Stone v. Millwright Regional Council of Ontario, Local 1592, 2013 HRTO 1530

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Stephen Stone Applicant

-and-

Millwright Regional Council of Ontario, Local 1592 and CFJ Nuclear Contractors Ltd. Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Douglas Sanderson Date: September 12, 2013 Citation: 2013 HRTO 1530 Indexed as: Stone v. Millwright Regional Council of Ontario, Local 1592

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Stephen Stone, Applicant No one appearing

Millwright Regional Council of Ontario, Local 1592, Respondent Meg Atkinson, Counsel

CFJ Nuclear Contractors Ltd., Respondent Richard Charney, Counsel

1This is an Application filed on August 31, 2012 under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of disability and reprisal or threat of reprisal.

2This Interim Decision addresses a Request for an Order During Proceedings the respondent Millwright Regional Council of Ontario, Local 1592 (the "union") filed on February 21, 2013 (the "Request"). The applicant did not file a Response to a Request for an Order and the time for doing so has passed. By letter dated February 27, 2013, the respondent CFJ Nuclear Contractors Ltd. stated that it took no position regarding the Request.

3The Request is in two parts. First the union submitted that the Tribunal should dismiss the Application because it discloses no prima facie case and/or the Application has no reasonable prospect of success. Accordingly, this part of the Request amounts to a Request for Summary Hearing under Rule 19A of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure (the "Rules"). Having reviewed the Application, this Request is denied. Pursuant to Rule 19A.5, the Tribunal need not give reasons for a decision not to hold a summary hearing following a party's request.

4Second, the union requested the dismissal of portions of the Application for delay. Section 34(1) and (2) state as follows:

34. (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

5The incidents in question are alleged to have occurred between May and August 2010. The Tribunal dismissed these allegations for delay as against a former respondent to this Application. See Stone v. Millwright Regional Council of Ontario, Local 1592, 2013 HRTO 278. The applicant asserted that the former respondent failed to accommodate his needs related to his lower back condition. The applicant did not assert that the union violated his Code rights with respect to these incidents, and merely identified the union steward at the time. Nonetheless, the union submitted that it was implicated in these incidents and that they occurred well outside the one year time limit set out in section 34(1) of the Code.

6To the extent the union is implicated in these allegations, they clearly occurred more than one year before the applicant filed the Application, i.e., August 31, 2012. As noted in Stone, supra, the Tribunal has held that in order to establish that a delay in filing an application was incurred in good faith under section 34(2) of the Code an applicant must provide some reasonable explanation for the delay. (See Corrigan v. Peterborough Victoria Northumberland and Clarington Catholic District School Board, 2008 HRTO 424.) The applicant did not respond to the union's Request and the Tribunal rejected his explanation that he delayed filing the Application because of fear of reprisal in Stone, supra. Consequently, the applicant provided no good faith explanation for the delay in filing an Application regarding these incidents. In the circumstances, I need not address the question of prejudice.

ORDER

7The Tribunal orders as follows:

1. The union's request for a summary hearing is denied
2. The allegations of incidents arising between May and August 2010 are dismissed for delay.

8I am not seized.