HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Ahmed Akash
Applicant
-and-
Toronto Transit Commission and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Michelle Flaherty
Index as: Akash v. Toronto Transit Commission
APPEARANCES
Ahmed Akash, Applicant ) Self Represented
Toronto Transit Commission ) Marni Tolenski
,Respondent ) Michelle Dobranowski, Counsel
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 ) Carlo Di Giovani and Tony Jones
,Respondent ) , Counsel
1The Application was filed by the applicant under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”) and alleges discrimination in employment on the basis of disability as well as reprisal or threat of reprisal. This Interim Decision follows a summary hearing, which was conducted in order to determine whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part because it has no reasonable prospect of success.
2For the reasons that follow, the Application is dismissed in part. With the exception of one allegation, I find the Application has no reasonable prospect of success.
3The respondents met their Code-related obligations when they offered or assisted in obtaining accommodated work within the applicant’s disability-related limitations. While the applicant insists that the respondents were also required to accommodate his preferred days off, type of work, hours of work, and location, there is no Code-related obligation for the TTC or the Union to ensure that the applicant’s preferences (unrelated to his Code needs) are respected. I find also that most of the remaining allegations have no reasonable prospect of success. As I explain in more detail in the reasons that follow, the additional allegations are either unrelated to a Code ground or they are based in speculation and bald allegations.
4Finally, the applicant has alleged that he was discriminated against because his disability was a factor in that, when he worked as a rear-door loader, he was not paid a spread allowance even though he worked a split shift that spanned a 10.5 to 12 hour period. At this stage of the proceeding, based on the materials and submissions before me, I am not able to determine whether or not this allegation has any reasonable prospect of success. As I explain in more detail, below, the parties are directed to file further written submissions on this issue.
OVERVIEW
5In essence, the Application relates to allegations that, although the applicant was provided with accommodated work that met his disability-related limitations, the work was not in keeping with the applicant’s preferences in terms of days off, type of work, hours of work, and location. The Application also contains a number of other allegations, which flow out of disciplinary issues and alleged reprisal measures.
6Pursuant to two Case Assessment Directions (“CAD”), the Tribunal held a summary hearing by way of conference call to determine whether the Application has a reasonable prospect of success against either of the respondents. The summary hearing was held on March 26, 2012. I heard submissions from the applicant and from counsel for the Toronto Transit Commission (“TTC”) and counsel for the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 (the “Union”).
7The applicant is a long-term employee of the TTC. He worked as a subway operator until he sustained an occupational injury. At the time of the summary hearing, the applicant was preparing to return to his full-time regular position as a subway operator. However, for a period of time, he required disability-related accommodation in the workplace.
8As I have indicated, the applicant complains that his preferences were not respected in the workplace accommodation process. He does not, however, dispute that he was provided with work that accommodated his disability-related limitations.
9The applicant also argues that he was discriminated against in the following ways:
a. The TTC reprised against him based on a human rights application he filed in 2008 and because he complained that a sign posted on a washroom door was discriminatory. The applicant states that he has been disciplined more harshly than other employees who have not raised human rights issues. He also argues that the TTC reprised against him by not considering his workplace preferences in the way that it has for other workers;
b. The TTC failed to pay him a spread allowance while he did accommodated work;
c. The applicant states that, had he filed a complaint with the TTC’s Human Rights Unit (“HRU”), it would not have been investigated;
d. The TTC disclosed documents to the Workers’ Safety and Insurance Board (“WSIB”) and set a trap for the applicant, which could have led to a denial of benefits;
e. Union officials yelled and used vulgar language when speaking to the applicant; and
f. The Union failed to pursue the applicant’s complaints regarding accommodation and a spread allowance with the TTC.
10The respondents deny the allegations of discrimination.
11The TTC argues that, although it is not strictly required to do so, it did in fact attempt to account for the applicant’s preferences in assigning accommodated work. It submitted correspondence between it and the applicant to show that the applicant did not cooperate with the accommodation process and that his preferences shifted considerably over time.
