HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Gigi Jacob
Applicant
-and-
Board of Directors, Cawthra Mansions Co-op
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Jay Sengupta
Indexed as: Jacob v. Board of Directors, Cawthra Mansions Co-op
APPEARANCES
Gigi Jacob, Applicant
Self-represented
Board of Directors, Cawthra Mansions Co-op, Respondent
Christine Davies, Counsel
Introduction
1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to housing because of receipt of public assistance.
2A Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”), dated September 19, 2012, was issued setting this matter down for a summary hearing. The CAD indicated that the applicant would proceed first and directed her to provide submissions on the question about why the Application should not be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success and point to the evidence on which the applicant will rely to prove a link between the respondent’s actions and the grounds cited. The respondent was not required to file a Response in advance of the summary hearing and it has not done so.
3For the reasons that follow, this Application is dismissed.
DECISION
4The Rules 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure read as follows:
19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.
19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.
5The issue that Rule 19A requires me to determine is whether the Application has no reasonable prospect of success. If a finding is made that the Application has no reasonable prospect of success, then it is dismissed. In the absence of such a finding, the Application continues to proceed through the Tribunal’s procedure.
6In Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, the Tribunal stated at paras 8 - 9:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
7The applicant argues that people who receive a subsidy are treated in a discriminatory fashion in comparison to those who pay market level housing charges. She specifically alleges that a policy dealing with people in receipt of subsidy who find themselves “overhoused” because of a decrease in the number of people in their household is discriminatory.
8The policy states that people in that situation are made two offers of units that are the appropriate size for their family unit. If they decline both, the household loses the subsidy and must pay market level housing charges in order to remain in their homes.
9When asked whether the people to whom she had referred to in the Application as having been impacted by this policy had authorized her to bring this Application on their behalf, the applicant indicated that they had not. She suggested that the policy does impact her because she and her daughter cannot make decisions about whether the latter will remain in the home or move out on her own without considering the policy.
10Finally, the applicant argues that the ground of “receipt of public assistance” is not limited to people in receipt of social assistance, but is broader and includes people like her and others who receive a housing subsidy. She says that the source of the money for the subsidy is public (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation or “CMHC”).
11The respondent makes several arguments. Firstly, it argues that there is no link to a Code ground. The respondent says that “public assistance” is synonymous with “social assistance” and is not broad enough to encompass receipt of a housing subsidy. The respondent also argues that the source of the subsidy in question is a combination of public and private money and is, therefore, not “public assistance”.
12Secondly, the respondent argues that even if receipt of a housing subsidy could be seen to be synonymous with receipt of public assistance, this Application is premature in that the applicant is not a person or persons whose rights can be argued to have been infringed under the Code. While the applicant references a number of other families that have been impacted by application of the policy in question to them, the same is not true of the applicant and she has not brought this Application on behalf of those other families. The applicant’s suggestion that the policy could impact on her if there was a change in the size of her family unit, the respondent suggests, invites speculation and is an admission that the policy in question has not been applied to the applicant.
13Having reviewed the arguments presented by the parties, I find the Application must be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success for the following reasons.
14I am not persuaded that the ground of “receipt of public assistance” is restricted to only those in receipt of social assistance. The Code does not define “public assistance” and a large and liberal construction of the language in the Code may well lend itself to a broader view of what the ground entails. However, in the instant Application, it is unnecessary for me to rule on this particular question, given my findings below.
15I accept the respondent’s argument that the Application is premature given that the applicant has not been subject to the operation and implementation of this policy herself. The narrative contained in the Application documents makes reference only to other families that have been affected by the policy not to the applicant herself being a person or persons, under section 34 of the Code, whose rights have been infringed.
16When questioned about this issue during the teleconference hearing, the applicant presented the argument that, as a person who received subsidy, she lacked the autonomy to make a decision concerning lowering the size of her family unit because of the presumably oppressive nature of this policy. Again, I accept the respondent’s argument that the applicant’s position is speculative.
17Accordingly, the Application is dismissed
Dated at Toronto, this 8^th^ day of April, 2013.
”signed by”
Jay Sengupta
Vice-chair