Weigl v. Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation, 2012 HRTO 304

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Ben Weigl

Applicant

-and-

Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation, Jim Mellor and Jim Steele

Respondents

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: Alison Renton

Date: February 10, 2012

Citation: 2012 HRTO 304

Indexed as: Weigl v. Windsor Essex Community Housing Corporation

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY

Ben Weigl, Applicant ) Self-represented

1On January 30, 2012, the Tribunal issued its Decision in this Application, 2012 HRTO 214, dismissing the Applications. The applicant has asked the Tribunal to reconsider its Decision by filing a Request for Reconsideration under Rule 26 (“the Request”). The Tribunal has not asked the respondents to respond to the Request.

BACKGROUND

2In file 2010-05865-I, the applicant alleged that he and other recipients of ODSP benefits were treated differently from other tenants because of the respondent’s change in the payment schedule. Formerly, the rent was due at the end of the month, which coincided with when the applicant received his ODSP benefits. The respondent provided notice that the rent would be due at the beginning of the month which temporarily placed the applicant in rent arrears. The Tribunal found that these circumstances did not equate to either direct or constructive discrimination under the Human Rights Code R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended, (the “Code”) that there was not a reasonable prospect of success and this Application was dismissed.

3In file 2011-08527-I, the applicant alleged that he had posted information on his bulletin board to educate other tenants about their rights, his information was removed, he raised concerns about the removals, his concerns were not responded to by the corporate respondent or others, and then the respondents and OPP officers showed up at his door on November 18, 2010, contrary to the respondents’ agreement to communicate with him in writing rather than in person. All the while, his Application in file 2010-05865-I remained outstanding. The respondents’ actions, the applicant alleged, were designed to intimidate him and to prevent him from educating other tenants about their rights. The Tribunal found that, notwithstanding that the events of November 18, 2010 occurred while the Application in file 2010-08527-I remained outstanding, there was nothing other than the applicant’s bald assertion that these events were connected and constituted reprisal within the meaning of the Code. The Tribunal determined that there was not a reasonable chance of success pertaining to the applicant’s reprisal allegations and this Application was also dismissed.

THE REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

4In the Request, the applicant submits that there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier. He further submits that the Decision is in conflict with established case law or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance.

5Specifically, the applicant submits that there is new evidence in para. 20 of the Decision of which he was not aware until “the respondents’ response letter” and “the fact that this paragraph is a falsehood by the respondents which predicated my feeling of reprisal”. Further, he believes that the Vice-chair failed to take into account the Ontario Human Rights Commissions’ (“the Commission”) Policy and Guideline on Disability and the Duty to Accommodate (“Disability Policy”) and “missed the point that [f]orcing a [p]erson with a disability into arrears is not treating that person with dignity”.

DECISION

6Under section 45.7 of the Code, the Tribunal may, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, reconsider its decisions in accordance with Tribunal’s Rules.

45.7(1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.

(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.

7The Tribunal has issued Rules governing such requests as well as a Practice Direction to provide guidance to the community on the Tribunal’s exercise of its reconsideration powers (Practice Direction on Reconsideration, January 2008 amended June 2008). Most relevant to this Decision is Rule 26 which states:

26.1 Any party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal within (thirty) 30 days of the date of the decision

26.5. A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that

(a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or

(b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or

(c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or

(d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

8The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration begins with the following statements:

Decisions of the Tribunal are generally considered final and are not subject to appeal. However, parties may request that the Tribunal reconsider a final decision it has made. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the Tribunal. Generally, the Tribunal will only reconsider a decision where it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary circumstances for doing so and where these circumstances outweigh the public interest in finality of orders and decisions.

Reconsideration is not an appeal or an opportunity for a party to repair deficiencies in the presentation of its case.

9As is evident from the above, reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That is, while the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to reopen and reconsider its own decisions, it is not obliged to do so. It may decide when reconsideration is advisable, both through the promulgation of rules setting out conditions for the exercise of its discretion, and through the application of its discretion on a case-by-case basis.

10The applicant relies on Rule 26.5(a) and (c) in support of the Request. I find that the applicant has not met the burden of establishing any of the threshold criteria justifying reconsideration. While he relies upon Rule 26.5(a), the applicant does not point to any new facts or evidence that was not available to him before the summary hearing. Para. 20 of the Decision, to which the applicant objects, is a summary of the respondents’ Response, served on the applicant and filed with the Tribunal well in advance of the summary hearing.

11Further, while the applicant also relies upon Rule 26.5(c), he has not provided any case law or Tribunal procedure with which the Decision is in conflict. His claim that this Vice-chair failed to take the Commission’s Disability Policy into consideration and “missed the point that [f]orcing a [p]erson with a disability into arrears is not treating that person with dignity”, is essentially a repetition of the arguments that he made orally before the Tribunal. A request for reconsideration is not an opportunity to restate or re-argue a position already advanced and considered. I am not convinced that any findings made in the Decision are in conflict with established jurisprudence.

12In sum, I find that the applicant has not established the existence of any of the criteria in Rule 26 that would lead to reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Decision. The Request is denied.