Runnalls v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2012 HRTO 1349

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Nelson Runnalls

Applicant

-and-

Attorney General of Ontario

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Ena Chadha

Date: July 6, 2012

Citation: 2012 HRTO 1349

Indexed as: Runnalls v. Ontario (Attorney General)

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Nelson Runnalls, Applicant

Self-represented

1The applicant filed an Application under section 34 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended, (the “Code”) on February 12, 2012, alleging disability discrimination in the areas of goods, services and facilities and contracts.

2The applicant alleges that he was discriminatorily denied disclosure of his fresh and complete transcript of his February 2001 trial. In response to Questions 6 and 7 of the Application, the applicant alleged that the discrimination occurred in Gore Bay, Ontario and that discrimination “continues”. In his narrative, the applicant alleges that the discrimination is “an outrageous chain of events” since his trial in February 2001 when he was allegedly wrongfully convicted. Along with his Application, the applicant filed copies of various correspondence from court authorities and government officials to the applicant and excerpts of a trial transcript.

3On May 15, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“Notice”) stating that, pursuant to section 34(1) of the Code, the Application may be outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination. The Notice directed the applicant to provide written submissions responding to the issue of delay.

4On June 13, 2012, the applicant filed submissions opposing dismissal and provided copies of numerous legal documents.

DECISION

5I am of the view that this Application should be dismissed on the basis of delay as the Application does not meet the requirements of section 34(1).

6The applicant’s allegations relate to seeking a transcript of his criminal trial that took place in Gore Bay on February 12, 2001. The applicant’s allegations against the respondent Attorney General pertain to various requests that he has made over the years since the trial demanding that court authorities provide him with a fresh and complete copy of the transcript. The applicant indicated in response to question 7 of the Application that the discrimination “continues”, presumably because he has not received a copy of the transcript that he believes is accurate and complete reflection of the trial. This Application was filed in February 2012, almost 11 years after the trial.

7Section 34 of the Code provides:

(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

8The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. See, for example, Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241. The mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the Code’s objective that human rights claims should be dealt with fairly and expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they seek to pursue a human rights claim.

9The Tribunal’s jurisprudence establishes that the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that the delay in filing the Application was in good faith. In determining the issue of good faith, factors for consideration include whether Code-related reasons (such as a disability) directly impeded the applicant’s ability to file an application; the nature of the allegations; and whether the applicant was able to raise allegations in other venues during the period in question: Quimado v. S.A. Armstrong Ltd., 2009 HRTO 110 and Doyle v. Canarm, 2009 HRTO 674.

10As stated in Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241, in order for an applicant to establish that a delay in filing an application was incurred in good faith, the applicant must show something more than simply an absence of bad faith; otherwise, there would be little meaning to the statutory limitation period.

11The applicant states that the delay should not bar this Application from proceeding because he was subjected to a conspiracy of mistreatment by the judicial system. The applicant indicates that he has attempted to raise his concerns with various officials and agencies; however, he has not received adequate redress. The applicant also appears to claim that his mental health has “stripped his abilities”.

12It appears the alleged refusal to provide a copy of the trial transcript occurred several years prior to the filing of this Application. Based on the documentary materials, it appears that the applicant’s former lawyer attended at the Gore Bay courthouse in April 2004 to compare the trial transcript with the tape recordings and at that time indicated that there were no discrepancies. The applicant disputed this point and subsequently requested a second copy of the transcript in 2005. At that time, the applicant was informed that his lawyer could make further arrangements to compare the tapes and transcripts. At some point it appears that the applicant was provided with a copy of a transcript, which the applicant disputes as incomplete and inaccurate. The applicant nevertheless maintains that he was entitled to receive another fresh and complete copy of the transcript. He has repeated the same request to court authorities and the Minister of the Attorney General since 2005, repeatedly in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

13There is no doubt based on the applicant’s materials that the applicant lives with a mental health disability. The documentary materials do not establish that the applicant’s mental health precluded him from pursuing his human rights concerns. In fact the applicant’s submissions and materials indicate that, notwithstanding any mental health challenges, the applicant actively advanced his rights and sought out avenues of recourse over the past several years. Further, the fact that a person is pursuing other forms of redress or waiting for other legal proceedings to conclude before pursuing one’s rights under the Code will generally not constitute a valid explanation for delay in filing an Application. See Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 1670.

14The applicant claims that he continues to suffer extreme hardship because of the alleged discriminatory acts that took place in his trial and afterwards. The fact that the alleged discrimination has continuing effects does not extend the time limit for filing an application under the Code. See Mafinezam v. University of Toronto, 2010 HRTO 1495.

15I do not accept the applicant’s suggestion that the discrimination continues up to 2012 because he continues to experience the effects of the trial and has not received a copy of the transcript that satisfies his demands. As previously noted, any alleged continuing effect flowing from the earlier events does not extend the Code’s section 34(1) timeline: see Mafinezam v. University of Toronto, supra. Moreover, to allow an applicant to revive an out of time claim by simply restating old concerns or demands would undermine the purpose of section 34 of the Code. See Seetharam v. Iogen, 2010 HRTO 1811.

16Based on the information before the Tribunal, the applicant has not demonstrated why he could not meet the requisite Code deadline and that the delay in filing this Application was incurred in good faith as per s. 34(2) of the Code. While the applicant may well have experienced personal hardships and is living with a mental health condition, he has not established that he could not have pursued his rights within the timeline mandated by the Code. The documentary materials indicate that the applicant was previously instructing his legal representatives and later actively advocated for himself in various forums in seeking to pursue his rights.

17In sum, I am not persuaded that the delay in bringing this Application satisfies the good faith criteria of section 34(1). It is not necessary for me to consider whether substantial prejudice would result from the delay. I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to process the Application because it was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination and the delay was not incurred in good faith.

18Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.