C.G. v. Timmins Police Services, 2013 HRTO 43

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

C.G.

Applicant

-and-

Ontario Court of Justice Timmins c/o Justice Ralph Carr, Justice Martin Lambert, Timmins Police Services, Kapuskasing Ontario Provincial Police, Timmins District Hospital, North Eastern Ontario Family and Children’s Services

Respondents

INTERIM dECISION

Adjudicator: Ena Chadha

Date: January 10, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 43

Indexed as: C.G. v. Timmins Police Services

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

C.G., Applicant ) Self-represented

1The applicant filed this Application on August 13, 2012 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (“Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to services, goods and facilities on the basis of disability, family status and association with a person identified by a Code-ground.

2On November 9, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“Notice”) on the basis that the Application may be outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because some of the respondents identified in the Application are judges and the allegations appear to be challenging the decision or outcome of adjudicative processes. The Notice indicated that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear applications against courts and tribunals based on the execution of adjudicative duties or decision-making because of the doctrine of judicial immunity: see Cartier v. Nairn, 2009 HRTO 2208; Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered Corp., 2009 HRTO 2180.

3The Notice directed to applicant to file written submissions explaining why she believed the Application may be within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Although the applicant wrote to the Tribunal on November 20, 2012 clarifying the identity and address of certain respondents, the applicant did not file submissions with respect to the issue of jurisdiction.

4The Tribunal explained the concept of judicial immunity in Cartier, supra at paras. 12-15:

The doctrine of judicial immunity prohibits legal proceedings against judicial actors which are based on their actions as adjudicators or decision-makers. The doctrine is rooted in the principle of judicial independence, the purpose of which is to ensure that judicial actors are free to execute their decision-making duties with independence and without fear of consequences.

In addition, the Tribunal has held on a number of occasions that “services” within the meaning of the Code does not include the outcome or decision resulting from adjudications by other statutory bodies, including the courts.

5I adopt the legal principles articulated in Cartier, supra, and on this basis determine that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the Application as against “Ontario Court of Justice Timmins c/o Justice Ralph Carr” and “Justice Martin Lambert”

6Accordingly, the Application as against “Ontario Court of Justice Timmins c/o Justice Ralph Carr” and “Justice Martin Lambert” is dismissed.