12The Union argues that it did, in fact, take appropriate steps to represent the applicant. In any event, it argues that the allegations against it relate to its representation of the applicant and not to any Code factor. In this respect, the Union relies on the Tribunal’s reasoning in Traversy v. Mississauga Professional Firefighters’ Association, 2009 HRTO 996. Further, the Union stated that even if Union officials did yell or use vulgarity when speaking to the applicant, this does not amount to a violation of the Code.
13The applicant had filed a Requst for Order During Proceedings (“Request”) seeking the disclosure of a number of documents, including documents related to accommodation measures in place for other workers. He requested that the summary hearing be adjourned pending disclosure of the requested documents. The respondents objected to the Request.
14At the outset of the hearing, I denied the Request and directed that the summary hearing proceed as scheduled. As I explained to the parties, a summary hearing is typically conducted without requiring either party to comply with disclosure obligations under the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. Based on the written submissions filed by the parties, I found that there was no basis to deviate from that practice in the circumstances. However, I invited the applicant to, in his oral submissions, explain how he believes the requested disclosure would assist him in establishing that the Application has a reasonable prospect of success.
ANALYSIS
Does The Duty To Accommodate An Employee’s Disability Include A Duty To Accommodate His Workplace Preferences?
15The applicant alleges that the duty to accommodate an injured worker under the Code includes a requirement to take into account his preferences in terms of location, time off, hours and type of work . The applicant relies on Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 (“Renaud”).
16There is no basis at law for the applicant’s argument. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Renaud stands for the opposite proposition. The Court writes:
This does not mean that, in addition to bringing to the attention of the employer the facts relating to discrimination, the complainant has a duty to originate a solution. While the complainant may be in a position to make suggestions, the employer is in the best position to determine how the complainant can be accommodated without undue interference in the operation of the employer’s business. When an employer has initiated a proposal that is reasonable and would, if implemented, fulfil the duty to accommodate, the complainant has a duty to facilitate the implementation of the proposal. If failure to take reasonable steps on the part of the complainant causes the proposal to founder, the complaint will be dismissed. The other aspect of this duty is the obligation to accept reasonable accommodation. This is the aspect referred to by McIntyre J. in O’Malley. The complainant cannot expect a perfect solution. If a proposal that would be reasonable in all the circumstances is turned down, the employer’s duty is discharged.
17In the circumstances of this case, based only on the applicant’s own submissions and the documentary evidence filed by the parties, it is clear to me that the applicant was exceptionally uncooperative in the accommodation process. He refused work that accommodated his disability because it did not align with his workplace preferences. His workplace preferences shifted over time and he repeatedly and assertively insisted on particular terms of accommodated work that had no connection to his Code-related needs. Indeed, the dispute between the parties appears to stem, in large part, from the applicant’s misapprehension of his rights under the Code.
18The applicant was, it seems, particularly frustrated that he was not offered a green light check position at his preferred work location. The applicant is left handed and his injury was to his left shoulder. The green light check position involved documenting how long a subway train was sitting at a green light at the end of the line. The TTC, unsure as to whether the applicant’s injury would impact his ability to write with his left hand for prolonged periods of time, asked the applicant to obtain additional information from his physician in this regard.
19The TTC states that it took some time for the applicant to provide the requested information and that, by the time he did, the green light check position at that particular work location was no longer available. The applicant disputes this. He argues that the TTC was requiring him to jump through hoops and that it was deliberately frustrating the accommodation process.
20It is not necessary for me to resolve the factual dispute as to the amount of time that elapsed before the applicant provided confirmation that he could perform the green light check position. As the Supreme Court of Canada indicated in Renaud, an applicant cannot require a perfect accommodation solution. The TTC had no Code-related requirement to provide the applicant with a particular job. In the circumstances, where the applicant was offered work that fully accommodated his disability, he has no reasonable prospect of establishing that the TTC’s failure to offer the applicant the green light check position at his preferred workplace location breached the Code in any way. Further, although he does not specifically allege that the TTC discriminated against him by requiring additional medical information, I find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that this was in breach of the Code. In reaching this conclusion, I note the applicant’s injury to his left shoulder, the fact that he is left handed, and the fact that the green light check position would have required him to spend hours documenting information.
