Theverajah v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness Toronto, 2012 HRTO 1772

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

A.T. Maheen Theverajah

Applicant

-and-

International Society for Krishna Consciousness Toronto, Keshava Dass, Maharaj Bhakti and Subuddhai Dassi

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: September 19, 2012

Citation: 2012 HRTO 1772

Indexed as: Theverajah v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness Toronto

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

A.T. Maheen Theverajah, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to the provision of goods and services because of creed.

2In a Case Assessment Direction (CAD) dated September 21, 2011 the Tribunal of its own motion directed a summary hearing to determine whether the Application should be dismissed on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success.

3A summary hearing was held in this case by telephone conference call. In addition to entertaining the parties’ submissions on whether or not the Application should be dismissed because it had no reasonable prospect of success, at the request of both parties efforts were made to resolve this dispute without the need for a decision from the Tribunal. The parties were unable to resolve their disputes and the applicant was afforded a further opportunity to make written submissions on the no reasonable prospect of success issues.

4Rules 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure read as follows:

19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.

19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.

5Details about the nature of a summary hearing were set out as follows in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, at paras. 8 and 9:

In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.

In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.

6The Tribunal does not have the general power to deal with allegations of unfairness. It can only deal with alleged discrimination or harassment on the grounds set out in the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). To succeed in an Application, an applicant must be able to prove, on a balance of probabilities, a link between a respondent’s alleged actions and a Code ground.

7The allegations in this Application relate primarily to a dispute between the applicant and a senior member of the corporate respondent, a congregation of members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness. The applicant alleges that he became involved in a verbal altercation with the individual in question and was told to leave the temple. The applicant believes that by this action he was in effect banned from the temple for all purposes. The applicant was and had been a member of the congregation for some time.

8The respondents acknowledge that there was a verbal altercation between the applicant and the individual in question but deny that the applicant was banned from the temple. The respondents state that on occasion they do ban individuals but that requires an extensive process culminating in a written communication with the person subject to the ban. None of that happened in this case. The respondent states, on the contrary, it made efforts to communicate with the applicant to discuss the incident described above and resolve it.

9Underlying the verbal altercation was an ongoing issue with respect to the role of volunteerism in temple life. The applicant is of the view that all of the work of maintaining the temple should be conducted by volunteers. The leaders of this Temple while acknowledging that volunteerism is central to their creed do not agree that paid work is necessarily forbidden. It was this doctrinal dispute that formed the backdrop to the verbal altercation described above. The applicant also alleges that other members of the community did not share his doctrinal view and treated him differently as a consequence. He does not specify how he was treated differently.

10The applicant also alleges that because he was of the view that paid work in the temple was contrary to a proper interpretation of his creed, the volunteer labour he provided was targeted. The respondent says that this was not the case. It agreed that some of the work the applicant had performed was contracted to others, but only because the applicant was unable to perform all of it from time to time. In general the respondents state that while volunteerism is central to their creed, the fact is that not all of the work can be done by volunteers.

11I find that this application must be dismissed because there is no reasonable prospect that the applicant will be able to establish that what he experienced in the incident described above was discrimination on the basis of creed.

12Although there is no dispute that there was a verbal altercation between the applicant and the temple official on the day in question, there is no evidence to support the applicant’s mistaken belief that he was being banned from the temple because of a doctrinal dispute about the role of volunteerism. The applicant could not point to any evidence he had to rebut the assertions of the respondent that he was not subject to a ban and indeed acknowledged that the respondents had attempted to reach out to him to discuss the incident. Without that what the applicant is left with is evidence of a verbal altercation with the individual in question which without anything else is not discrimination under the Code.

13Similarly the applicant could point to no evidence that would support his assertion that his volunteer work was treated differently because of the doctrinal dispute. As indicated above the respondent acknowledged that some of the work the applicant performed was contracted out to persons who were paid to perform some of these tasks from time to time. The applicant was upset by this but can point to no evidence that the work he did was specifically targeted.

14The applicant’s central conceptual contention that the respondents were not entitled to manage the temple in ways that he disagreed with (up to and including banning him from the temple because of different views on a point of doctrine) is problematic. Religious communities although in some sense open to the public, provide a service to a community of like-minded individuals. When an individual’s views diverge from the communities, I do not think that a doctrinal dispute or a request to leave the community based on such a dispute amounts to discrimination in the provision of services on the basis of creed.

15For all of these reasons I find that this Application must be dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success.