Glenn Nicholas v. Web Offset Publications Limited, 2013 HRTO 1741

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Glenn Nicholas

Applicant

-and-

Web Offset Publications Limited

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Douglas Sanderson

Date: October 16, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 1741

Indexed as: Nicholas v. Web Offset Publications Limited

1This is an Application filed on July 12, 2013, under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of disability.

2In Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1507, dated September 6, 2013, the Tribunal declined to dismiss this Application because of delay because it was not plain and obvious that the applicant did not have a good faith explanation for the delay in filing the Application.

3In the same Interim Decision, however, the Tribunal noted that the material filed by the Applicant indicated that the respondent filed a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the “BIA”). The materials also indicated that the applicant filed a Proof of Claim under the BIA for notice and severance pay. The BIA provides, in part:

69 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) and sections 69.4 and 69.5 on the filing of a notice of intention under section 50.4 by an insolvent person,

(a) No creditor has any remedy against the insolvent person or the insolvent person’s property, or shall commence or continue any action, execution or other proceedings, for the recovery of a claim provable in bankruptcy,

69.3 (1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2) and sections 69.4 and 69.5, on the bankruptcy of any debtor, no creditor has any remedy against the debtor or the debtor’s property, or shall commence or continue any action, execution or other proceedings, for the recovery of a claim provable in bankruptcy.

4In the Interim Decision, the Tribunal noted its jurisprudence in which it has found that an application seeking monetary compensation for a violation of Code is stayed by operation of section 69(1) of the BIA. See Rijal v. Distinctive Designs Furniture, 2009 HRTO 297, and also Mead v. Loop Enterprise, 2010 HRTO 1461. Accordingly it appeared that the Application could not proceed against the respondent and the Tribunal directed the applicant to file written submissions within 14 days of the date of the Interim Decision to provide any information that would indicate that a stay under section 69(1) of the BIA is not, or is no longer in place, failing which the Tribunal would dismiss the Application. As of the date of this Decision, the applicant has not filed any submission regarding the effect of the BIA on this Application.

5I find that the Application is stayed pursuant to section 69(1) of the BIA. The Application is dismissed.