21I fully accept that it is disruptive for an employee with a disability to work a different shift, do a different job, or work in a different location. But, as I have indicated, the Code does not require the employer to provide a perfect solution or to ensure that workplace preferences are met. It is certainly ideal where preferences are considered and I do not think it unreasonable that the applicant expressed his work preferences. However, in this case, the applicant’s behaviour and his insistence or particular work conditions was highly uncooperative and impeded the accommodation process. For example, in a letter to the TTC dated September 22, 2010, he writes:
On Friday September 17, 2010 employer was adamant that, the only transitional work available was split shift “Crash Gate” with no weekend-off or Rear-door loading with weekend-off. My employer is fully aware that my preference is no split, after PM start and weekend-off is possible.
22I note that the applicant had not claimed that his request for weekends off, for afternoon starts or no split shift is based on any Code-ground.
23On September 30, 2010, the applicant wrote a further letter to the TTC objecting to his assignment to a rear-door loading position because it involved standing for eight hours a day, it exposed him to weather elements and second-hand smoke, it was an unproductive job assignment, and because he believed that crash gate work was available. None of these objections is based on a Code-ground, including an established physical limitation. In his letter of September 30, 2010, the applicant wrote:
Therefore, under the collective agreement […] I exercise my rights as follows:
I choose Friday and Saturday as my off days. I am a Muslim and need Friday off based on religious grounds… I have chosen Friday-Saturday off-days many times in the past.
Starting Sunday October 2010 I will report to Danforth division at 11:00 am for the available Sunday work and I chose Crsh Gate work 11am to 7pm straight hours
Monday to Thursday, closest work location to my home, I choose Scarborough town centre crash gate 2pm to 10pm. I’ll report at 2pm for remaining work days. Then, it is up the my employer to deploy me, in smoke free workplace within such time frame.
24In my view, this letter is an attempt by the applicant to dictate the terms and conditions of his work for reasons that are unrelated to the Code. There no basis in the Code to support the applicant’s position with regards to work conditions that do not engage a Code-factor. I note that the TTC invited the applicant to direct his request for Fridays off for religious reasons to its human rights unit. The applicant has not, in this Application or in his submissions at the summary hearing, alleged that his right to accommodation based on religion was not met.
25In conclusion, there is no dispute that the work offered to the applicant met his Code-related restrictions. Based only on the applicant’s submissions and the documentary evidence, I have no difficulty concluding that the applicant was uncooperative in the accommodation process. His vision of the employer’s duty to accommodate his disability is not grounded in the Code. I find that there is no reasonable prospect that the applicant could succeed in establishing that, in not meeting his workplace preferences, the respondents failed to meet their obligation to accommodate him under the Code.
Was There Differential Treatment Amongst Accommodated Workers?
26The applicant argues that the TTC failed to consider his preferences but accommodated the preferences of other workers. While he acknowledged that there is no basis to conclude that this alleged differential treatment is based on disability, he states that his race was a factor. In this regard, he states that the workers he saw working in jobs that appeared to be better suited were all white.
27The respondents vigourously object to the applicant raising the ground of race at this stage of the proceeding. They point out that this ground was not identified in the Application. In fact, in the Application, the applicant specifically stated that he was not alleging racial discrimination.
28It is not necessary for me to determine whether the Application can properly include the ground of race. In my view, whether considered in terms of disability or race, the applicant does not have a reasonable prospect of establishing that any distinction in the TTC’s willingness to accommodate workers’ preferences is discriminatory. First, as I have indicated, the applicant was highly uncooperative in the accommodation process and his preferences shifted over time. I have already concluded that, to the extent that the TTC did not accommodate the applicant’s preferences, this appears to have been because of the applicant’s own behaviour rather than because of any Code-related ground.
29The applicant argues that disclosure of information regarding the accommodation of other workers will establish differential treatment. He argues that, once he is given information about the details of accommodation processes followed in other cases, he will be able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. I further understand the applicant to argue that the very fact that the other workers were white while he is racialized amounts to a prima facie case of discrimination.
30I note that the issue for me to determine at the summary hearing is not whether the applicant has raised a prima facie case of discrimination, but rather whether the Application has any reasonable prospect of success. The meaning of these two terms is discussed in detail in Pellerin v. Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud, 2011 HRTO 1777.
