Jeremy Davidson v. U-Haul Canada, 2013 HRTO 1397

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Jeremy Davidson

Applicant

-and-

U-Haul Canada

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel

Date: August 14, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 1397

Indexed as: Davidson v. U-Haul Canada

1The applicant filed an Application under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), on June 12, 2013.

2In his Application, the applicant indicated that the last incident of alleged discrimination occurred on April 30, 2012. He noted in the Application that he did not file his Application within the one year time limit in the Code because he was “busy with school”. He indicated that it was his understanding that it was “not too late to file”. He then stated “I initially did not continue as I thought it was too much work for a part-time job”.

3On June 24, 2013 the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application (“NOID”) on the basis that the Application appears to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Notice noted that the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in the Application. The applicant was directed to respond to the delay issue raised in the NOID by no later than July 24, 2013. The applicant has not responded to the NOID and the time for doing so has now passed.

4Under the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, an Application will only be dismissed at this preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the Application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381; Belcastro v. Metrolinx Go Transit, 2012 HRTO 2121.

5For the reasons set out below, I have determined that it is plain and obvious that the Application is untimely and should be dismissed for delay.

ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO DELAY

6Section 34 of the Code provides that an Application must be filed within one year of the incident to which the Application relates, or within one year of the last incident in a series of events. Subsection 34(2) allows for a filing of an Application outside of the time limit if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any of the respondents.

7The applicant filed his Application more than a year after his employment was terminated. The last incident of alleged discrimination occurred at the end of April 2012 and the Application was filed on June 12, 2013.

8The Tribunal can accept an Application that is untimely if it is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice would result from accepting the Application. To show that a delay was incurred in good faith, the applicant must provide a reasonable explanation for his failure to pursue his rights under the Code in a timely manner.

9I do not find that the applicant has established a good faith reason for the delay in filing his Application. The reasons provided by the applicant are that he was busy with school and/or his part-time job and that he was under the impression that the Application would still be timely.

10Neither of these reasons amounts to a good faith reason for the applicant’s delay. I do not accept that being busy with other commitments such as those referred by the applicant satisfies the good faith requirement in s. 34(2). Although ignorance of one’s rights may in some circumstances amount to good faith, the applicant must establish that he or she had no reason to make inquiries about his or her rights. See Simmons v. Ontario (Transportation), 2010 HRTO 1884. In this case, the applicant has failed to provide any explanation for why he did not, or could not have, made inquiries about his rights in order to ensure that his Application was filed in a timely manner.

11The Application is dismissed.