HRTO 2012

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of age and family status after her employment was terminated upon her return from bereavement leave.

The respondent requested a summary hearing, arguing the termination was due to a workplace reorganization and that there was no link to the prohibited grounds.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of establishing a link between her termination and her age or family status, as a simple difference in age from her replacement and the timing of her termination were insufficient to prove discrimination.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in housing on the basis of disability.

The Tribunal issued multiple Case Assessment Directions requiring the applicant to provide written submissions and file documents, witness lists, and summaries of evidence.

The applicant failed to comply with these directions despite warnings that failure to do so could result in the dismissal of the application.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed two separate human rights applications against Humber College and the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, alleging failure to accommodate her learning disabilities and reprisal.

The Tribunal considered whether to consolidate the applications pursuant to Rule 1.7(d) of its Rules of Procedure.

Despite the applicant's opposition based on the complexity of dealing with both matters simultaneously, the Tribunal found common issues of fact and law and a public interest in avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings.

The Tribunal ordered the applications consolidated, noting that case directions could be used to manage the complexity for the applicant.

The respondent City of Toronto brought a request for early dismissal of an application alleging that its zoning by-laws discriminate against persons with mental health disabilities by imposing minimum separation distances for supportive housing.

The City argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to strike down by-laws, that the Ontario Municipal Board was the proper forum, and that the application was vague and hypothetical.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for early dismissal, finding it premature to decide these issues without a full evidentiary record, and allowed the applicant's request to amend the application.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal on the basis of disability and sex following her dismissal upon attempting to return from short-term disability leave.

The respondent requested that the application be dismissed under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal based on the same facts and seeking similar remedies.

The Tribunal found that the civil action and the application relied on identical facts and sought similar remedies, triggering the mandatory bar in section 34(11).

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability (a sleep disorder) following his termination for sleeping on the job.

The application was filed 22 months after the termination, which was 10 months beyond the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to determine whether the delay was incurred in good faith.

The Tribunal found that the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, acting for the applicant, had reason to make inquiries about the applicant's Code rights by April 2008 but failed to file the application until April 2009, instead pursuing other avenues of redress.

The Tribunal concluded the delay was not incurred in good faith and dismissed the application as out of time.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging systemic and individual discrimination by her employer.

The respondents requested that the application be deferred pending the conclusion of an ongoing grievance and arbitration process.

The applicant opposed deferral, arguing that the Tribunal's deferral power under section 45 of the Human Rights Code violates section 7 of the Charter because it transfers control of human rights claims from individuals to unions.

The Tribunal held that section 7 is not engaged, as deferral is a procedural step that does not restrict fundamental personal choices.

The Tribunal deferred the application pending the completion of the grievance process to avoid duplication of proceedings.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of sex and reprisal.

The respondents failed to appear at the scheduled hearing time, and the hearing proceeded in their absence.

The adjudicator found that the applicant was passed over for promotion because she was a woman, was subjected to reprisal after raising concerns, and that the respondents failed to properly investigate her complaints.

When a respondent arrived late and sought to make submissions on the merits, the adjudicator directed them to file submissions on remedy or a Request for Reconsideration.

The applicant, a 58-year-old district sales manager, alleged discrimination in employment based on age and disability after her position was eliminated following a one-year medical leave.

The respondent failed to participate in the proceedings and was deemed to have accepted the allegations.

The Tribunal found that the applicant established a prima facie case of discrimination, relying on a supervisor's comment analogizing her medical leave to an abandonment and a workplace message to hire only 'dumb, young, and good looking' employees.

The Tribunal concluded that age and disability were factors in the decision to eliminate her position, but deferred the determination of remedy pending further information from the applicant regarding mitigation and income.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal based on the respondent having previously filed a human rights application against him.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for delay and lack of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found the application was filed more than two years after the incident and the applicant failed to provide a good faith explanation for the delay.

Furthermore, the Tribunal found it plain and obvious that the application was outside its jurisdiction, as being named in a human rights application does not itself constitute discrimination or reprisal.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal by his former employer regarding his termination, benefits, and alleged wage siphoning.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intention to Dismiss.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to allege facts that would constitute a reprisal under section 8 of the Human Rights Code.

Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the remaining allegations regarding wage siphoning and return to work issues were barred by issue estoppel, as they had been previously dismissed in a 2009 final decision involving the same parties.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

A summary hearing was scheduled by conference call to allow the applicant to clarify her allegations.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing and did not contact the Tribunal to explain her absence.

The Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability after being bumped into a Welder position during a workplace downsizing, rather than his preferred Plateworker/Welder position.

The respondent requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was accommodated in his current position with no loss of income and did not allege a failure to accommodate, only that he was not in his ideal position.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as having no reasonable prospect of success, noting that the duty to accommodate does not require placing an employee in their ideal position.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on ancestry and disability, claiming police used excessive force during an incident at the airport.

The application was filed more than two years after the incident.

The Tribunal considered whether the delay was incurred in good faith under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

Despite the applicant's mental health history and financial barriers, the Tribunal found the delay was not justified, noting the applicant had been capable of taking other legal actions during the delay period.

The application was dismissed as untimely.

The applicant filed a human rights application against the respondent.

The respondent subsequently filed an assignment in bankruptcy, resulting in a stay of proceedings under section 69 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The applicant indicated that he would not apply to have the stay lifted and was not seeking to place the application in abeyance.

Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application.

The applicants requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed their applications alleging reprisal.

The applicants argued there were new facts and that the decision conflicted with established case law.

The Tribunal found that the applicants failed to establish any of the threshold criteria justifying reconsideration under Rule 26, noting that pleadings in civil actions are protected by absolute privilege and cannot form the basis of a reprisal claim.

The request for reconsideration was denied.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sexual harassment and wrongful dismissal.

Prior to filing the application, the applicant commenced a civil action against the respondent based on the same facts and seeking similar remedies.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss to determine if it had jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found that section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code barred the application because the civil proceeding raised the same allegations and sought remedies for the alleged infringement.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application against a university and several individuals, including a fellow student, alleging discrimination after the student refused to let him participate in a group assignment and used a racial epithet.

The applicant requested an order compelling the university to disclose the student's contact information for service.

The Tribunal considered whether the fellow student was a proper respondent.

Finding that the student was not providing an educational service to the applicant, the Tribunal concluded that the Human Rights Code does not cover allegations of discrimination between fellow classmates.

The student was removed as a respondent and the request to compel disclosure of her contact information was denied.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of family status, claiming she was denied work shifts because she, her husband, and her mother were employed at the same place.

The Tribunal initially issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss because the application appeared to be filed more than one year after the last alleged incident.

After reviewing the applicant's submissions alleging ongoing discrimination, the Tribunal found it was not plain and obvious that the application was out of time.

The Tribunal directed that the application be served on the respondents, who may raise the issue of delay in their response.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, specifically a failure to accommodate.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer because the applicant had also filed a workplace grievance based on the same facts and issues.

The applicant opposed deferral, while the employer noted the grievance was proceeding.

The applicant's union requested and was granted intervenor status.

The Tribunal ordered the application deferred pending the conclusion of the grievance to avoid concurrent proceedings and inconsistent decisions.