31I am mindful that, as the Tribunal explained in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994 at para. 10:
In considering what evidence is reasonably available to the applicant, the Tribunal must be attentive to the fact that in some cases of alleged discrimination, information about the reasons for the actions taken by a respondent are within the sole knowledge of the respondent. Evidence about the reasons for actions taken by a respondent may sometimes come through the disclosure process and through cross-examination of the people involved. The Tribunal must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that such evidence may lead to a finding of discrimination. However, when there is no reasonable prospect that any such evidence could allow the applicant to prove his or her case on a balance of probabilities, the application must be dismissed following the summary hearing.
32As the Tribunal indicated in Forde v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, 2011 HRTO 1389, for an Application to continue in the Tribunal’s process following a summary hearing, there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show discrimination on the basis of one of the grounds alleged in the Code.
33In the circumstances of this case, given the applicant’s behaviour and his fundamental lack of cooperation with the accommodation process, the allegations that race was a factor in the TTC’s accommodation of workers’ preferences is speculative and a mere accusation. In my view, there is no reasonable prospect that this allegation could succeed or that the additional disclosure requested by the applicant would assist him in establishing this allegation.
The Allegations Against The Union
34As I have indicated, the applicant’s allegations against the Union are twofold. He argues: a) that the Union failed to take appropriate steps to represent him and his interests; and b) that Union officials yelled at him and used vulgar language.
35It is neither necessary nor appropriate for me to consider whether the union adequately represented the applicant. As the Tribunal explained in Traversy v. Mississauga Professional Firefighters’ Association, 2009 HRTO 996 at para. 33,
Assuming that the Code also applies to this aspect of a union’s relationship with the employees it represents, a claim that the union violates the Code must be based on an assertion of differential treatment, and not simply a failure to act. The failure or refusal to take forward a human rights issue, such as accommodation of a disability in the workplace, is not, in and of itself, a breach of the Code. There may be many reasons that have no discriminatory overtones why a union might choose not to pursue a human rights claim on behalf of an employee: see Baylet v. Universal Workers Union, 2009 HRTO 700, 2009 HRTO 700. There must be a claim, and a factual foundation for the claim, that the failure to act was based on discriminatory factors.
36The applicant does not allege that the Union’s alleged failure to appropriately represent him is based on a Code-related factor and he has provided no basis to support such a conclusion.
37The applicant’s concerns about the way in which certain union officials addressed him relate to alleged unprofessionalism, including swearing and raised voices. As the Tribunal has stated in the past, the use of vulgar language does not necessarily give rise to discrimination within the meaning of the Code: Haykin v. Roth, 2009 HRTO 2017 at para. 49. Further, the purpose of the Code is not to police the respondent’s every comment, nor does a person’s hurt feelings, anxiety or upset about a situation mean that the Code was violated: Gurney v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada, 2011 HRTO 984 at para. 7.
38It is not necessary or appropriate for me to determine whether Union officials yelled or used vulgar language when addressing the applicant. Whether or not they did, the applicant has provided no basis to suggest that a Code-related factor was a basis for any alleged unprofessionalism or use of vulgar language by the Union. For this reason, I find that these allegations against the Union have no reasonable prospect of success.
Allegations Of Reprisal
39The Application raises a further issue as to whether or not the applicant has a reasonable prospect of establishing that the TTC reprised against him in the sense that it acted or made a threat with the intention of retaliating against the applicant because he had asserted rights under the Code: Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878, at paras. 33-34.
40The applicant filed an earlier Application in 2008 and in late January 2010, complaining that a sign posted in a bathroom was discriminatory. I have no difficulty accepting that the applicant did assert his rights under the Code, although I make no finding as to whether either incident gives rise to any actual discrimination under the Code.
41The applicant alleges that he was disciplined more harshly than others because he asserted his rights under the Code. The discipline in question relates to a series of three incidents between the applicant and a fellow operator concerning seating in the operators’ break room and the temperature of the room. These incidents occurred on January 5, January 9, and February 18, 2010.
