HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Maria Primeiro Applicant
-and-
City of Ottawa and Marie Fénelon Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Mary Truemner Date: March 29, 2011 Citation: 2011 HRTO 561 Indexed as: Primeiro v. Ottawa (City)
APPEARANCES
Maria Primeiro, Applicant ) Self-represented City of Ottawa, Respondent ) Meg Steele, Counsel
1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging that the respondents discriminated against the applicant with respect to employment on the basis of age contrary to sections 5 and 8 of the Code. The applicant’s allegations largely pertain to perceived mistreatment by the personal respondent who worked with her at a centre operated by the City of Ottawa. The applicant alleges that she was a victim of “psychological harassment”.
2In a Case Assessment Direction dated October 7, 2010 (the “CAD”), the Tribunal directed that there be a Summary Hearing because it appeared that the Application failed to identify any links between the applicant’s age and the alleged discriminatory treatment or harassment. The CAD explained that the Tribunal does not have the power to deal with all claims of unfairness or all disputes between parties, and it directed the applicant to explain how she would be able to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that she was subjected to discrimination or harassment based on age or any other prohibited ground in the Code.
3The Summary Hearing was held by teleconference on March 4, 2011, and the Tribunal explained that the purpose of the Summary Hearing was to determine if there was no reasonable prospect that the Application can succeed. All the parties except Ms. Fénelon participated on the call.
4The applicant made her submissions first. She explained that she had no proof that the alleged mistreatment by the personal respondent was linked to her age or any other prohibited ground in the Code. She said that she was 33 years old, and the personal respondent was probably over 40 years old, but she does not know why the personal respondent was mistreating her.
5In an attachment to her Application that appears to be a letter to her employer dated June 28, 2010, the applicant wonders if the harassment is because of her race, her colour, her “état civil”, her age, her language, her ethnic origin or her social condition. However, at the Summary Hearing, she confirmed that she had no evidence that the alleged mistreatment was related to a prohibited ground of discrimination. Rather, she believed it was because she was a new employee.
6The issues before me involve a legal analysis about whether the allegations, if true, might reasonably be considered to amount to a violation of the Code, and whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove the violation by linking the events she describes with the alleged grounds of discrimination, on a balance of probabilities, using evidence she has or evidence that is reasonably available to her.
7As stated in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, at paragraphs 8 and 9:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
8In her Application and in her oral submissions, the applicant provided no examples of the personal respondent referring to any of her personal characteristics, which might link the alleged mistreatment to a prohibited ground in the Code. Instead, the Application describes the personal respondent as being generally unfriendly, making allegedly unfair accusations about the applicant’s work performance, and accusing the applicant of trying to steal her job.
9While the applicant believes that she is several years younger than the personal respondent, she has not provided any evidence that her age was a factor in how she was treated. Consequently, I find there is no reasonable prospect of success for the allegation of discrimination or harassment on the basis of age. Also, I find that there is no reasonable prospect of success for an allegation that another prohibited ground, including race, colour and ethnic origin, was a factor in her alleged mistreatment, given the absence of any supporting evidence.
10The Application is therefore dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 29^th^ day of March, 2011.
“Signed by”
Mary Truemner Vice-chair

