HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Hana Abdul
Applicant
-and-
Inside Out Toronto
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Ena Chadha
Indexed as: Abdul v. Inside Out Toronto
1This Decision deals with an Application filed on March 14, 2011 under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended, (the “Code”) alleging discrimination in the area of services, goods and facilities on the basis of race and place of origin.
2The Application narrative indicates that in January 2009 the applicant was involved in a mentorship program; however, she was never informed of the dates, times and location of the workshops. The applicant alleges that, in December 2009, she made inquiries about the program and learned that it was finished. The applicant believes that she was treated this way because of “[t]he entire thing was racialized”.
3On April 13, 2011, the Tribunal sent out a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“Notice”) on the grounds that the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of alleged discrimination.
4On April 15, 2011, the applicant filed submissions in response to the Notice. Although the Application indicates that the date of the last event was in 2009, in her submissions the applicant alleges the last incident took place on April 14, 2011 when she attempted to make inquiries with the Executive Director of the respondent organization about the mentorship workshops.
5Section 34(1) of the Code provides that a person may file an application alleging that his or her rights under the Code have been infringed within one year of the incident (or last incident) of alleged discrimination. Section 34(2) provides that persons may apply to the Tribunal more than one year after the incident(s) in certain circumstances. Section 34 states:
34 (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
6The threshold question in applying section 34 to the circumstances is what constitutes the “incident” to which the Application relates. Although the applicant noted, in response to Question 7 of the Application, that the date of the last discriminatory incident was 2009, she now claims that the events have continued into 2011. The 2011 timeframe refers to the applicant’s attempts to communicate with the Executive Director of the respondent organization. Specifically, the 2011 discriminatory behaviour the applicant complains about is the Executive Director’s lack of knowledge of the mentorship program that the applicant was allegedly involved in 2009.
7I do not accept the applicant’s contention that the alleged discrimination she experienced in 2009 reoccurred in 2011 as the latest incident of discrimination simply because of her communications with the Executive Director. The acts which the applicant perceives to be discriminatory at the heart of her Application took place in 2009. This is acknowledged in her Application, where explains that the reason for the delay in filing her Application was because she was conducting her own research on the matter. As such, I find that the last incident of alleged discrimination cited in the Application took place in 2009.
8On review of the material before me, I am satisfied that this Application may not proceed. The applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for the delay that leads to the conclusion that it was incurred in good faith.
9The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. See, for example, Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241. The mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the Code’s objective that human rights claims should be dealt with fairly and expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they seek to pursue a human rights claim.
10I reject the applicant’s contention that the alleged discrimination she experienced in 2009 continued until, or reoccurred in, 2011 simply because she attempted to re-communicate her concerns at that time. To allow an applicant to revive an out of time claim by simply restating old concerns would undermine the purpose of section 34 of the Code. See Seetharam v. Iogen, 2010 HRTO 1811. Moreover, any alleged continuing effect flowing from the 2009 events do not extend the Code’s section 34(1) timeline. See Mafinezam v. University of Toronto, 2010 HRTO 1495.
11In sum, I am not persuaded that the delay in bringing this Application was incurred in good faith. It is not necessary for me to consider whether substantial prejudice would result from the delay. I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to process the Application because it was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in the Application and the delay was not incurred in good faith.
12The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto this 27th day of April, 2011.
“Signed by”
Ena Chadha
Vice-chair