42At the summary hearing, I asked the applicant to explain why he believes that the discipline he received for these incidents was linked, in any way, to his assertion of his rights under the Code. He states that he cannot know what was in management’s mind when it disciplined him, but that he suspects that his assertion of Code rights was a factor in its decision-making. The applicant also argues that his complaint about the bathroom sign was particularly embarrassing for one manager and that she likely tried to retaliate against him in imposing harsh discipline.
43I note that the discipline in question occurred in early 2010, approximately two years after the applicant filed his earlier Application. A significant period of time elapsed between the filing of the earlier Application and the discipline. The applicant has provided no basis beyond a bald assertion of reprisal to connect the two incidents.
44In regards to the complaint about the bathroom sign, I note that it occurred in late January 2010, after the second of the three disciplinarly incidents involving the applicant. By the time the applicant complained about the bathroom sign, the parties were already engaged in a course of progressive discipline.
45The parties agree that the third incident between the applicant and the other operator involved a confrontation, during which the applicant swore at the other operator. In addition, the TTC states that the applicant’s behaviour was threatening and intimidating. The applicant disputes this.
46The applicant argues that other employees have not been disciplined for using vulgar language. He states that the fact that the third incident led to the termination of his employment demonstrates the harsh discipline he received in retaliation for asserting Code rights.
47It is not necessary for me to resolve the factual dispute as to the nature of the third incident. Nor is it necessary or appropriate for me to determine whether or not the discipline imposed by the TTC is reasonable or appropriate in the circumstances. The only issue before me is whether the applicant has a reasonable prospect of establishing that the discipline constitutes reprisal in the sense that it was imposed with the intention of retaliating against the applicant for asserting rights under the Code.
48The applicant’s position rests on the argument that others were not disciplined for using vulgar language. This argument, however, fails to account for the fact that the third incident arose in a particular context, where the applicant had already been disciplined twice for his behaviour toward a particular co-worker. The applicant has not argued that others, in similar circumstances, were disciplined any differently than he was. As I have indicated, I make no finding as to the appropriateness of the discicpline. However, in all of the circumstances, I do find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that he was disciplined more harshly than others in similar circumstances or that this was in retaliation for asserting Code rights.
49I note that applicant was very quickly reinstated into the workplace, following a grievance filed by the Union and a settlement achieved at a step one grievance meeting. The applicant took issue with the terms of the reinstatement agreement, arguing that they were unfair and that he entered into the agreement under duress. While he takes issue with the fairness of the agreement, it is not clear to me that the applicant has alleged that this reinstatement or the agreement giving rise to it was discriminatory. In any event, he has suggested no basis that would support such a conclusion or show that he has a reasonable prospect of showing that the reinstatement process breached the Code in any way.
50Finally, the applicant argues that the TTC’s failure to consider his preferences was in retaliation for his assertion of Code rights. As I have indicated, the applicant’s shifting preferences and his own behaviour seems to be at the root of any failure to accommodate the applicant’s workplace preferences. The applicant has provided nothing beyond speculation and accusations to support his argument this was a retaliatory measure. In all of the circumstances of the case, I find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of establishing reprisal in this regard.
Spread Allowance
51The collective agreement between the TTC and the Union provides for a spread allowance for three categories of workers (transportation operators, collection/subway suppliers and traffic checkers). Individuals who do these categories of work and who are scheduled for a split shift that spans a period of 10.5 to 12 hours (depending on the applicable provision of the collective agreement) are entitled to additional compensation.
52The applicant alleges that he was discriminated against because, when he was doing accommodated work, he was not paid a spread allowance.
53First, he argues that on one day, he worked a split shift as a crash gate worker but was not paid a spread allowance. The TTC acknowledges that crash gate is a category of work that qualifies for a spread allowance under the collective agreement, but it argues that the applicant’s scheduled work did not span the requisite number of hours and that he was therefore not entitled to a spread allowance. At the summary hearing, the applicant acknowledged that he did not recall whether or not his work had spanned the requisite number of hours on the date in question. In the circumstances, I find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of showing that a Code-related ground was a factor in the failure to pay him a spread allowance on that date.
