Harold Woodbeck v. The Corporation of the City of Thunder Bay, 2011 HRTO 96

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Harold Woodbeck

Applicant

-and-

The Corporation of the City of Thunder Bay

Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

Harold Woodbeck

Applicant

-and-

Canadian Union of Public Employees and its Local 87

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Brian Cook

Date: January 12, 2011

Citation: 2011 HRTO 96

Indexed as: Woodbeck v. Thunder Bay (City)

APPEARANCES

Harold Woodbeck, Applicant Self-represented

The Corporation of the City of Thunder Bay,

Respondent Mandy Fricot, Counsel

Canadian Union of Public Employees Gavin Leeb, Counsel

and its Local 87, Respondent

1This Interim Decision addresses matters discussed in a telephone conference call hearing held on January 10, 2011.

2The applicant has filed two Applications. The first, in file 2009-02547-I named the City of Thunder Bay (the “City”) and two personal respondents. The second, in file number 2009-02549-I, named Canadian Union of Public Employees and its Local 87 (the “Union”).

PERSONAL RESPONDENTS

3The respondents in the Application against the City ask that the personal respondents be removed as parties. The applicant consented to this and the style of cause has been amended accordingly.

TIMELINESS OF THE APPLICATION AGAINST THE CITY

4Sections 34(1) and (2) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended, (the “Code”) provide as follows:

34.(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

5The Application against the City was filed on June 5, 2009. According to the Application, the date of the last discriminatory event was on or about December 10, 2007. The Application was accordingly not filed within one year as required by section 34(1). Under section 34(2), the applicant may nevertheless be allowed to bring the Application if the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

6The issue of the timeliness of the Application against the City was identified during my review of the case materials in preparation for the telephone conference call. The parties were therefore not prepared to deal with the issue during the telephone conference call. As discussed during the telephone conference call, the parties may therefore make written submissions on this issue. The applicant shall send his submissions and any supporting documents to the Tribunal by February 4, 2011. The applicant must explain how the delay was incurred and why it was incurred in good faith. He must also demonstrate that the delay resulted in no substantial prejudice to the respondents. If the applicant does not file submissions by February 4, 2011, the delay issue may be decided on the basis of the materials in the file. The respondents shall provide their response within two weeks of their receipt of the applicant’s submissions. If the respondents do not file submissions within that time, the delay issue will similarly be decided on the basis of the materials in the file.

7During the telephone conference call, a number of procedural matters were discussed, including a request for disclosure of the applicant’s medical records, WSIB file and medical records filed with the Manulife Insurance Company; a request that the applicant provide particulars (details) about his allegations; and a request by the applicant for access to the minutes of the joint occupational health and safety committee. In addition, the respondents propose that the hearing be bifurcated (divided) and that the first part of the hearing would concern only the issue of whether the applicant has a disability within the meaning of the Code.

8Under the circumstances, I find that it is appropriate to deal first with the timeliness issue and to wait until that issue has been determined before making any orders respecting these other issues.

9I am seized of these Applications.