HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Alexandro Mancini
Applicant
-and-
L’Université Laurentienne
Respondent
decision
Adjudicator: Geneviève Debané
Indexed as: Mancini v. Université Laurentienne
APPEARANCES
Alexandro Mancini, Applicant ) Self-represented
L’Université Laurentienne, Respondent ) Kathryn J. Bird, Counsel
1This is an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”) which alleges discrimination in services on the basis of family status, age and receipt of social assistance.
2In a Case Assessment Direction dated August 29, 2011, the Tribunal advised the respondent L’Université Laurentienne (the “respondent University”) that it did not have to file a Response and the Tribunal of its own initiative was directing that a summary hearing be held in this matter.
3A half-day summary hearing by teleconference was held on March 5, 2012 in which all parties participated. The applicant made his oral submissions in French and an interpreter was made available to the parties. The Tribunal advised that the respondent did not have to make oral submissions.
Background
4The applicant claims that he applied for admission at the respondent University in 2007, paying the required $45 dollar fee. He was denied admission on the basis that he could not provide an official transcript of his studies from Laval University in Quebec. The applicant alleges that he has an outstanding debt with Laval University and it is refusing to issue him an official transcript.
5The applicant waited a few years, until the end of 2010, and contacted the respondent University and was advised by a representative that it did not have a file open in his name. The applicant states that he changed his name in 2007.
6The applicant then proceeded to re-apply for admission at the respondent University in 2011, paying the $45 dollar fee, but omitted to include in his application that he had studied at Laval University. However, the respondent University contacted him requesting that he provide an official transcript from Laval University. The applicant was surprised that the respondent University wanted this information.
7The applicant alludes that there may have been improper confidential information that was exchanged between the two universities. Further, the applicant asserts that he was able to gain admittance to the University of Ottawa despite the fact that he had this outstanding debt. Also, the applicant notes that the respondent University did not demand original transcripts of his studies in Tunisia. The applicant claims that all of the foregoing is evidence that there is an agreement between the two universities to deny admission if a student has an outstanding debt. The applicant asserts that he was not treated fairly by the respondent University who made unreasonable demands from him.
Decision
8Details about the nature of a summary hearing were set out as follows in Daric v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, at paras. 8 and 9:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
9Section 1 and 2 of the Code state:
Services
- Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status or disability. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 1; 1999, c. 6, s. 28 (1); 2001, c. 32, s. 27 (1); 2005, c. 5, s. 32 (1).
Accommodation
- (1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of accommodation, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status, disability or the receipt of public assistance. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 2 (1); 1999, c. 6, s. 28 (2); 2001, c. 32, s. 27 (1); 2005, c. 5, s. 32 (2).
10The Application alleges discrimination with respect to services. Section 1, which identifies the prohibited grounds of discrimination with respect to services, does not include or prohibit discrimination on the basis of “receipt of social assistance”. The right to equal treatment on the basis of “receipt of social assistance” is only with respect to accommodation. I note that the Application clearly states that “receipt of social assistance” only applies to housing. Therefore, I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the Application with respect to the claim that the applicant was discriminated against by the respondent University on the basis that he was in “receipt of social assistance”.
11Though the applicant has asserted that the respondent University also discriminated against him on the basis of his family status and age, the applicant provided no submissions and/or proposed evidence on this issue which could reasonably support this assertion.
12The applicant also asserted that since the respondent University was not able to assess his two applications it did not fulfill its contractual obligations and the total $90 dollars in fees should be returned to him. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over allegations of alleged breaches of contract, general allegations of unfairness, and/or to assess whether the fee should in fact be returned to the applicant.
13Since the Application has no reasonable prospect of success, the Application is
dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 20th day of March, 2012.
”signed by”__________________
Geneviève Debané
Vice-chair