54Second, the applicant argues that it is discriminatory for the TTC to exclude rear door loading work from those categories that quality for a spread allowance. The applicant also argues that the Union is guilty of discrimination for not ensuring that disabled workers assigned to rear door loading qualify for a spread allowance. He argues that the work of the rear-door loader closely resembles that of the crash gate position: both involve taking fares during peak hours.
55The TTC explained that the rear-door loader position is not set out in the collective agreement; the position was created in order to accommodate injured workers. Counsel for the TTC explained that not all TTC workers qualify for a spread allowance, even if they work a split shift. She states that any distinctions in terms of eligibility for a spread allowance is based on categories of work, not on a workers’ disability. For example, she states that disabled workers in accommodated work that does quality for spread allowance (for example, crash gate workers) are paid this additional amount where they meet the hourly requirements.
56Based on the materials and submissions before me, I am not able to determine whether the applicant’s allegations in regards to the spread allowance for rear-door loading work have no reasonable prospect of success.
57Based on the applicant and the TTC’s submissions at the summary hearing, it appears that the TTC has created a category of work for disabled employees. While these employees may work similar hours and perform similar work to, for example, crash gate workers, they are not entitled to a spread allowance. I understand the TTC’s argument that disabled workers are paid a spread allowance when they do eligible work. However, it seems that the applicant’s allegations raise an issue as to whether the failure to include rear-door loaders as a category of work eligible for a spread allowance is in breach of the Code. Counsel for the TTC stated that she believed there are jobs or categories of work that, like rear door loading, do not qualify for a spread allowance even when they involve a split shift and the work is spread out over 10.5 to 12 hours. However, she did not point to a particular example.
58In my view, it is appropriate to invite further written submissions from the parties regarding the following issue:
Was the applicant’s disability a factor in the fact that, when he worked as a rear-door loader, he was not paid a spread allowance when he worked a split shift that spanned a 10.5 to 12 hour period?
59The parties’ written submissions on this issue should be exchanged and filed with the Tribunal according to the following schedule:
A. The TTC, within two weeks of the date of this Interim Decision;
B. The Union, within three weeks of the date of this Interim Decision;
C. The applicant, within four weeks of the date of this Interim Decision; and
D. The TTC and the Union’s reply submissions, within five weeks of the date of this Interim Decision.
60Given that the rear-door loader position is not included in the collective agreement, it is not clear that the Union had any role in negotiating this work condition. However, I have not heard submissions from the parties on this issue and, given that the applicant asserts the Union did have a role to play, it seems appropriate that the Union remain a respondent to the proceeding at this time and that it be given an opportunity to present written submissions. This decision is without prejudice to the Union’s ability to seek to be removed as a respondent at a later stage.
Other Allegations
61The applicant’s allegations concerning the human rights unit (“HRU”) appear to be hypothetical. He complains that the HRU investigated complaints against him by a fellow operator. While he initially seemed to be alleging that it failed to investigate complaints he had lodged, the applicant later acknowledged that, although the HRU invited him to file a complaint, he never did so. The applicant explained that his allegation of discrimination was based on his belief that, had he filed a complaint, the HRU would not have treated it seriously.
62This allegation is purely hypothetical and speculative. There is no reasonable prospect that the applicant will succeed in showing that an anticipated failure to investigate a complaint violates the Code.
63The applicant also alleges that the TTC disclosed information to the WSIB. The applicant argues that this was an act of harassment and that the disclosure was designed to set a trap for him. However, the applicant has made no allegation that this disclosure constitutes discrimination on the basis of a Code-related ground. This allegation has no reasonable prospect of success.
SUMMARY
64The Application is dismissed in part. For the resaons set out above, I find that most of the allegations it contains have no reasonable prospect of success.
65The parties are directed to provide additional written submissions on the following issue:
Was the applicant’s disability a factor in the fact that, when he worked as a rear-door loader, he was not paid a spread allowance when he worked a split shift that spanned a 10.5 to 12 hour period?
66These submissions must be exchanged and filed in accordance with the timetable set out in paragraph 59, above.
67I am not seized.
Dated at Toronto, this 2nd day of April, 2012.
“Signed by”
Michelle Flahery
Vice-chair