HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Leslie Hatvani
Applicant
-and-
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as Represented by the Ministry of Community and Social Services
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Judith Keene
Indexed as: Hatvani v. Ontario (Community and Social Services)
Appearances
Leslie Hatvani, Applicant ) Self-represented
Ministry of Community and Social Services, ) Sharlene Ziniuk, Respondent ) Counsel
1This is a Decision in respect of an Application filed on August 11, 2010, under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), which alleges that the respondent (through the Family Responsibility Office), discriminated against the applicant with respect to services on the basis of sex, contrary to s. 1 of the Code.
2In his Application, the applicant appeared to be claiming that the respondent takes a stricter approach to support payments he must make to his former spouse as compared to support payments his former spouse must make to him. He made assertions in the Application without explaining how the respondent’s actions constitute discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of the Code, other than stating the fact that he is a man and his former spouse is a woman. It also appeared that portions of the Application might relate to matters that have already been determined by a judge and actions the respondent took because of court orders.
3On October 25, 2010, the Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) directing that a summary hearing be held by teleconference pursuant to Rule 19A of its Rules of Procedure. The Application was delivered to the respondent with the CAD, which directed that the respondent need not file a substantive Response. The CAD provided that either party could file any cases or documents they intended to rely upon at the Summary Hearing no later than 14 days prior to the teleconference.
4The respondent filed with the Tribunal several documents, including seven copies of Orders of the Ontario Court of Justice, and copied these to the applicant. The summary hearing was held on March 25, 2011.
SUMMARY HEARING
5The applicant’s dealings with the Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”) arise because of an Order of the Ontario Court of Justice in May, 2007, to the effect that that the applicant and his wife were each to have custody of a child, with child support orders made against each parent based on the child support guidelines and the spouse’s income. In the first Order, the applicant's income is designated “imputed”. Both the applicant's imputed income and his support order are higher amounts than those noted for his wife.
6Three further Orders dated respectively in October, 2007, and in May and September, 2008, deal with arrears, vary support orders, and set out obligations on the applicant to file evidence of income. An Order dated in November, 2008 fixes the applicant’s child support at a higher amount than previously ordered, based on the child-support guidelines and an annual income that is no longer designated “imputed”. This Order also terminates the applicant's wife's support obligation.
7An Order dated in August, 2009 fixes the applicant’s child-support at a lower figure than the previous Orders. Finally, an Order dated in January, 2010, indicates that there are no arrears owing by the applicant's wife, that the applicant must pay costs fixed at $1500 “which amount shall be payable as additional child-support”, and an order that “[U]nless support order is withdrawn from the director of the family responsibility office, it shall be enforced by the Director”.
8The applicant made several allegations to the effect that the Orders were based on incorrect facts, and that counsel for the FRO “perjured” herself during proceedings before the court. These allegations, involving as they do the evidence given in court proceedings and decisions of the Ontario Court of Justice, are not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Applicable principles include the principles of judicial immunity, as discussed in Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered, 2009 HRTO 2180, and witness immunity. See discussion in Samuel Manu-Tech. Inc. v. Redipac Recycling Corp., 1999 CanLII 3776 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. 3242 (C.A.).
9There is also considerable appellate jurisprudence concerning abuse of process arising from attempts to relitigate a matter that has been decided by a competent court or tribunal. The applicant might have brought such allegations in further court proceedings, but as of the date of the hearing he had not appealed any of the Orders. The Supreme Court of Canada in Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 issued a strong warning against relitigation “unless the circumstances dictate that relitigation is in fact necessary to enhance the credibility and the effectiveness of the adjudicative process as a whole”.
10The only remaining allegation made by the applicant is that the FRO enforced arrears orders against him less frequently than it enforced arrears orders against his wife. However, he could point to no evidence, other than the fact that he is a man and his wife is a woman, that would link the respondent’s actions to his sex. As noted in Mangal v. Molson Toronto Brewery, 2011 HRTO 575, in a claim of discrimination that is not made under s. 11 of the Code, the applicant must establish that he was treated differently from others because of a personal characteristic protected by the Code.
11Counsel for the FRO indicated that arrears orders were enforced against the applicant’s wife on two occasions during the sixteen-month period during which the applicant’s wife had support obligations, and that arrears were enforced against the applicant on six occasions. The applicant disputed neither of these statements. Counsel for the FRO also suggested that assessing arrears in the applicant’s case was complicated by the fact that, although the applicant’s child-support obligation throughout this period was always higher than that of his wife, the Orders of the Court did not allow for offsetting the amounts owed. Thus, at any one point during most of the period, the applicant’s wife might have paid less than she was ordered to pay, but might at that point be owed an amount by the applicant that exceeded the amount she owed him. Although he took issue with the original Orders that were the source of his debt, the applicant did not deny this.
12As in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, this leaves the Tribunal with only a bald allegation of discrimination with nothing to suggest that the actions of the respondent were connected with ground of sex.
13In the circumstances of this case, I find that the Application has no reasonable prospect of success. The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 27th day of April, 2011
”signed by”______________
Judith Keene
Vice-chair