HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Lianne Aubin Applicant
-and-
Sudbury Sexual Assault Crisis Centre and Morag Anderson Respondents
A N D B E T W E E N:
Carrie-Anne Collin Applicant
-and-
Sudbury Sexual Assault Crisis Centre and Morag Anderson Respondents
A N D B E T W E E N:
Lyndsay Rogers Applicant
-and-
Sudbury Sexual Assault Crisis Centre and Morag Anderson Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Ena Chadha Date: January 11, 2012 Citation: 2012 HRTO 56 Indexed as: Aubin v. Sudbury Sexual Assault Crisis Centre
1These three Applications allege sexual harassment, discrimination and reprisal with respect to employment and all three applicants were employed by the same respondent organization. By way of an earlier Interim Decision, 2011 HRTO 1281, the Tribunal consolidated the three Applications and granted the request to add a new reprisal allegation to two of the Applications.
2On August 25, 2011, the applicants filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings (“Request”) asking that they be permitted to add two respondent parties to the Applications. This Interim Decision addresses that Request.
REQUEST TO ADD EXISTING PERSONAL RESPONDENT TO AN APPLICATION
3The applicants seek to add Morag Anderson, a respondent named in the other two Applications, as a personal respondent in Application 2010-06285-I. The applicants indicate that, because of a clerical oversight, Application 2010-06285-I failed to identify Morag Anderson as a personal respondent.
4The Tribunal accepts the applicants’ submissions that because of an administrative error Morag Anderson was not identified as a respondent party in Form 1 of Application 2010-06285-I. Although Morag Anderson was omitted from the section of Form 1 which identifies individual respondents, the Tribunal notes that Morag Anderson was the focus of the Application narrative and was also listed as a respondent party in supplementary Form 1A. Given that Morag Anderson was included in the narrative and identified as a respondent in Form 1A from the outset, as well being a respondent party in the other two Applications, there does not appear to be any issue of prejudice with respect to identifying Morag Anderson as a personal respondent at this stage of the Tribunal’s process.
5Accordingly, the Tribunal grants the Request to add Morag Anderson as a personal respondent in Application 2010-06285-I.
REQUEST TO ADD NEW RESPONDENT TO ALL APPLICATIONS
6The applicants also seek to add Leanne Tucker as a new personal respondent to all the Applications. The applicants allege Ms. Tucker engaged in discriminatory comments and conduct during a period of time that she served as President of the Board of Directors of the organizational respondent and, at some other point in time, while she served as Executive Director of the organizational respondent. The applicants allege that Ms. Tucker ignored and belittled their human rights concerns, condoned the harassment allegedly perpetuated by the personal respondent, failed to investigate their concerns, and engaged in reprisal.
7The respondents deny the allegations and submit that at all material times Ms. Tucker was acting in her authorized capacity as President of the Board of Directors of the respondent organization. The respondents submit that the allegations against Ms. Tucker also relate to her assuming duties of the Executive Director and attempt to challenge her managerial decisions, such as discipline and handling of employment policies. The respondents contend that the Request is untimely and the addition of Ms. Tucker as a respondent party would significantly alter the scope of the original Applications.
8Rule 1.7(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure states that, in order to provide for the fair, just and expeditious resolution of any matter before it, the Tribunal may add a party. In Smyth v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 1513 (“Smyth”), the Tribunal articulated three issues for consideration when deciding whether or not to add a respondent party:
(1) Are there allegations made that could support a finding that the proposed respondent violated the Code?
(2) If the proposed respondent is an individual and an organization is also named, is there a compelling reason to include him or her as a respondent?
(3) Would it be fair, in all the circumstances, to add the proposed respondent?
The Application of the first stage involves considering whether there are allegations made in the Application or amendments sought to it that could lead to a finding that the Code was infringed. At the second stage, the Tribunal applies the Persaud factors, which focus in most cases on whether there is an organizational respondent named that can effectively remedy the infringement and the centrality of the allegations against the proposed respondent. At the third stage, the Tribunal may consider a variety of factors, including the effects on the hearing process of adding the proposed respondent, the reasons the proposed respondent was not named in the Application or Response, prejudice to the other parties, and the need for and likely effectiveness of a remedial order against the proposed respondent if the Application is allowed.
9With respect to the first factor of the test in Smyth, I will assume, without deciding, that the allegations support a finding that Ms. Tucker violated the applicants’ rights. However, given full consideration of all the above-noted factors, I do not find it is appropriate to add Ms. Tucker as a respondent party. I do not accept that “compelling juridical reasons” exist in favour of adding the proposed respondent. See Sigrist and Carson v. London District School Board, [2008 HRTO 14](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/on