Sprager v. Chill Chain Logistics, 2012 HRTO 1519

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Leah Sprager

Applicant

-and-

Chill Chain Logistics (a Division of Willard Meats)

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Naomi Overend

Date: August 2, 2012

Citation: 2012 HRTO 1519

Indexed as: Sprager v. Chill Chain Logistics

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Leah Sprager, Applicant

Frank E. Van Dyke, Counsel

Introduction

1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, on April 27, 2012, alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability and sex. The applicant indicated in her Application that the last incident of alleged discrimination took place on April 17, 2011, although her counsel states that the incident occurred on April 18, 2011.

2A Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) was issued on June 11, 2012, indicating that the Application appears to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because it was filed more than one year after the last incident of alleged discrimination.

DELAY

3Section 34 states, in part:

(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

4As stated by the Tribunal in Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241, “the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they may seek to pursue a human rights claim.” When filing outside this one year time limit, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the Tribunal with an explanation as to why he did not pursue his rights under the Code in a timely manner.

5The applicant’s Application is dated April 2, 2012, and appears to be hand-written by the applicant herself. In his submissions in response to the NOID, the applicant’s counsel advised that the delay in submitting the Application was occasioned by the applicant being required to attend to her mother who was having hip replacement surgery in another city. The cover letter with the Application, prepared by her lawyer, is dated April 23, 2012, although because it was sent by mail, was not received by the Tribunal until April 27, 2012.

6In the circumstances, I am not satisfied it is plain and obvious that the delay in filing the Application outside the one-year limitation period was not incurred in good faith. Accordingly, the Tribunal will continue to deal with the Application.

7This is not a final decision regarding the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in respect of this Application.

8I am not seized of this matter.