HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
F.S. by his next friend M.S.
Applicant
-and-
Etobicoke Youth Soccer Club, Toronto Soccer Association, Ontario Soccer Association and Remo DiCarlo
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Jay Sengupta
Date: June 21, 2013
Citation: 2013 HRTO 1111
Indexed as: F.S. by his next friend M.S. v. Etobicoke Youth Soccer Club
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
F.S. by his next friend M.S., Applicant
Self-represented
Etobicoke Youth Soccer Club and Remo DiCarlo, Respondents
Self-represented
Toronto Soccer Association and Ontario Soccer Association, Respondents
Jessica Di Federico, Counsel
Introduction
1This is an Application filed by a parent on behalf of her child, under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"), alleging discrimination with respect to membership in a vocational association because of ancestry, place of origin, citizenship and ethnic origin.
2Although the applicant's next friend identifies membership in a vocational association as the social area engaged by the facts of this Application, given the allegations made, it appears she intended to identify the social area of goods, services and facilities.
3The applicant originally named the Etobicoke Youth Soccer Club and Remo DiCarlo as respondents. The Etobicoke Youth Soccer Club, in turn, named the Toronto Soccer Association and the Ontario Soccer Association as additional respondents.
4The respondents seek dismissal of the Application pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code on the basis that the applicant's complaint about his former coach, Remo DiCarlo, was dealt with by way of a committee hearing conducted by members of the Etobicoke Youth Soccer Club, who heard from the applicant, respondent DiCarlo and numerous witnesses, before concluding that there had been no violation of various rules and policies of the organization and its parent organizations, including the "Zero Tolerance Policy", and issuing a written decision to that effect.
5The applicant's parents then wrote to the Toronto Soccer Association, as they disagreed with the Club's decision. The Toronto Soccer Association reviewed two letters sent by the family and concluded no violation of rules or policies had taken place. No appeal was filed by the applicant or his family to the Ontario Soccer Association although there was some communication between the applicant's family and that organization at various times during this dispute.
6Section 45.1 of the Code provides as follows:
The Tribunal may dismiss an application, in whole or in part, in accordance with its rules if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.
7The Tribunal's jurisprudence has explained that section 45.1 gives expression to a legislative intent to avoid the duplication of proceedings and the re-litigation of issues that have been dealt with elsewhere. See Campbell v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 62.
8Section 45.1 is generally considered in two parts: (1) was there another "proceeding" and, (2) if so, did it "appropriately deal with" the substance of the application. In Campbell, supra, the Tribunal stated that a "proceeding" for the purpose of section 45.1 includes, at the very least, an adjudicative process established under a statutory regime.
9As the Tribunal pointed out in Cedeno v. Martens, 2012 HRTO 383:
The Tribunal's jurisprudence has held that an internal investigation or internal complaints process does not generally constitute a "proceeding" within the meaning of section 45.1 of the Code. See for example, Maurer v. Metroland Media Group, 2009 HRTO 200; Schuyler v. Ford Motor Company of Canada, 2009 HRTO 855; Robert v. Temagami Co-operative, 2010 HRTO 2256; Byaruhanga v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2010 HRTO 2273.
10In the circumstances of this case, the only processes engaged were internal to the respondent organizations. While these processes were established in accordance with the Constitution and By-laws established by the respondent Ontario Soccer Association, it is not a process established under a statutory regime. In my view, no other proceeding can be said to have appropriately dealt with the substance of the Application.
11Accordingly, the respondents' request to dismiss the Application pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code is denied.
12I am not seized.
Dated at Toronto, this 21st day of June, 2013.
"Signed by"
Jay Sengupta
Vice-chair

