Demedeiros v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2013 HRTO 38

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Lina Demedeiros

Applicant

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario as represented by the Ministry of the Attorney General and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Judith Keene

Date: January 9, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 38

Indexed as: Demedeiros v. Ontario (Attorney General)

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Lina Demedeiros, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1This is a Decision in respect of an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"), alleging discrimination with respect to goods, services and facilities because of family status, marital status and sex. The Application also alleges reprisal.

2The Application refers to legal procedings related to child custody and support, dating from 1994 and apparently ongoing until at least 2011. The applicant alleges that one or more judges discriminated against her because she was not represented by a lawyer. In addition to a monetary remedy, the applicant seeks "retrial in the Supreme Court of Canada with the jury", legal counsel paid for at public expense and charges laid for perjury.

3On October 16, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss ("NOID") indicating that the Application appeared to raise matters outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The NOID indicated that the Application and the narrative setting out the incidents of alleged discrimination fails to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code, and that the applicant appeared to be challenging the decision or outcome of an adjudicative process. The NOID referred to specific decisions in which the Tribunal has concluded that the outcome or decision resulting from adjudications by other statutory bodies, including the Courts, are protected by the principle of adjudicative immunity or do not fall within the definition of "services" within the meaning of the Code.

4The applicant's submissions in response to the NOID assert a constitutional right to Legal Aid, and discuss the concept of "parental alienation". The only way in which the applicant appears to address the concerns raised in the NOID is to concede that "the nature of this matter does require an exception although it engages an adjudicative process".

5On review of the Application and the applicant’s submissions, I see no connection between the alleged adverse treatment and a ground of discrimination set out in the Code. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is based on the Code, which prohibits discrimination in the areas of services, goods and facilities, on the basis of grounds listed in the Code. Clearly the applicant feels that the decisions made by the courts in the course of litigation about the custody and support of her child were unfair; however, the Tribunal does not have a general power to inquire into claims of unfairness outside the areas and grounds listed in the Code.

6For the above-noted reason, the Application is dismissed.