Watson v. Watson Bus Service and Farm, 2013 HRTO 1662

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Joseph Watson

Applicant

-and-

Watson Bus Service and Farm, Wanda Watson, John Watson, Jennifer Watson and Emily Taylor

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Eric Whist

Date: October 2, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 1662

Indexed as: Watson v. Watson Bus Service and Farm

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Joseph Watson, Applicant

Self-represented

INTRODUCTION

1This is an Application filed on February 6, 2013, under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The Application alleges discrimination in contracts and housing on the basis of disability and family status. The Application alleges that the applicant had an agreement with his mother (and formerly his parents) that he would be given a house as part of his inheritance. Instead this house was sold in 2001 while the applicant was institutionalized because of mental health issues.

2The Application alleges that three of the personal respondents – the applicant’s sister, brother and sister-in-law – pressured the fourth personal respondent – the applicant’s mother, the owner of the named corporate respondent – into selling the house. It is alleged that they believed that as the applicant was mentally ill he could not handle money and might lose the house.

3On February 28, 2013, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”), in which it stated that the Application appeared to be outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in the Application and the applicant had not cited facts that constituted “good faith” within the meaning of the Tribunal’s case law. The Tribunal invited the applicant to provide written submissions to explain the delay of approximately twelve years in the filing of his Application.

4On March 4, 2013, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal to say that the delay in the filing of his Application was attributable to his mental health issues. He stated that he was in the process of getting his doctor to complete an assessment regarding his mental capacity and that he would forward this to the Tribunal upon its completion.

5On March 14, 2013, the Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) directing the applicant to provide further written submissions to explain in greater detail why he was unable to file his Application for such a lengthy period of time. The CAD stated that if the applicant intended to rely on the fact that he has had mental health issues he needed to provide medical evidence to show that his medical condition was so debilitating that it prevented him from filing an Application in a timely manner.

6On March 27, 2013, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal providing letters from two physicians dated January 21, 2013 and March 24, 2013. The letters indicate that the applicant has had mental health issues dating from before the date of the alleged incident of discrimination that have required the applicant to undergo periods of hospitalization and that may have affected the applicant’s ability to appreciate the significance of many things including timelines with respect to litigation. In a subsequent CAD issued to the parties on May 10, 2013 the Tribunal concluded that it was not plain and obvious that the Application should be dismissed for delay.

7However, in the CAD the Tribunal raised, on its own motion, a further issue of whether the Application should be dismissed as outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal noted that allegations in this Application might raise similar jurisdictional issues to those addressed in Kaur v. Nehra (“Kaur”), 2012 HRTO 1948, a decision in which the Tribunal determined that the Code was not intended to, and did not apply to, the beginning and ending of marriages.

8The CAD went on to state that similar to Kaur, it was not evident that the relationship between family members and a decision not to provide a promised inheritance, in this case a house, would constitute discrimination under the Code. The Tribunal directed the applicant to provide written submissions explaining why he believed his allegations came within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (power to decide). The Tribunal is now in receipt of the applicant’s submissions.

9In his submissions the applicant reiterates that his parents made a verbal declaration and promise in approximately 1994 that the applicant would inherit their house, a promise he states his mother subsequently reaffirmed after his father’s death in 1997. He submits that the other personal respondents, as part of their efforts to take charge of his mother’s estate, arranged to have the house sold when the applicant was mentally ill and institutionalized in 2001.

DECISION AND ANALYSIS

10The applicant’s Application is dismissed as it is plain and obvious that it is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

11The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with all allegations of unfair or differential treatment or to inquire into all relationships and all difficulties that may occur in those relationships. The Tribunal only has jurisdiction over those areas of alleged discrimination that are set out in the Code. These are: employment, housing, goods and services or facilities, contracts and membership in a vocational association.

12In his Application the applicant indicates that he was discriminated against in contracts, an area that is covered under the Code. Section 3 of the Code states:

3. Every person having legal capacity has a right to contract on equal terms without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability.

13However, the applicant’s relationship with his parents, and later his mother or the named corporate respondent, is not a contractual relationship that would be covered by section 3 of the Code. A contract between parties requires that the parties each receive a benefit, or consideration, otherwise it is not a contract in law. This is a basic principle of contract law.

14In this case the applicant’s parents and later the applicant’s mother promised the applicant a house as an inheritance. A promised inheritance is not a contract as the recipient does not have to do or promise to do anything in exchange for the inheritance. It is, by definition, a gift.

15The further decision to sell the house in question also does not mean that the applicant was discriminated against under section 3 of the Code. While the selling and buying of a house involves a contract as between the vendor and purchaser, both parties receive a benefit. In this case, the applicant is not contending that there was an agreement of purchase and sale for the house to which he was a party, nor was there an agreement or contract that was set aside for Code related reasons.

16In his Application the applicant also indicates that he was discriminated against in housing. Section 2 of the Code deals with discrimination in respect of housing and provides that:

2. (1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of accommodation, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status, disability or the receipt of public assistance.

17In my view the applicant was not denied a right to equal treatment. He was not denied a benefit or opportunity available to other members of society with respect to accommodation. The house in question was a family gift promised only to him. A subsequent decision by his family not to give this gift cannot give rise to a claim of unequal treatment under the Code. The facts of this situation are simply ones not covered under the Code. As a consequence the Application is dismissed.