Cira v. Ontario Racing Commission, 2012 HRTO 1528

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Frank Cira

Applicant

-and-

Ontario Racing Commission, Gunner Lindberg, Richard Grubb, Ben Newton and Steve Koch

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Mary Truemner

Date: August 3, 2012

Citation: 2012 HRTO 1528

Indexed as: Cira v. Ontario Racing Commission

APPEARANCES

Frank Cira, Applicant

No one appearing

Ontario Racing Commission, Gunner Lindberg, Richard Grubb and Ben Newton, Respondents

Peigi Ross, Counsel

Steve Koch, Respondent

William Ford, Counsel

Introduction

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of disability. By Case Assessment Direction dated January 11, 2012, the Tribunal directed, on its own initiative, that this Application be set down for a summary hearing by teleconference on the issue of whether it has a reasonable prospect of success.

2A Notice was issued on March 6, 2012, indicating that the parties were to participate in a summary hearing by way of teleconference on May 8, 2012. It was sent to the applicant’s address as indicated on his Application. On May 8, 2012, however, only the respondents appeared on the summary hearing conference call. I was the adjudicator. Upon noticing that the applicant had written to the Tribunal mentioning what appeared to be a new address subsequent to the Notice being issued, I decided that the Tribunal should re-schedule a summary hearing and send another Notice to the new address provided by the applicant. In a Case Assessment Direction dated May 14, 2012, (“my CAD”), I confirmed the rescheduling of the summary hearing by way of teleconference. I also noted that the applicant was not clear about his exact address, and directed the applicant to comply with the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and confirm his address.

3On May 14, 2012, the Tribunal issued my CAD and a Notice of Rescheduled Summary Hearing, setting the date for July 31, 2012. The Notice advised the parties of steps the Tribunal might take if they fail to attend the summary hearing. One of the consequences listed for the applicant failing to attend is the dismissal of the Application as abandoned.

4On June 18, 2012, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal. Although he failed to comply with my direction and confirm what his address is exactly, he stated that he would be present at the summary hearing on July 31, 2012.

5On July 31, 2012, the summary hearing commenced at 1:30 p.m. as scheduled. The respondents were on the line, but the applicant was not. I advised the respondents that we would wait until 2:00 p.m. to see if the applicant would join the line. I then inquired with Tribunal staff as to whether the applicant had appeared in person at the Tribunal’s hearing centre, or if he had contacted anyone about any difficulty accessing the conference call. Tribunal staff confirmed that there had been no attempt by the applicant to contact the Tribunal or at attend at its offices.

6At 2:00 p.m., the applicant was still absent from the call.

7The respondents made submissions that I should either dismiss the Application as abandoned, given that the applicant had written to say that he was aware that the summary hearing had been scheduled for July 31, 2012, or proceed in the applicant’s absence. I dismissed the Application as abandoned, and indicated that my reasons would follow.

REASONS

8In Ouwroulis v. New Locomotion, 2009 HRTO 335, at paragraphs 4 – 7, the Tribunal stated as follows:

Human rights applications are serious matters. The Code, which has been described as quasi-constitutional legislation, enumerates our most fundamental rights and responsibilities. The enforcement procedures in the Code provide the opportunity for individuals who believe their human rights have been infringed, to file applications directly with the Tribunal, and have the merits of those claims determined in a timely way. Where the Tribunal finds that an applicant’s rights have been violated, the Tribunal has broad remedial powers, and may award monetary compensation and make orders to ensure future compliance with the Code.

When an individual files a human rights application, they are commencing a legal proceeding that requires a respondent to take immediate steps. The respondent must inform itself about the subject matter of the claim and, except in limited circumstances, file a complete response. This may involve the expenditure of significant resources.

Likewise, the filing of a human rights application engages public resources. The Tribunal expects to receive thousands of applications each year from individuals who believe their human rights have been violated. The Tribunal has a responsibility to ensure that public resources are used effectively to meet the demands of all applicants who file applications. Most important, because of the quasi-constitutional nature of human rights, and in furtherance of its statutory mandate, the Tribunal has an obligation to treat each application seriously, and ensure that it is dealt with fairly and expeditiously.

The opportunity for an individual to make a claim of discrimination to a publicly funded adjudicative body, which has extensive procedural and remedial powers, comes with the obligation to respect the seriousness and significance of the process, and comply with the Tribunal’s Rules.

9In Szabo v. York University, 2012 HRTO 659, the Tribunal referred to the above quotation and stated the following:

The Tribunal has a duty to dispose of applications fairly, justly and expeditiously: see section 40 of the Code and Rule 1.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. This duty is not only in relation to applicants, but also in relation to respondents, who may expend significant resources responding to human rights Applications, and the public, whose tax dollars fund the Tribunal. The Tribunal has commented on the responsibilities of parties appearing before it.

10In this case, the respondents have twice now attended summary hearings at which the applicant did not attend. The applicant never explained why he did not attend the first hearing, nor did he confirm whether he received the original Notice of the first summary hearing. It is clear to me, however, that he received the Notice of Rescheduled Hearing or he would not have known that the date for it was July 31, 2012. It is therefore appropriate that the Tribunal, to be fair, just and expeditious, dismiss the Application as abandoned.