HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Louise Tone
Applicant
-and-
W. Dixon & Sons Ltd.
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Judith Keene
Date: February 24, 2012
Citation: 2012 HRTO 397
Indexed as: Tone v. W. Dixon & Sons Ltd.
1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”) on October 7, 2011. The Application alleges discrimination with respect to employment on the basis of disability. On December 2, 2011, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer under Rule 14.2 of its Rules of Procedure, as it appeared that the applicant had filed an appeal of a decision under the under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Schedule A (“WSIA”). The applicant and the respondent were invited to make written submissions on why the Application should, or should not be deferred. The applicant has indicated that she wishes to proceed without deferral and has filed materials related to her WSIA appeal. The respondent has filed no submissions.
2Section 45 of the Code confirms the Tribunal’s authority to defer consideration of an application. Under Rule 14 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal may, on its own initiative, defer consideration of an application after providing notice of its intention to do so to all parties and giving them an opportunity to make submissions.
3The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Rule 14.1).
4Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. However, deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings.
5Some of the factors that may be relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the type of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer having regard to the nature and status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them.
6It appears from the applicant’s submissions that her appeal is at only the initial stage; correspondence from the Office of the Worker Advisor dated May 5, 2011 indicated that the applicant has been placed on “a long waiting list”. That letter briefly raised the employer’s duty to accommodate, but more recent filings dated October 25, 2011 from the applicant’s assigned representative indicate that the appeal is confined to the issue of whether a medical condition that arose after an initial workplace injury should be compensated as an aggravation of the original compensable injury. There appears to me to be no significant overlap of issues between the Application and the appeal. In the circumstances, I am not convinced that deferral of the Application is warranted.
7A copy of the application was previously delivered to the respondent. The respondent is directed to file its Response no later than 35 days from the date of this Interim Decision. I am not seized of this matter.
Dated at Toronto, this 24th day of February, 2012.
“Signed by “
Judith Keene
Vice-chair