Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Victoria Jacques Applicant
-and-
The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company Respondent
INTERIM Decision
Adjudicator: David Muir Date: March 9, 2012 Citation: 2012 HRTO 504 Indexed as: Jacques v. The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company
APPEARANCES
Victoria Jacques ) Bruce Best, Counsel
The Dominion of Canada ) Jeffrey Goodman and General Insurance Company ) Vivian Bercovici, Counsel
1This an Application filed pursuant to section 34 of section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, (the "Code").
2The applicant alleges that her right to be free from discrimination in contract and services because of a disability has been infringed by the respondent. The applicant alleges that as a consequence of a disability her licence was suspended for a period exceeding 36 months and as a consequence of that suspension she was deemed to be a novice driver under Regulations made pursuant to the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. H. 8. Consequently, states the applicant, she was subject to a Rating Rule of the respondent which resulted in a significantly higher premium for her automobile insurance despite a lengthy prior unblemished driving record.
3A Request for Summary Hearing filed by the respondent was granted in a Case Assessment Direction issued by the Tribunal on October 28, 2011. An oral hearing by teleconference was held on March 6, 2012. Both parties participated. As this is a summary hearing Decision it is inappropriate to indicate any conclusions with respect to the allegations or the responses to them. Similarly I have not commented on or outlined in any great detail the arguments of the parties as they relate to merits of the Application. I have instead focussed on the key issue informing my determination of the only issue before me – whether this Application have no reasonable prospect of success.
4Rules 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure read as follows:
19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.
19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.
5The nature of the issues to be canvassed in a summary hearing were described in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, at paras. 8 and 9:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
6The parties are agreed that this case falls within the first category of cases set out above; that is, assuming that all of the allegations made by the applicant are proved, whether there is no reasonable prospect that her allegation that the Code has been violated can be sustained.
7The applicant states that she has been driving an automobile for many years and has had many years of claims free and violation free driving experience. As a result of a medical issue which is assumed to constitute a disability for purposes of this Decision the applicant's licence was suspended in September 2006. The applicant was successfully treated for the medical condition and was elegible to have her licence reinstated sometime in August 2009, but it remained suspended for more than 36 months from the date it was suspended. The timing of these events gave rise to the suggestion at the hearing that the delay in the applicant having her licence reinstated might also be a causal factor in the circumstances she subsequently faced, but it was agreed that this issue would be left unless it was necessary to deal with it should the respondent's primary position not be accepted.
8As a consequence of the applicant's driver's licence being reinstated more than 36 months after its initial suspension the applicant was deemed to be a "novice driver" pursuant to subsection 29(1) of Ontario Regulation 340/94, made under the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8