submissions. The Tribunal apologizes for the lengthy delay between receipt of the applicant’s submissions and this Decision.
5At the same time as she filed her submissions, the applicant also filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings (Form 10) (“Request”), in which she appears to ask the Tribunal to defer her Application. She does not specify what proceedings she would like her Application to be deferred to in this Request, but attached several documents relating to two complaints she made to the Office of the Independent Police Review Director on or around January 4, 2011.
6These two complaints relate to the individual respondent, Cst. David Cziraki. One of the complaints deals with the allegations in her Application to this Tribunal, and the other deals with an alleged encounter between the applicant and Cst. Cziraki in 2004. Upon careful review of the material sent in by the applicant, it would appear that these other proceedings had concluded long before the applicant made her Request. In any event, for reasons discussed below, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to address this Request.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
7The applicant alleges she was involved in an altercation when she attempted to reserve a parking spot in a grocery store parking lot by standing in it while her mother re-positioned the car. She alleges another driver pulled in while she was standing there and when she would not move, hit her with his car on two occasions, apparently in an attempt to get her to move.
8The applicant reported this encounter to the police later on that day, and appears to be dissatisfied with the response she received from the police receptionist and Cst. Cziraki, the officer apparently assigned to the investigation of her complaint. She alleges that both individuals asked her how old the individual who hit her was, which she views as irrelevant. It is her stated belief that her failure to be served by the respondent police force was because she is a young woman and the alleged assailant was an old man.
DECISION
9The Application is dismissed on the basis that it does not have a reasonable prospect of success.
ANALYSIS
10This hearing was conducted pursuant to Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. This rule 19A directs the Tribunal to determine is whether the Application has no reasonable prospect of success. In the first case decided under the new procedure, Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, the Tribunal provided the following guidance:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground. [Emphasis added]
11Other than pointing to her testimony that the receptionist and individual respondent both asked her the age of the driver, the applicant has identified no other evidence on which she can make a link between the ground of age and the respondents’ alleged inaction. It is not necessary to hear from the respondents about whether they enquired as to the driver’s age as I am prepared to take notice of the fact that in a police investigation, the respondents would want to establish basic identifying information such as age, gender and other indicia of appearance. On its face, there is nothing discriminatory about such a question.
12The applicant did not identify any other evidence she might call to support her assertion that she was discriminated against on the basis of age or gender. Neither the narrative in her Application nor her written submissions for this summary hearing make any link – directly or by inference – between the events and the applicant’s disability or the ground of reprisal.
13Unfair treatment does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the Code. As this Tribunal points out in Forde v. Avon Maitland District School Board, 2011 HRTO 1389 (“Forde”), at para. 17:
The Tribunal does not have the power to deal with general allegations of unfairness. For an Application to continue in the Tribunal’s process there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show discrimination on the basis of one of the grounds alleged in the Code.
14The applicant’s assertion that her age, gender or disability must have been a factor is nothing more than a bald assertion or, to use the words in Forde, “mere speculation and accusations.” Given the absence of proposed evidence on which a link might be established, I must conclude that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success of proving discrimination on the basis of any of the enumerated grounds in the Code or reprisal.
ORDER
15The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 11th day of January, 2013.
”signed by”
Naomi Overend
Vice-chair