HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Ginette Chaumont

Applicant

-and-

The Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of Ottawa

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: July 4, 2012

Citation: 2012 HRTO 1321

Indexed as: Chaumont v. Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of Ottawa

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Ginette Chaumont, Applicant

Stephen Shaddock, Counsel

The Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of Ottawa, Respondent

Sebastian Huard, Counsel

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of age, sex and disability. This Interim Decision deals with a Request for Order During Proceeding (“Request”) filed by the respondents seeking the removal of two individual respondents. The applicant consents to the Request.

2Rule 1.7(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules provides that the Tribunal may add or remove a party. In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 14, at para. 42, the Tribunal set out the general principles that apply to this issue:

The unnecessary naming of personal respondents is a practice to be discouraged, as this serves to unnecessarily add to the complexity of proceedings and can often operate as a roadblock to resolution. Pursuant to section 45(1) of the Code, a corporation is deemed to be liable for “any act or thing done or omitted to be done in the course of his or her employment by an officer, official, employee or agent”. Where there is no issue as to the ability of a corporate respondent to respond to or remedy an alleged Code infringement and no issue raised as to a corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the actions of an individual who is sought to be added as a personal respondent, then in my view the individual ought not be added as a personal respondent in the absence of some compelling juridical reason. A compelling juridical reason may exist, for example, where it is the individual conduct of a proposed personal respondent that is a central issue as opposed to actions which are more in the nature of following organizational practices or policies or where the nature of the alleged conduct of a proposed personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found.

The Tribunal further expanded on these principles in Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31, at para. 5:

Applying these principles to the Tribunal’s power to remove a personal respondent from a proceeding, the following non-exhaustive list of factors may be helpful in assessing whether a personal respondent should be removed:

1. Is there is a corporate respondent in the proceeding that also is alleged to be liable for the same conduct?

2. Is there any issue raised as to the corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the conduct of the personal respondent who sought to be removed?

3. Is there is any issue as to the ability of the corporate respondent to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringement?

4. Does any compelling reason exist to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found?

5. Would any prejudice be caused to any party as a result of removing the personal respondent?

In considering whether any compelling reason exists to continue the proceeding against a personal respondent, one way of approaching this question is to ask whether it is necessary to involve this person as a party in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the complaint.

3The respondents submit that the two proposed respondents should be removed based on the following factors:

a. There is a corporate respondent which is alleged to have discriminated against the Applicant on the basis of the same allegations.

b. The corporate respondent accepts liability for any of the alleged actions of the two individuals. At all material times the two individuals were (and remain) the Vicar General and the Archbishop of the corporate respondent, respectively. All of the their decisions and actions of Msgr. Kevin Beach and Most Reverend Terrence Prendergast with respect to the applicant, if any, were done in their capacity as employees of the corporate respondent.

c. There is no question with respect to the corporate respondent's ability to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringements.

d. There is no compelling reason to continue the proceeding as against the two individuals and the applicant will suffer no prejudice by their removal from the Application.

4As indicated previously the applicant has consented to the Request.

5Having regard to the factors set out above, and the applicant’s consent, I am satisfied that it is not necessary to the fair, just and expeditious adjudication of this Application to continue the Application against the two individuals.

6The respondent’s Request is granted and the style of cause amended accordingly.

7I am not seized of this case.