Richardson v. Sterling Karamar Property Management, 2013 HRTO 2046

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Jeffrey Richardson

Applicant

-and-

Sterling Karamar Property Management and Mimosa Xhoxhaj

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: December 10, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 2046

Indexed as: Richardson v. Sterling Karamar Property Management

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Jeffrey Richardson, Applicant

Self-represented

1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to housing because of disability, receipt of public assistance and reprisal. Despite the applicant’s reliance on the ground of disability, the applicant denies that he is a person with a disability.

2The Application was filed with the Tribunal on July 16, 2013. In his Application the applicant alleges that the respondents, his landlord and a property manager, have violated the Code by not providing enough space for bicycles in his building. The applicant also alleges that the respondents refuse to allow tenants to transport their bicycles in the building elevators.

3On October 28, 2013, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”). The NOID advised the applicant that the Application may be outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction for a number of reasons. The material text of this NOID is set out here:

A review of the Application and the narrative setting out the incidents of alleged discrimination fails to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondents.

HRTO’s powers are limited to hearing and deciding allegations of discrimination within the social areas and based on the grounds contained in the Code. The HRTO does not have a general power to inquire into claims of unfairness which are not covered by the Code.

You allege discrimination based on “reprisal or threat of reprisal” but have failed to explain how the respondents’ behaviour was related to any of the following: claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code [s. 8]. See for example Mirea v. Canadian National Exhibition, 2009 HRTO 32; Chan v. Tai Pan Vacations, 2009 HRTO 273.

4The Applicant provided submissions in apparent response to the NOID; however, the applicant did not address these issues in a meaningful way. The applicant does make a number of inappropriate and unfounded allegations about the Tribunal’s neutrality and the submissions are full of overtly homophobic and sexist remarks.

5At this preliminary stage before the Application has been delivered to the respondent and a Response (Form 2) has been filed, the Tribunal will only dismiss an Application where it is plain and obvious that it is outside the its jurisdiction.

6The Application is dismissed. The applicant claims discrimination on the basis of disability, receipt of public assistance and reprisal. The narrative of the Application contains no allegations that engage the Code. His claim is that the respondents do not provide sufficient space for bicycles in the building. The applicant has recently purchased a new cargo tricycle which he uses in a business he operates. He does not claim that he requires the bicycle as an accommodation for a disability and as indicated he denies that he is a person with a disability. It is not at all clear how the lack of space to park his bicycle or to transport it in the building elevator engages any Code ground.

7As regards the allegation of reprisal the applicant makes no Code claim and provides no particulars of any acts or commissions of the respondents that he alleges were in reprisal for him having advanced a Code claim.

8As the NOID indicated, the Tribunal does not have the general power to deal with allegations of unfairness. It can only deal with alleged discrimination or harassment on the grounds set out in the Code. To succeed in an Application, an applicant must be able to prove discrimination on the basis of a Code ground on a balance of probabilities. To show discrimination, an applicant must prove a link between a respondent’s alleged actions and a Code ground. Having reviewed the Application, there is no apparent link between the alleged acts of the respondents and the Code grounds claimed.

9For all of these reasons I am satisfied that it is plain and obvious that this Application raises no potential Code claim and therefore is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and must be dismissed for that reason.